Mark Mittelstadt v. Sonny Perdue , 913 F.3d 626 ( 2019 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 17-2447
    MARK MITTELSTADT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    SONNY PERDUE, Secretary of Agriculture,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 3:15-cv-00725-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 15, 2019
    ____________________
    Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mark Mittelstadt owned a tract of
    land in Richland County, Wisconsin, that was enrolled in the
    Conservation Reserve Program (“CRP”), administered by the
    United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), from
    1987 to 2006. Participants in the CRP agree to remove environ-
    mentally sensitive land from agricultural production in return
    for annual rental payments from the USDA. In 2006, the
    agency denied Mr. Mittelstadt’s application to reenroll his
    2                                                    No. 17-2447
    land in the CRP. After exhausting his administrative appeals,
    he brought this action against the Secretary of the USDA (“the
    Secretary”). He asserted one claim under Section 702 of the
    Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 
    5 U.S.C. § 701
     et seq.,
    challenging the Secretary’s final decision denying reenroll-
    ment, and one common law claim for breach of contract.
    Mr. Mittelstadt moved for summary judgment in the district
    court, seeking an order directing reenrollment of his land in
    the CRP and awarding monetary relief for the alleged breach
    of contract. The district court denied his motion for summary
    judgment, affirmed the Secretary’s rulings, and entered judg-
    ment in favor of the Secretary on Mr. Mittelstadt’s APA and
    breach of contract claims. Mr. Mittelstadt now appeals the
    district court’s decision.
    Under the regulations governing the CRP, the USDA has
    broad discretion to evaluate offers of enrollment in the pro-
    gram on a competitive basis by considering the environmen-
    tal benefits of a producer’s land relative to its costs. Given the
    agency’s wide latitude, we conclude that the Farm Services
    Agency (“FSA”) did not abuse its discretion when it denied
    reenrollment of Mr. Mittelstadt’s land. Moreover, because he
    never entered a new contract with the agency, there was no
    breach of contract. We therefore affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    I
    A.
    In 1988, Mr. Mittelstadt purchased a tract of land in Rich-
    land County, Wisconsin (“Tract 9073”), that was subject to a
    CRP contract for the period 1987 through 1996. To comply
    with a revised conservation plan, Mr. Mittelstadt planted
    No. 17-2447                                                              3
    white pine, walnut, and red oak trees on the land in 1989. A
    CRP review later that year determined that Mr. Mittelstadt
    had completed all items in the conservation plan. Another
    CRP maintenance inspection in 1995 found no problems with
    the land. In 1996, the Commodity Credit Corporation
    (“CCC”) extended the existing CRP contract for one year, to
    run from October 1, 1996, through September 30, 1997.
    In 1997, Mr. Mittelstadt applied to reenroll his land in the
    program, stating on the application that Tract 9073 had a con-
    servation practice of CP11, or “vegetative cover—trees—al-
    ready established.”1 Relying on the information in his appli-
    cation, the FSA assigned his land an environmental benefits
    index (“EBI”) score of fifty points.2 This EBI score meant that
    the conservation practices on the land included “[p]ine estab-
    lished with less than 500 trees per acre with strips of native
    herbaceous and shrub plantings best suited for wildlife in the
    area, mixed hardwoods established, or longleaf pine.”3 The
    FSA approved the new contract (“Contract 653”), to be effec-
    tive from 1998 to 2007. A 2002 field status review of the prop-
    erty found no violations, noting, “Trees are growing and look-
    ing good.”4
    In 2006, Mr. Mittelstadt began the reenrollment process by
    paying for a spot-check inspection of Tract 9073. The inspec-
    tion found no violations, noting “62.9 CP11 Tre[es] … already
    1   R.16-5 at 2.
    2 The FSA relies on a national EBI to rank offers for enrollment in the CRP
    based on their estimated environmental benefits and costs. See R.16-1 at
    679.
    3   R.16-5 at 3.
    4   
    Id.
    4                                                           No. 17-2447
    est” and “good.”5 The Natural Resources Conservation Ser-
    vice (“NRCS”) sent Mr. Mittelstadt Contract 1710, a form CRP
    contract for the term October 1, 2007, to September 30, 2017,
    which Mr. Mittelstadt signed on July 26, 2006.6 On August 19,
    2006, Mr. Mittelstadt signed a revised version of the contract,
    amended to reflect the correct acreage of Tract 9073.
    In August 2006, the NRCS sent Mr. Mittelstadt a conserva-
    tion plan for Tract 9073. The plan “identified the conservation
    practice as CP11, a ‘mixed stand (2 species) of hardwoods best
    suited for wildlife in the area.’”7 Mr. Mittelstadt signed the
    plan on August 24, 2006, and, on September 1, 2006, the Rich-
    land County Conservation Department approved it. The
    NRCS signed off on the plan on September 5, 2006, as did the
    FSA on September 13, 2006.
    B.
    On or around September 13, 2006, Jared Reuter, the
    County Executive Director of the Richland County FSA,
    signed the amended version of Contract 1710 on behalf of the
    CCC. Reuter’s signature was later whited out,8 however, and
    Mr. Mittelstadt never received a countersigned copy of Con-
    tract 1710. On September 14 and 16, 2006, Reuter conducted
    two maintenance inspections of Mr. Mittelstadt’s land. By let-
    ter dated September 21, 2006, the FSA County Committee
    5   
    Id.
    6   The CCC never countersigned the original version of Contract 1710.
    7   R.16-5 at 3.
    8 The Secretary contends that Reuter likely whited out his signature after
    inspecting Mr. Mittelstadt’s property and discovering CRP violations on
    Tract 9073. Appellee’s Br. 8 n.2.
    No. 17-2447                                                                  5
    notified Mr. Mittelstadt that the inspections revealed CRP vi-
    olations on Tract 9073. Aerial photos taken in 2005 showed
    that three areas of the acreage had “suffered tree loss that the
    field reporter did not originally report during the re-enroll-
    ment compliance check.”9 Reuter also found that very few red
    oak trees “were present from the original planting,” and
    “[o]ne area with the most red oak present had less than 100
    planted red oak trees present.”10 The letter warned that “[v]io-
    lations of this type can result in termination of the acreage in-
    volved” and that Mr. Mittelstadt’s “re-enrollment/extension
    offer cannot be approved until this issue is settled.”11
    At a hearing on October 25, 2006, the FSA County Com-
    mittee discussed the issues raised by the inspections, and the
    next day, the committee sent Mr. Mittelstadt a letter terminat-
    ing Contract 653. The committee explained that, in 1997,
    Mr. Mittelstadt’s acreage did not have “a ‘mixed hardwood
    stand of trees (more than one species of hardwood trees)’ be-
    cause of the ‘failed population of red oak.’”12 As a result, the
    FSA had assigned incorrectly an EBI score of fifty points upon
    reenrollment of the land in the CRP. Further, to “be eligible to
    be placed in the CRP,” land must qualify under a covered cat-
    egory, such as “[a]creage enrolled in CRP during the final
    year of the CRP contract.” 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.6
    (a). Because
    Mr. Mittelstadt’s land was enrolled improperly under
    9   R.16-5 at 3.
    10   R.19 at 103 (Letter from Reuter to Mr. Mittelstadt (Sept. 21, 2006)).
    11   
    Id.
     at 103–04.
    12   R.16-5 at 4.
    6                                                  No. 17-2447
    Contract 653 in 1997, the committee also found it was not eli-
    gible for reenrollment under Contract 1710 in 2006.
    Mr. Mittelstadt appealed the County Committee’s deci-
    sion to the Wisconsin State FSA Committee. By letter dated
    August 13, 2007, the State FSA Committee upheld the County
    Committee’s decision, finding that “[t]here are no areas of the
    contract that qualify as ‘mixed hardwoods.’”13 The State Com-
    mittee concluded that “the scoring of the contract offer in 1997
    was incorrect,” and that the land was “also ineligible for
    re-enrollment through the re-enrollment and extension pro-
    cess that was conducted in 2006 because the current contract
    was not in compliance.”14
    C.
    Mr. Mittelstadt sought review from the USDA’s National
    Appeals Division, where the parties stipulated that the sole
    issue on appeal was the propriety of the eligibility determina-
    tion with respect to Contract 653 that had been made in 1997.
    The Hearing Officer upheld the State Committee’s decision,
    but, on further review, the Deputy Director reversed the de-
    cision. Because “the preponderance of the evidence show[ed]
    that the placement of trees on Appellant’s land satisfied the
    ‘mixed hardwoods established’ requirement for a CP11 prac-
    tice and warranted the assigned EBI score of fifty points,” the
    Deputy Director ordered the FSA to reinstate Contract 653.15
    However, the Deputy Director found no error with respect to
    the FSA’s denial of reenrollment under Contract 1710. Given
    13   R.19 at 38.
    14   
    Id.
    15   R.16-5 at 7.
    No. 17-2447                                                  7
    that Mr. Mittelstadt’s land “may not meet new standards such
    as a new definition of mixed hardwood stand or FSA other-
    wise may have a legitimate reason for not extending re-enroll-
    ment,” the decision “was supported by applicable regulations
    and substantial evidence in the record.”16
    Mr. Mittelstadt sought reconsideration of the Deputy Di-
    rector’s decision, which the FSA Director denied. The Director
    explained that “agency regulations at 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.31
    (a)
    provide that acceptance or rejection of any offer of land by an
    owner for CRP participation shall be in the sole discretion of
    the CCC and offers may be rejected for any reason as deter-
    mined to accomplish the goals of the program.”17 According
    to the Director, “[w]hile not cited in the determination, this
    regulation was the basis” for the Deputy Director’s decision.18
    Thus, “[o]nce FSA concluded that the property no longer had
    as high an EBI score as it once did, FSA could use that score
    to decide that funding a continuation of enrollment of the
    property was not as high a priority as funding other CRP con-
    tracts.”19
    D.
    Having exhausted his administrative appeals, Mr. Mittel-
    stadt filed a complaint in the district court. He asserted a
    claim under the APA, contending that the decision denying
    16   
    Id.
    17   R.16-6 at 1.
    18   
    Id.
    19   
    Id.
    8                                                             No. 17-2447
    his application for reenrollment under Contract 1710 was ar-
    bitrary, capricious, and unlawful. In the alternative, he set out
    a common law claim, asserting that the agency breached its
    obligations under Contract 1710. He later moved for sum-
    mary judgment on both counts of the complaint.
    The district court denied Mr. Mittelstadt’s motion for
    summary judgment and affirmed the agency’s final decision.
    First, the district court rejected Mr. Mittelstadt’s contention
    that the Deputy Director of the National Appeals Division
    had abused his discretion by upholding the denial of reenroll-
    ment under Contract 1710 despite the parties’ stipulation that
    the sole issue on appeal was the propriety of the 1997 eligibil-
    ity determination. Second, the district court rejected Mr. Mit-
    telstadt’s assertion that the USDA had abused its discretion
    by denying reenrollment of his land in 2007 based on a con-
    servation standard adopted in 2006. Third, the district court
    dismissed Mr. Mittelstadt’s common law claim for breach of
    contract, determining that no contract existed to support that
    claim. The district court then entered judgment in favor of the
    Secretary on Mr. Mittelstadt’s APA and breach of contract
    claims. Mr. Mittelstadt timely sought review of the district
    court’s decision.20
    20  The district court had jurisdiction over this case under the judicial re-
    view provision of the APA, which waives sovereign immunity for actions
    “seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an
    agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official
    capacity or under color of legal authority.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 702
    . For purposes of
    § 702, the Supreme Court has held that the mere “fact that a judicial rem-
    edy may require one party to pay money to another is not a sufficient rea-
    son to characterize the relief as ‘money damages.’” Bowen v. Massachusetts,
    
    487 U.S. 879
    , 893 (1988). Instead, the critical question is whether the plain-
    tiff seeks substitute or specific relief. Whereas “[d]amages are given to the
    No. 17-2447                                                                 9
    II
    DISCUSSION
    We review the district court’s decision on summary judg-
    ment de novo. Stable Invs. P’ship v. Vilsack, 
    775 F.3d 910
    , 915
    (7th Cir. 2015). In “an action for review of final action taken
    by a federal administrative agency, the ultimate question is
    whether that action is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
    cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.’” 
    Id.
     (ci-
    tation omitted) (quoting 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)). To “answer[] that
    question, we rely on the same administrative record that was
    plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss,” specific remedies “attempt to
    give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was entitled.” 
    Id. at 895
     (quot-
    ing Maryland Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
    763 F.2d 1441
    , 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) (emphasis in original). Here, Mr. Mittel-
    stadt’s request for an order directing the Secretary “to pay all amounts due
    and owing under Contract 1710,” R.3 ¶ 152, was not a request for “money
    damages” because Mr. Mittelstadt sought payments “not as compensation
    for [the Secretary’s] failure to perform some other obligation,” but as “the
    very thing to which he was entitled” under the CRP. Columbus Reg’l Hosp.
    v. FEMA, 
    708 F.3d 893
    , 896 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bowen, 
    487 U.S. at 895
    ).
    Mr. Mittelstadt’s APA claim challenging the Secretary’s decision denying
    reenrollment seeks “relief other than money damages,” and is “therefore
    within the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702.” Maryland Dep’t
    of Human Res. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
    763 F.2d 1441
    , 1448 (D.C.
    Cir. 1985) (quoting 
    5 U.S.C. § 702
    ). Additionally, because his breach of con-
    tract claim is, at base, an alternative request for administrative relief di-
    recting the Secretary to make the payments to which Mr. Mittelstadt
    would have been entitled under Contract 1710, this claim is simply a dif-
    ferent way of characterizing his request for “the very thing to which he
    was entitled” under the CRP. Columbus Reg’l Hosp., 708 F.3d at 896 (quot-
    ing Bowen, 
    487 U.S. at 895
    ). Jurisdiction over Mr. Mittelstadt’s breach of
    contract claim was therefore proper under § 702. We have jurisdiction over
    this appeal from the district court’s entry of summary judgment under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    10                                                          No. 17-2447
    before the district court and render an independent judgment
    as to whether the agency acted unreasonably.” 
    Id.
     Under this
    “deferential standard,” we “will uphold a decision of less
    than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be dis-
    cerned.” St. Clair v. Sec’y of Navy, 
    155 F.3d 848
    , 851 (7th Cir.
    1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    A.
    We begin with an examination of the governing statutory
    scheme. As part of the Food Security Act of 1985,21 Congress
    established the CRP. This program incentivizes landowners
    to remove environmentally sensitive land from agricultural
    production in return for annual rental payments from the
    USDA. S. Rep. 99-145, at 1971 (1985). The impetus for the de-
    velopment of the CRP was an increased concern about soil
    erosion. 
    Id.
     In 1982, the National Resources Inventory22 had
    determined that almost fifty percent of erosion occurred on
    only ten percent of cropland in the United States. 
    Id.
     The Soil
    Conservation Service projected that the CRP would “reduce
    wind and water erosion on these acres by an average of nearly
    20 tons per acre per year.” 
    Id.
     (capitalization omitted). Ac-
    cordingly, Congress directed the Secretary to “formulate and
    carry out” the CRP by awarding contracts to encourage land-
    owners “to conserve and improve the soil, water, and wildlife
    resources of such land and to address issues raised by State,
    21 Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1201, 1231–1236, 
    99 Stat. 1354
    , 1504–05, 1509–14
    (codified as amended at 
    16 U.S.C. §§ 3801
    , 3831–3836).
    22 Administered by the NRCS, the National Resources Inventory is a “sta-
    tistically-based survey” designed to “assess conditions and trends of soil,
    water, and related resources on nonfederal lands in the United States.” 
    7 C.F.R. § 601.1
    (f)(1)(v).
    No. 17-2447                                                                 11
    regional, and national conservation initiatives.” 
    16 U.S.C. § 3831
    (a).
    The USDA oversees the CRP, with funding provided by
    the CCC, an entity owned and operated by the government.
    
    16 U.S.C. § 3841
    (a). Together with the FSA, the CCC is respon-
    sible for implementing the regulations governing the CRP. 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.1
    (a). The Agricultural Stabilization and Conser-
    vation Service, which operates through state and county com-
    mittees, administers the CRP on behalf of the CCC.
    The FSA and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva-
    tion Service also have issued, for use by the state and county
    committees, handbooks detailing the procedures and require-
    ments for implementing and participating in the CRP. These
    handbooks, which were not published in the Federal Register
    and therefore were not promulgated according to the require-
    ments of the APA, are interpretive only and do not have the
    force or effect of official regulations.23
    The statute limits the type and total acreage of land that
    can be enrolled in the CRP. Land eligible for enrollment in-
    cludes certain highly erodible cropland, marginal pasture
    land, grasslands, and, at the Secretary’s determination, other-
    wise ineligible cropland that poses an environmental threat.
    
    16 U.S.C. § 3831
    (b). During fiscal year 2018, the Secretary
    could maintain no more than twenty-four million acres of
    land in the program. 
    Id.
     § 3831(d)(1)(E). Additionally, the
    23 See Westcott v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
    765 F.2d 121
    , 122 (8th Cir. 1985) (per
    curiam); see also Thomas v. Cty. Office Comm. of Cameron Cty., 
    327 F. Supp. 1244
    , 1253 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Graham v. Lawrimore, 
    185 F. Supp. 761
    , 764
    (E.D.S.C. 1960); Hawkins v. State Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Comm.,
    
    149 F. Supp. 681
    , 686 (S.D. Tex. 1957).
    12                                                         No. 17-2447
    Secretary cannot enroll more than twenty-five percent of the
    cropland in any county unless he determines that enrolling a
    larger percentage “would not adversely affect the local econ-
    omy.” 
    16 U.S.C. § 3844
    (f).
    Landowners who wish to participate in the CRP must en-
    gage in a bid system. According to the legislative history, the
    statute utilizes this system because “the competitive bid sys-
    tem is the most cost-effective means of identifying our least
    productive and most erosion prone acreage, while at the same
    time minimizing cost to the U.S. Treasury.” S. Rep. 99-145, at
    1971 (capitalization omitted). Congress determines, for a
    given year, the maximum acreage permitted to be enrolled in
    the CRP each time it amends the authorizing statute.24 Indi-
    vidual rental payments are capped at $50,000 per year. 
    16 U.S.C. § 3834
    (g)(1).
    To participate in the bidding process, landowners submit
    offers to the CCC indicating “the amounts they are willing to
    accept as rental payments to enroll their acreage in the CRP.”
    
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.31
    (a). The CCC may evaluate offers “on a com-
    petitive basis in which the offers selected will be those where
    the greatest environmental benefits relative to cost are gener-
    ated.” 
    Id.
     In evaluating offers, the agency employs a national
    EBI, which “provides a relative ranking of estimated environ-
    mental benefits and cost for land offered for CRP.”25 “Ac-
    ceptance or rejection of any offer” is “in the sole discretion of
    the CCC[,] and offers may be rejected for any reason as
    24 See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, §
    2201(c)
    (amending 
    16 U.S.C. § 3831
    (d)); Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
    113-79, § 2001(d) (same).
    25   R.16-1 at 679.
    No. 17-2447                                                               13
    determined needed to accomplish the goals of CRP.” 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.31
    (a). When evaluating contract offers, the CCC may
    consider such factors as soil erosion, water quality, wildlife
    benefits, soil productivity, the “[l]ikelihood that enrolled land
    will remain in non-agriculture use beyond the contract pe-
    riod,” air quality, and the cost of enrolling the land in the CRP.
    
    Id.
     § 1410.31(b). Offers to enroll in the CRP are “irrevocable
    for such period as is determined and announced by the Dep-
    uty Administrator” of the FSA. 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.32
    (c)(2). If an
    applicant revokes his offer during the irrevocable period, he
    may be liable to the CCC for liquidated damages. 
    Id.
    Following CCC approval, the USDA awards CRP con-
    tracts for terms between ten and fifteen years, depending on
    the type of land involved. 
    16 U.S.C. § 3831
    (e)(1).26 In return
    for converting their land to less intensive uses, landowners
    receive annual rental payments. 
    16 U.S.C. § 3833
    (a)(2). The
    amounts of these payments are determined when the land-
    owners submit bids for CRP contracts. 
    16 U.S.C. § 3834
    (d)(2)(A)(i).
    Participants in the CRP must obtain and implement a con-
    servation plan outlining required conservation practices for
    the enrolled land. The conservation plan is considered part of
    the CRP contract, 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.20
    (a)(2), and must be ap-
    proved by the conservation district in which the land is
    26 Specifically, “[c]ontracts with land devoted to hardwood trees, shelter-
    belts, windbreaks, or wildlife corridors will be for a term of 10 years to 15
    years, as requested by the applicant.” 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.7
    (a). By contrast,
    “[o]ther general and continuous signup contracts … will be for a term of
    10 to 15 years, as determined by the Deputy Administrator.” 
    Id.
    § 1410.7(b). “Grassland signup contracts will be for a term of 15 years.” Id.
    § 1410.7(c).
    14                                                        No. 17-2447
    located, 
    7 C.F.R. §§ 1410.3
    (b), 1410.22(a). Landowners must
    “[e]stablish and maintain” the required vegetative cover and
    the required practices on the enrolled land, and must “take
    other actions that may be required by CCC to achieve the de-
    sired environmental benefits and to maintain the productive
    capability of the soil throughout the contract period.” 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.20
    (a)(6). All conservation plans and revisions to such
    plans are subject to the approval of the Deputy Administrator
    of the FSA. 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.22
    (e). Subject to fund availability,
    the CCC must “[s]hare up to 50 percent of the cost” of estab-
    lishing conservation practices with CRP participants. 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.21
    (a). Rental payments combined with cost-sharing are
    designed to assure landowners of a return on the land with-
    out having to risk large sums of money to adopt conservation
    practices.27
    The CCC retains the authority to modify or terminate an
    existing CRP contract. Specifically, the CCC can modify a CRP
    contract if the Deputy Administrator determines that,
    through no fault of the participant, the “installed practice
    failed to adequately provide for the desired environmental
    benefit” or “deteriorated,” and that “[a]nother practice will
    achieve at least the same level of environmental benefit.” 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.33
    (b). Additionally, the CCC can terminate a
    CRP contract before expiration of the term if, among other
    grounds, “[t]he participant is not in compliance with the
    terms and conditions of the contract,” “[t]he CRP practice fails
    or is not established after a certain time period,” the “contract
    was approved based on erroneous eligibility determina-
    tions,” or “[t]he Deputy Administrator determines that such
    27See Michael W. Strain, Student Survey, The Conservation Reserve: A Bold
    Step Towards the Future, 
    31 S.D. L. Rev. 523
    , 529 (1986).
    No. 17-2447                                                                 15
    a termination is needed in the public interest, or is otherwise
    necessary and appropriate to further the goals of CRP.” 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.32
    (f).
    This statutory and regulatory scheme places considerable
    discretion over CRP participation in the hands of the FSA. The
    implementing regulations afford the agency broad discretion
    to evaluate offers for enrollment and reenrollment in the pro-
    gram:
    [O]ffers may, to the extent practicable, be evalu-
    ated on a competitive basis in which the offers
    selected will be those where the greatest envi-
    ronmental benefits relative to cost are gener-
    ated … . Acceptance or rejection of any offer,
    however, shall be in the sole discretion of the
    CCC and offers may be rejected for any reason
    as determined needed to accomplish the goals
    of CRP.
    
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.31
    (a). Although we have had no occasion to
    describe the scope of discretion under this particular regula-
    tion, our cases involving other statutory and regulatory
    grants of “sole discretion” confirm that this language confers
    wide latitude upon the relevant actor.28
    28 See, e.g., Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
    128 F.3d 573
    , 577–78 (7th Cir. 1997)
    (concluding, where the Rescissions Act of 1995 required the Secretary of
    Agriculture to prepare an environmental assessment and a biological eval-
    uation “at the sole discretion of the Secretary concerned and to the extent
    that the Secretary concerned considers appropriate and feasible,” that
    “this language clearly authorize[d] the Secretary to permit a shorter pe-
    riod for public comment than that usually required under the Public Par-
    ticipation Law” (emphasis added)).
    16                                                            No. 17-2447
    B.
    With this statutory and regulatory background in mind,
    we turn first to Mr. Mittelstadt’s contention that the agency
    abused its discretion because it had not defined “mixed hard-
    woods” when it considered his application for reenrollment
    under Contract 653 in 1997 or under Contract 1710 in 2006.
    We also consider his related argument that the agency’s ap-
    plication of a new interpretation of “mixed hardwoods,”
    adopted in 2006, when it denied his request for reenrollment
    under Contract 1710 was an abuse of discretion.
    Here, the Secretary “readily acknowledge[d] that,
    throughout the entire relevant time period, there was never a
    published definition of ‘mixed hardwoods’ in FSA’s Hand-
    book, in the regulations, or elsewhere.”29 Nevertheless, to
    evaluate Mr. Mittelstadt’s 2006 application for reenrollment,
    the agency interpreted “mixed hardwoods” to mean “two
    species of hardwoods planted together in the same rows.”30
    Given the great discretion vested in the Secretary to obtain
    optimal environmental return for every dollar appropriated
    for the CRP, the FSA clearly had the capability to tighten the
    definition of “mixed hardwoods” for new contract periods.31
    The very nature of the program affords the Secretary the au-
    thority to change the terms and conditions of participation in
    29   Appellee’s Br. 35.
    30   R.9 ¶ 70.
    31 Cf. Paragon Health Network, Inc. v. Thompson, 
    251 F.3d 1141
    , 1147 (7th Cir.
    2001) (noting that “Congress is presumed to have delegated the primary
    power to fill regulatory ambiguities to the agency, and courts owe defer-
    ence to agency decisions that clarify a regulation regardless of the fact that
    the agency waited to exercise this power”).
    No. 17-2447                                                               17
    order to achieve, given the resources available, the most ad-
    vantageous result. The USDA’s policy, therefore, was to
    maintain a competitive program that allowed the Secretary to
    select, based on currently available funding, the best land
    available to attain the goals of the program. The agency did
    not have to contract for the same conservation measures at the
    same price upon each reenrollment.
    The Secretary’s decision to limit program participation to
    land with a different pattern of hardwoods, a pattern that he
    deemed more favorable to the conservation ends of the pro-
    gram, cannot be characterized fairly as the reversal of an
    agency policy. Because there was no previous specific defini-
    tion applicable to all future contracts set forth in the regula-
    tions or even in the FSA Handbook, the Secretary did not re-
    verse a governing policy.32 For the same reason, the 2006 re-
    quirement cannot be characterized as such “a sudden and un-
    expected change in agency policy” as to be arbitrary, capri-
    cious, or an abuse of discretion.33 The new requirement is
    grounded firmly in the governing statutes and regulations
    and implements the Secretary’s decision that such a criterion
    32 Cf. Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 
    164 F.3d 1115
    ,
    1123 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that, since no prior Forest Service or USDA
    plans provided a definition of the term “guest” for purposes of motorboat
    use restrictions, the definition newly provided by the Forest Service to
    avoid abuses of the motorboat use quota system could not “be considered
    as reversing a prior agency policy” and was entitled to deference).
    33 See 
    id.
     (observing that “‘the mere fact that an agency interpretation con-
    tradicts a prior agency position is not fatal,’ unless the new position is a
    sudden and unexpected change in agency policy that can be characterized
    as arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” (quoting Smiley v. Citi-
    bank (S.D.), N.A., 
    517 U.S. 735
    , 742 (1996)).
    18                                                           No. 17-2447
    will ensure that the available government funds are imple-
    mented in the most effective manner.34
    Mr. Mittelstadt conceded that “there were never areas of
    [his] acreage planted to more than one species of hard-
    wood.”35 He had understood that “the terminology ‘mixed
    hardwoods’ mean[t] only 1 hardwood species ‘mixed’ with
    pine.”36 Accordingly, in 1989, he planted three sections of
    trees on his land: (1) walnut and white pine trees, (2) red oak
    and white pine trees, and (3) solely white pine trees.37 Pine
    trees are softwoods, whereas walnut and red oak trees are
    hardwoods, so that no section he planted had more than one
    species of hardwood tree mixed with pine. It follows that, by
    2006, his acreage did not meet the FSA’s new requirement,
    which required that “there be at least 2 species of hardwoods
    34 Mr. Mittelstadt asserts that the FSA was “affirmatively required” to in-
    form him of the new interpretation of “mixed hardwoods” and to “help[]
    him craft a new plan that would elevate [Tract 9073’s] EBI score by chang-
    ing the arrangement of hardwood species.” Appellant’s Br. 32. He relies
    on the FSA Handbook, which states that the “FSA will review EBI scoring
    parameters with the producers and encourage the planting of cover types
    and conservation measures, if appropriate, that will provide higher envi-
    ronmental benefits.” R.16-1 at 679. However, the agency did not discover
    that Mr. Mittelstadt’s land did not meet the new requirement for “mixed
    hardwoods” until he began the reenrollment process, at which point the
    maintenance inspections revealed CRP violations. The agency informed
    him that, to reenroll his land, he could cure the violations by planting two
    or more species of hardwood trees mixed with a softwood tree. The FSA
    Handbook, which does not confer a legal right on Mr. Mittelstadt to par-
    ticipate in the program, did not require more.
    35   R.19 at 36–37.
    36   Id. at 37.
    37   Id. at 28.
    No. 17-2447                                                                19
    mixed into the rows of hardwoods.”38 The FSA therefore did
    not abuse its discretion when it determined that Mr. Mittel-
    stadt’s land did not satisfy the 2006 requirement of “mixed
    hardwoods.”
    39 C. 38
     
    Id. at 37
    . Relatedly, Mr. Mittelstadt submits that it was error for the FSA
    not to recalculate the EBI score for Tract 9073 using its new interpretation
    of “mixed hardwoods.” At multiple stages of the review process, how-
    ever, the agency concluded that there were “no areas of the contract that
    qualify as ‘mixed hardwoods’” under the 2006 requirement. R.19 at 38; see
    also R.16-4 at 5. Nor does Mr. Mittelstadt contend that he engaged in other
    conservation practices that would contribute to Tract 9073’s EBI score. Ac-
    cordingly, no formal recalculation was needed to conclude that, under the
    new interpretation, Tract 9073 “no longer had as high an EBI score as it
    once did.” R.16-6 at 1. The FSA’s failure to formally recalculate the EBI
    score for Tract 9073 was not an abuse of discretion.
    39 Mr. Mittelstadt’s claim that complying with the FSA’s new interpreta-
    tion of “mixed hardwoods” would have brought him in violation of the
    existing conservation plan under either Contract 653 or Contract 1710 is
    unsubstantiated. The 1997 conservation plan for Contract 653 instructed:
    CRP-CP11. The existing tree planting will not be man-
    aged for Christmas trees and will be protected from fire
    and from grazing by domestic livestock for the duration
    of the CRP contract.
    R.19-2 at 13. Similarly, the 2006 conservation plan for Contract 1710 stated:
    CRP-CP11. Vegetative Cover, Trees Already Estab-
    lished. … The existing tree planting will not be managed
    for Christmas trees and will be protected from fire and
    from grazing by livestock for the duration of the CRP con-
    tract. Spot treat for weed and brush control … .
    R.19-1 at 39. Nothing in either conservation plan suggests that Mr. Mittel-
    stadt would have violated those terms by planting “two species of hard-
    woods … together in the same rows.” R.9 ¶ 70.
    20                                                          No. 17-2447
    We turn next to Mr. Mittelstadt’s contention that the FSA
    erroneously relied on 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.31
    (a) to uphold the
    CCC’s denial of reenrollment under Contract 1710. According
    to Mr. Mittelstadt, this provision “has nothing to do with the
    post-award process through which Tract 9073 was disquali-
    fied from Contract 1710,” and “instead describes the
    pre-award process” through which Contract 1710 was
    awarded.40 We cannot accept this argument because it is
    premised on a nonexistent temporal distinction.
    The FSA Handbook instructs that, “[w]hen the producer
    is ready to submit an offer, County Offices shall provide … to
    the producer” Form CRP-1.41 Once a producer submits an
    40   Appellant’s Br. 35–36.
    41 R.16-1 at 179. As an alternative theory of recovery, Mr. Mittelstadt as-
    serts that, when the agency sent him Form CRP-1 for Contract 1710, it had
    accepted his offer of reenrollment, and there was a binding contract. But
    that argument ignores the FSA’s express description of Form CRP-1 as a
    form document that constitutes the producer’s “offer” of enrollment in the
    CRP, not the agency’s acceptance of that offer. Further, the FSA Handbook
    states that “[p]roducers withdrawing CRP-1 during the irrevocable period
    shall be subject to liquidated damages,” 
    id.,
     and Form CRP-1 reiterates
    that, by signing the form, the participant “agrees to pay such liquidated
    damages … if the Participant withdraws prior to CCC acceptance or rejec-
    tion.” R.19-1 at 45. These provisions confirm that Form CRP-1 constitutes
    an offer to be considered by the CCC, not a binding contract. Given that
    the regulations similarly require that a producer pay liquidated damages
    to the CCC if he “revokes an offer during the period in which the offer is
    irrevocable,” 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.32
    (c)(2) (emphases added), the prospect of
    having to pay liquidated damages provides no support to Mr. Mittel-
    stadt’s position that a binding contract existed. Finally, the FSA Handbook
    requires that Form CRP-1 “be signed and dated by all required signato-
    ries,” R.16-2 at 183, but Mr. Mittelstadt never received a countersigned
    No. 17-2447                                                             21
    offer on Form CRP-1, the FSA County Committee “shall sub-
    mit all offers … to the national level for review and evalua-
    tion.”42 The regulation at issue, 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.31
    (a), confers
    “sole discretion” upon the CCC to evaluate offers of enroll-
    ment in the CRP “on a competitive basis in which the offers
    selected will be those where the greatest environmental ben-
    efits relative to cost are generated.” The regulations further
    provide that, “[i]n order to be eligible to be placed in the CRP,
    land must” qualify under an enumerated eligibility category,
    such as “[a]creage enrolled in CRP during the final year of the
    CRP contract.” 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.6
    (a).
    In 2006, when the FSA County Committee concluded that
    the 1997 eligibility determination had been incorrect and ter-
    minated Contract 653, Tract 9073 no longer qualified as eligi-
    ble “[a]creage enrolled in CRP.” 
    Id.
     However, when the Dep-
    uty Director of the National Appeals Division reversed that
    determination and reinstated Contract 653, the effect of his or-
    der was only to reinstate Tract 9073’s ground for eligibility
    under 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.6
    (a)(3).43 Mr. Mittelstadt’s bid to
    copy of Contract 1710. Because there was no binding contract, Mr. Mittel-
    stadt cannot state a claim for breach.
    42   R.16-1 at 185 (emphasis omitted).
    43 Mr. Mittelstadt further contends that the Deputy Director’s ruling on
    the reenrollment of Contract 1710 was improper because, at the pre-hear-
    ing before the Hearing Officer, “the parties stipulated that the sole issue
    on appeal was the erroneous eligibility determination that was made in
    1997.” R.16-5 at 4. The Hearing Officer found that the “FSA correctly de-
    termined that Appellant did not establish a mixed stand of hardwood
    trees on the contract acreage” and that “Appellant based his request for
    CRP reenrollment under contract 1710 on the same inaccurate EBI scoring
    used in CRP contract 653.” R.16-4 at 5–6. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer
    determined both that “FSA correctly terminated contract 653 because of
    22                                                           No. 17-2447
    reenroll was still subject to the CCC’s discretion to evaluate
    his offer based on its relative competitiveness, see 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.31
    (a), and actual reenrollment required CCC approval.
    The FSA Director recognized precisely this degree of discre-
    tion when he denied Mr. Mittelstadt’s request for reconsider-
    ation, explaining that “agency regulations at 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.31
    (a) provide that acceptance or rejection of any offer
    of land by an owner for CRP participation shall be in the sole
    discretion of the CCC and offers may be rejected for any rea-
    son as determined to accomplish the goals of the program.”44
    According to the Director, “[w]hile not cited in the determi-
    nation, this regulation was the basis” for the Deputy Direc-
    tor’s decision.45 It was no abuse of discretion for the FSA to
    rely on 
    7 C.F.R. § 1410.31
    (a) to uphold the CCC’s decision.
    Relatedly, Mr. Mittelstadt claims that the agency was first
    required to change his conservation plan to comply with its
    new interpretation of “mixed hardwoods” and that, if he “re-
    fused to conform Tract 9073 to the corrected Conservation
    an inaccurate EBI score” and that FSA “correctly denied Appellant’s reen-
    rollment request under CRP contract 1710.” 
    Id. at 6
    . Thus, the Deputy Di-
    rector’s review of the Hearing Officer’s decision necessarily encompassed
    both the Hearing Officer’s findings with regard to the termination of Con-
    tract 653 and the reenrollment under Contract 1710, which were “based”
    on “the same inaccurate EBI scor[e].” 
    Id.
     The district court correctly con-
    cluded that “the parties’ stipulation … ma[de] little practical sense on its
    face,” R.25 at 18, given that the Deputy Director could not properly review
    the Hearing Officer’s decision without considering the grounds for that
    decision in full.
    44   R.16-6 at 1.
    45   
    Id.
    No. 17-2447                                                23
    Plan, the Tract would then be in violation.”46 But Mr. Mittel-
    stadt confuses the order of procedure required. The FSA
    Handbook instructs that, “[i]f [an] offer is determined ac-
    ceptable,” then “a conservation plan must be developed by
    NRCS … and approved by the Conservation District before
    CRP-1 can be approved” by the FSA County Committee.47 Be-
    cause the FSA never accepted Mr. Mittelstadt’s offer to reen-
    roll his land, the agency was under no obligation to develop
    a new conservation plan for Tract 9073 before denying reen-
    rollment. The FSA’s course of proceeding simply was not an
    abuse of discretion.
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    AFFIRMED
    46   Appellant’s Br. 49 (emphasis in original).
    47   R.16-1 at 186.