Royal v. Durison , 254 F. App'x 163 ( 2007 )

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-20-2007
Royal v. Durison
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-1036
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-1036
____________
HOZAY ROYAL
also known as
CHARLES JOHNSON
v.
ROBERT DURISON;
VIVIAN T. MILLER*
Hozay Royal,
Appellant
(*Dismissed pursuant to Order of 5/29/07)
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cv-04441)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________
Argued October 3, 2007
Before: McKEE, BARRY and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 20, 2007)
Theodore P. Metzler (Argued)
Covington & Burling
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
Attorney for Appellant
Elise M. Bruhl (Argued)
Mia Carpiniello
City of Philadelphia
Law Department
1515 Arch Street
One Parkway, 17th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Attorneys for Appellee
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Hozay Royal instituted this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking
monetary damages from certain Pennsylvania officials for failure to recalculate his
sentence and to credit him with time served prior to his original sentence. He argues that
the government’s alleged inaction violated his right to due process and the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. He also argues that the decision in Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not bar his claim. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and
will affirm the order of the District Court on the alternative grounds that Royal’s claim is
barred by Heck.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
2
On July 31, 2003, Hozay Royal filed a § 1983 claim against defendants Robert
Durison and Vivian Miller (both Philadelphia County officials). The claim alleged that
the defendants violated Royal’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to
respond properly to his claim that he had not been credited for time served prior to
sentencing, causing him to serve a sentence in excess of the maximum statutory term. On
May 27, 2004, the District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the
substantive claims. Royal filed a timely appeal, and on April 21, 2005, we issued an
order directing the parties to address whether Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
which was not relied upon in the District Court’s opinion, barred Royal’s claim as a
threshold matter. Following argument before this Court on October 3, 2007, we hold that
Heck does, in fact, bar Royal’s claim.
II.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over questions of law. See, e.g., Epstein Family P’ship v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d
762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994). We are permitted to affirm the District Court on any grounds
with factual support in the record, Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en
banc), and may affirm the District Court’s order “on grounds different than those used by
the lower court in reaching its decision.” Erie Telecomms. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089
n.10 (3d Cir.1988).
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III.
In Heck, the Supreme Court announced that “in order to recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” the plaintiff
must, as a threshold matter, show that there has been a “favorable termination” of his
prior proceedings by demonstrating that “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. at 486-87. As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has explained, the Supreme Court’s rationale in Heck “was based, in part,
on a desire to ‘avoid[] parallel litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt,’
prevent ‘the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical
transaction,’ and preclude ‘a convicted criminal defendant [from making a] . . . collateral
attack on the conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit.’” Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d
65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 484). As the Supreme Court further
elaborated in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), a § 1983 claim filed by a state
prisoner is barred, regardless of the target of the lawsuit, if success in the § 1983 action
“would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 82.
Royal does not allege that his prior proceedings were favorably terminated, and therefore
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he must show that success on the instant claim would not necessarily “demonstrate the
invalidity” of his incarceration in a legally cognizable manner.
Royal’s first claim is that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he
“was incarcerated for more than six months in excess of the maximum sentence allowed
under Pennsylvania law[.]” (Appellant’s. Br. 17). Even if true, this claim is not
cognizable under Heck. Were we to hold that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did, in
fact, incarcerate Royal beyond the statutory maximum, we would necessarily be holding
that the “confinement or its duration” was invalid in violation of the favorable termination
requirement announced in Heck. Id.
Royal’s second claim is that his due process rights were violated when defendants
failed to properly investigate his allegation that his time served had been improperly
calculated. Royal contends that had defendants “meaningfully and expeditiously
considered” these allegations, they would have discovered documents showing that his
time had been improperly calculated. Royal alleges that this claim is not barred by Heck,
because he is not calling into question the validity of the sentence or the conviction, but
rather just the calculation of time served. This argument is unavailing. In Williams v.
Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2006), we held that a state prisoner’s claim – that prison
authorities failed to adequately investigate his likelihood of recidivating, leading to a
denial of his parole – was barred by Heck. Id. at 177. Although Royal attempts to
distinguish Williams on the ground that “the conduct Williams challenged, if proved true,
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would have resulted in a ruling that he should never have been returned to prison”
(Appellant’s Br. 31), there is no indication in the opinion that Heck only bars claims that,
if established, would invalidate an entire sentence, rather than simply part of a sentence.
See, e.g., Heck, 512 U.S. at 482-83 (discussing the application of the doctrine in the
context of a prisoner’s deprivation of good-time credits, not the entirety of his sentence).
Finally, Royal argues that Heck should not apply in this case because he cannot, at
this point, file a habeas petition to challenge any aspect of his incarceration. While
several Courts of Appeals have concluded that Heck’s favorable termination requirement
does not apply to a prisoner no longer in custody,1 we have expressly declined to adopt
this rule. Williams, 453 F.3d at 177-78. Since Royal has therefore not established the
favorable termination requirement, his § 1983 claim cannot go forward.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court on the
alternate grounds that it is barred by Heck.
1
See, e.g., Huang, 251 F.3d at 74; Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396
(6th Cir. 1999); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2000).
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