Lerch, John v. City of Green Bay , 218 F. App'x 502 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                       NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted February 21, 2007*
    Decided February 23, 2007
    Before
    Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
    Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
    No. 06-3046
    JOHN L. LERCH,                              Appeal from the United States
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                    District Court for the Eastern
    District of Wisconsin
    v.
    No. 05-C-484
    CITY OF GREEN BAY, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.                  William C. Griesbach,
    Judge.
    ORDER
    John Lerch appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the
    defendants on his equal protection claim. We affirm.
    Lerch, a white male, rents out nine residential properties that he owns in
    Green Bay to low-income tenants. Some of these tenants have complained to the
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that
    oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the
    record. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 06-3046                                                                    Page 2
    city about the condition of the properties. Over the last 15 years, city inspectors
    have cited the properties repeatedly for housing code violations, including
    uncollected rubbish, an unpaved driveway apron, chipped paint, and insufficient
    weather-proofing of exterior surfaces; city inspectors have also ordered debris
    removed from the properties at Lerch’s expense. Many of such citations and orders
    were issued without prior warning or notice. Lerch complained to the city and the
    Inspection Department that enforcement of the housing code was unfair because he
    was cited for the same violations committed by owners of nearby properties, who he
    surmised had not been cited.
    After his complaints went unheeded, Lerch brought a “class of one” equal
    protection claim against the City of Green Bay and several building inspectors
    under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his properties had been singled out for
    disproportionately harsh treatment. Discovery ensued, and eventually the court
    granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court determined that Lerch
    had not presented sufficient evidence that he was similarly situated to other
    property owners who were not cited or that he was subjected to any disparate
    treatment that was irrational or motivated by some illegitimate animus or ill will.
    Lerch first challenges in only general terms the district court’s conclusion
    that he could not establish a class-of-one claim. To establish this claim, a plaintiff
    must present evidence that a government official treated him differently from other
    similarly situated individuals and that there was no rational basis for the
    treatment. RJB Properties, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 
    468 F.3d 1005
    , 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2006). See also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
    528 U.S. 562
    ,
    564 (2000). Lerch argues that he has shown that similarly situated owners were
    treated differently because he was cited for having an unpaved driveway apron,
    while other nearby properties seemingly avoid citation, since their driveway aprons
    continue to be unpaved.
    Lerch, however, cannot meet his “very significant burden” of introducing
    evidence that the other individuals are similarly situated in all relevant respects.
    RJB 
    Properties, 468 F.3d at 1010
    . He offered no proof, for instance, that the owners
    of those properties owned many rental properties containing multiple code
    violations, that their tenants had complained to the city, or that the other owners
    were not cited, much less that the same inspector made the decision in each case.
    See Maulding Dev., LLC v. City of Springfield, 
    453 F.3d 967
    , 971 (7th Cir. 2006).
    He thus has not shown that he was similarly situated to another property owner
    who was not cited.
    Lerch also suggests that the district court should not have granted summary
    judgment to the defendants without considering their intransigence in refusing to
    timely answer his discovery requests. But the defendants answered his requests a
    No. 06-3046                                                                     Page 3
    week after they moved for summary judgment and almost a month before his
    response was due. If Lerch was not satisfied with the pace of their responses, he
    should have asked for additional time for discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), see
    Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 
    462 F.3d 701
    , 706 (7th Cir. 2006), or moved to compel
    defendants’ compliance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a), see Woods v. City of Chicago,
    
    234 F.3d 979
    , 990-91 (7th Cir. 2000).
    Finally, Lerch suggests that the district court erred in denying him leave to
    amend his complaint to add allegations of subsequent incidents that he had with
    city inspectors over his properties. The district court denied his initial attempts at
    amendment because he failed to follow the court’s local procedural rules. The court
    then denied Lerch’s most recent request because it would have required additional
    discovery and unduly delayed the case. Given that any delay would require the
    court to push back deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions, we note no
    abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling. See Bethany Pharm. Co., Inc. v. QVC, Inc.,
    
    241 F.3d 854
    , 861-62 (7th Cir. 2001).
    Lerch’s remaining challenges warrant no discussion.
    AFFIRMED.