Williams-Bey, Joseph v. Buss, Edwin G. , 263 F. App'x 523 ( 2008 )


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  •                        NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted February 13, 2008*
    Decided February 14, 2008
    Before
    Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
    Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
    Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
    No. 06-4011
    JOSEPH T. WILLIAMS-BEY,                          Appeal from the United States District
    Petitioner-Appellant,                        Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
    South Bend Division
    v.
    No. 3:06cv570AS
    EDWIN G. BUSS,
    Respondent-Appellee.                         Allen Sharp,
    Judge.
    ORDER
    Joseph Williams-Bey, an inmate at the Indiana State Prison, filed a petition
    for a writ of habeas corpus, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    , claiming that his constitutional
    and statutory rights were violated when the prison chaplain suspended him without
    notice or a hearing from participating in activities at the prison’s religious center.
    The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Williams-Bey could not
    *
    The appellee was not served with process in the district court and is not
    participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have
    concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the
    appellant’s brief and the record. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 06-4011                                                                    Page 2
    challenge this punishment under § 2254 because it did not affect the duration of his
    detention. The court suggested, however, that Williams-Bey could possibly re-file
    his claims in an action under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . We affirm.
    The facts alleged in Williams-Bey’s complaint are sparse. In August 2006
    one of the prison chaplains suspended Williams-Bey from participating in all
    activities at the prison’s religious center because of Williams-Bey’s conduct toward
    the chaplain a few days earlier. The complaint does not say what that conduct was.
    Williams-Bey learned of his suspension in a letter from the chaplain, which he
    attached to the complaint. The letter said that Williams-Bey would be allowed to
    participate in activities again if he repented to the chaplain.
    After the district court dismissed his habeas corpus petition, Williams-Bey
    brought this appeal. But he does not address the basis of the district court’s
    dismissal, i.e., that the allegations do not state a claim under § 2254 because his
    punishment does not affect the fact or duration of his confinement. Instead,
    Williams-Bey argues the merits of his underlying claims.
    Dismissal was proper here. It is well-established that a prisoner who
    challenges neither the fact nor duration of confinement but instead challenges the
    conditions of confinement—such as exclusion from programs and loss of
    privileges—must do so in an action under § 1983 or another federal statute, not a
    petition for habeas corpus. See Cochran v. Buss, 
    381 F.3d 637
    , 639 (7th Cir. 2004);
    Bunn v. Conley, 
    309 F.3d 1002
    , 1007 (7th Cir. 2002); Moran v. Sondalle, 
    218 F.3d 647
    , 650-51 (7th Cir. 2000). Williams-Bey challenges only his suspension from
    participation in religious programs, which does not implicate the fact or duration of
    his sentence. See Bunn, 
    309 F.3d at 1007
    . Therefore, a § 2254 petition was the
    wrong vehicle for Williams-Bey to challenge his punishment.
    Moreover, instead of converting the petition into a § 1983 complaint on
    Williams-Bey’s behalf, the district court properly suggested that Williams-Bey could
    re-file his claims in a § 1983 action. District courts should not convert a habeas
    corpus petition into a civil rights complaint, even for a pro se petitioner, because
    important procedural differences exist between the two actions that can have
    significant consequences for the petitioner’s ability to appeal or bring later suits,
    among other things. See Glaus v. Anderson, 
    408 F.3d 382
    , 388-89 (7th Cir. 2005)
    (holding that re-characterization is appropriate in only narrow circumstances and
    outlining different consequences of filing § 1983 and habeas corpus actions); Moore
    v. Pemberton, 
    110 F.3d 22
    , 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (same).
    AFFIRMED.