Noesen, Neil T. v. Medical Staffing Net , 232 F. App'x 581 ( 2007 )


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  •                      NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted April 25, 2007*
    Decided May 2, 2007
    Before
    Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
    Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
    No. 06-2831
    NEIL T. NOESEN,                              Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                    Court for the Western District of
    Wisconsin
    v.
    No. 06-C-071-S
    MEDICAL STAFFING NETWORK,
    INC., et al.,                                John C. Shabaz,
    Defendants-Appellees.                  Judge.
    ORDER
    Neil Noesen, a pharmacist, refuses on religious grounds to fill prescriptions
    for birth control. He brought this pro se lawsuit against Medical Staffing Network,
    Inc. (“MSN”), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and the State of Wisconsin, alleging that they
    discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by refusing to exempt him
    from having any contact with customers who ask to have such prescriptions filled.
    The district court resolved all claims against Noesen. The only issues on appeal
    concern Noesen’s contention that the defendants violated Title VII of the Civil
    Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., when Wal-Mart refused to accede to
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that
    oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the
    record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 06-2831                                                                    Page 2
    his demand that it insulate him from any interaction, no matter how brief, with any
    person seeking birth control. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
    The material facts are undisputed. Wal-Mart’s pharmacy in Onalaska,
    Wisconsin assists hundreds of customers with pharmacy-related requests and fills
    an average of 250 prescriptions daily. To meet the high volume of customer
    requests, pharmacists and pharmacy technicians share customer-service duties.
    For example, both pharmacists and technicians must assist walk-in customers and
    answer telephone inquiries from customers, physicians, hospitals, clinics, insurance
    companies, and other pharmacies. Technicians typically input prescription
    information into the computer system and verify insurance, while pharmacists have
    sole responsibility for checking all prescriptions and handing the medications to
    retail customers. Approximately 10% of the pharmacy’s customer volume is related
    to requests for birth control.
    In July 2005 Wal-Mart asked MSN, a health care staffing provider, for
    temporary assistance in its Onalaska pharmacy. MSN recommended Noesen.
    Noesen, a Roman Catholic, is licensed by the State of Wisconsin to practice
    pharmacy, but the state licensing authority restricted his license in 2004 because of
    his refusal to fill, or refer to another pharmacy, a woman’s prescription for
    contraception. Under the restriction, Noesen must notify potential employers in
    writing of the pharmacy services he will not perform and the steps he will take to
    ensure that a patient’s access to medication remains unimpeded.
    Before starting work at the Onalaska pharmacy, Noesen wrote to Wal-Mart
    and explained that, due to his religious convictions, he would “decline to perform
    the provision of, or any activity related to the provision of contraceptive articles,”
    including “complete or partial cooperation with patient care situations which
    involve the provision of or counsel on contraceptive articles.” Robert Overton, a
    pharmacist and acting supervisor of the Onalaska pharmacy, understood Noesen’s
    limitations to mean that he would not fill prescriptions for birth control, and agreed
    to accommodate that limitation. Overton relieved Noesen from: filling
    prescriptions for birth control, taking orders for birth control from customers or
    physicians, handing customers birth control medication, and performing checks on
    birth control orders. Overton also arranged for birth control prescriptions to be
    sorted into a separate basket so that Noesen would not have to touch the items and
    ensured that someone would be available to fill orders and respond to customer
    inquiries concerning birth control.
    Within days Overton realized that, even with these accommodations, Noesen
    refused to perform general customer-service duties if they involved even briefly
    talking to customers seeking contraception. For example, when Noesen answered
    telephone calls from customers or physicians attempting to place orders for birth
    No. 06-2831                                                                     Page 3
    control, Noesen put them on hold and refused to alert other pharmacy staff that
    someone was holding. Similarly, when customers came to the counter with birth
    control prescriptions, Noesen walked away and refused to tell anyone that a
    customer needed assistance. Noesen explained that if required to speak to
    customers seeking birth control, he would always counsel them against it and
    refuse to fill their prescriptions. Noesen rejected Overton’s offer that Noesen assist
    only customers that were not of childbearing age or only male customers. He
    insisted that the only acceptable accommodation was to relieve him of all counter
    and telephone duties unless customers were first pre-screened by some other
    employee to ensure that they were not seeking birth control. Overton agreed that
    he and the pharmacy intern could assist all walk-in customers but due to high
    caller volume Noesen, like all other staff, needed to answer the telephones,
    although he could refer callers with birth control issues to others. Noesen rejected
    this accommodation.
    On his fifth day at the Onalaska pharmacy, after Noesen refused his work
    assignment with the modified accommodations, Overton fired Noesen. But Noesen
    refused to leave the store. He began lecturing customers about Wal-Mart’s
    discriminatory practices and had to be carried out by police. Based upon his
    conduct at Wal-Mart, MSN also fired Noesen.
    The district court resolved all claims in favor of the defendants. The court
    concluded that Noesen had not alleged a failure to accommodate claim against MSN
    and that “Wal-Mart gave [Noesen] the exact accommodation that he sought.” The
    court also explained that, after receiving Wal-Mart’s initial accommodation, Noesen
    wanted an additional accommodation—avoiding any situation where he might
    interact with a customer seeking birth control—to which he was not entitled. As to
    Noesen’s separate claims against the State of Wisconsin for failing to enact a rule
    that would allow him to refuse to distribute birth control, the district court
    dismissed them, stating generally that it lacked jurisdiction.
    On appeal Noesen first contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists
    concerning whether Wal-Mart and MSN reasonably accommodated his religious
    beliefs because a jury could find that his proposed accommodation was reasonable.
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts
    No. 06-2831                                                                    Page 4
    and inferences in Noesen’s favor.1 See Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 
    480 F.3d 534
    ,
    538 (7th Cir. 2007).
    Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires employers to make reasonable
    accommodations for their employees’ religious beliefs and practices unless doing so
    would result in undue hardship to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Reed v. Great
    Lakes Cos., 
    330 F.3d 931
    , 934-35 (7th Cir. 2003). A reasonable accommodation is
    one that “eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious
    practices.” Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 
    479 U.S. 60
    , 70 (1986); see Anderson
    v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 
    274 F.3d 470
    , 475 (7th Cir. 2001). Noesen’s religious
    beliefs (and his interpretation of the Wisconsin Administrative Code) require him to
    avoid participating in the distribution of birth control “in any way.” Although
    Wal-Mart attempted to accommodate him, Noesen says that the conflict between
    his employment obligations and religious beliefs was not eliminated. And, he
    insists, the conflict could have been eliminated in only one way: by Wal-Mart
    relieving him of all counter and telephone duties. Noesen, however, was not
    entitled to that accommodation if it would work an undue hardship on Wal-Mart.
    See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 
    432 U.S. 63
    , 84
    (1977); Endres v. Ind. State Police, 
    349 F.3d 922
    , 925 (7th Cir. 2003). Undue
    hardship exists when a religious accommodation would cause more than minimal
    hardship to the employer or other employees. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 
    432 U.S. at 84
    ; Endres, 
    349 F.3d at 925
    .
    Wal-Mart contends, and we agree, that Noesen’s proposed accommodation
    would impose an undue hardship. It is undisputed that Wal-Mart’s relieving
    Noesen of all telephone and counter duties would have shifted his share of initial
    customer contact to other pharmacy staff. Yet an accommodation that requires
    other employees to assume a disproportionate workload (or divert them from their
    regular work) is an undue hardship as a matter of law. See Bruff v. N. Miss. Health
    Servs., Inc., 
    244 F.3d 495
    , 501 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Endres, 
    349 F.3d at 925
    (excusing some employees from undesirable tasks would create substantial costs for
    other employees as well as for the entity itself). Noesen nevertheless insists that
    reassigning initial customer contact away from him to lower-paid technicians would
    1
    We note that the district court never considered whether MSN afforded
    Noesen a reasonable accommodation because the court concluded that he had not
    alleged a failure to accommodate claim against MSN. Indeed, our review of the
    record reveals that he never developed a factual basis for his claim against MSN.
    Likewise, in his brief to this court he did not explain how MSN failed to
    accommodate him. Thus Noesen has waived his claim against MSN. See Spath v.
    Hayes Wheels Int’l-Ind., Inc., 
    211 F.3d 392
    , 397 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
    failure to develop factual basis for argument results in waiver).
    No. 06-2831                                                                     Page 5
    result in a more efficient use of pharmacy resources. But even assuming that the
    technicians could promptly answer all incoming calls from customers and health
    professionals, the diversion of technicians from their assigned duties of data input
    and insurance verification would impose the undue cost of uncompleted data work
    on Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart was under no obligation to rearrange staffing and incur
    such costs to accommodate an inflexible employee. See Endres, 
    349 F.3d at 926
    ;
    Bruff, 
    244 F.3d at 500
    . Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    in Wal-Mart’s favor was proper.
    Noesen next contends that the district court erroneously dismissed his claims
    against the State of Wisconsin because, he says, Title VII requires that Wisconsin
    enact a “conscience clause” exception to its codified standards of professional
    conduct allowing him to refuse to dispense birth control without facing disciplinary
    proceedings. Thus, he says, the state was a party to Wal-Mart’s Title VII violation.
    Even though Noesen insists that § 2000e-7 establishes federal court
    jurisdiction over his claim against the State of Wisconsin, it does not. The Eleventh
    Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits brought against states unless the
    state has consented to suit in federal court or Congress validly abrogated the state’s
    immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
    465 U.S. 89
    , 98-99 (1984).
    Although Congress has abrogated states’ immunity under Title VII, Nanda v. Bd. of
    Tr. of Univ. of Ill., 
    303 F.3d 817
    , 828-31 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
    539 U.S. 902
    (2003), Title VII applies to states only in their capacity as employers, see id.; Drake
    v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 
    134 F.3d 878
    , 885 n.4 (7th Cir. 1998). Here it is
    undisputed that the State of Wisconsin neither agreed to this suit in federal court
    nor employed Noesen during the events at issue in this suit. The district court
    therefore was correct that it lacked jurisdiction over Noesen’s Title VII claims
    against the State of Wisconsin and properly dismissed them.
    AFFIRMED.