Wallace v. Price , 243 F. App'x 710 ( 2007 )

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-6-2007
Wallace v. Price
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-9002
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 03-9002 & 03-9003
WILLIAM WALLACE, JR.,
Appellant
v.
JAMES PRICE, Superintendent
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 99-cv-00231)
District Judge: Hon. Sean J. McLaughlin
Argued June 7, 2007
Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 6, 2007)
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
William Wallace was sentenced to death after a Pennsylvania jury convicted him of
first degree murder in the death of Tina Spalla. The jury also convicted Wallace of robbery,
criminal conspiracy, and second degree murder in the death of Carl Luisi. Wallace has filed
a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions. The District Court,
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, ordered that the first
degree murder conviction be vacated because the trial court did not admit hearsay evidence
of a statement made by Wallace’s accomplice, Henry Brown, that he, not Wallace, shot
Spalla. The District Court held that the refusal to admit this statement violated Wallace’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as set forth in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
The other convictions were allowed to stand, leaving Wallace to serve a sentence of life
imprisonment without the opportunity for parole.
Wallace appealed the judgment of the District Court, raising the following five claims:
First, the exclusion of evidence of Brown’s confession warranted the vacating of all
Wallace’s convictions, not just the conviction for first degree murder. Second, the manner
by which Brown’s testimony was secured violated Wallace’s rights to due process and a fair
trial. Third, Wallace’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an independent
ballistics test. Fourth, Wallace’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the
prosecution enlisted the aid of a jailhouse informant, who later testified against Wallace.
Fifth, the penalty-phase jury instructions regarding mitigation erroneously suggested a need
for unanimity in violation of Mills v. Maryland, 487 U.S. 367 (1988), and that error was not
harmless. The Commonwealth cross-appealed, claiming that the District Court erred in
2
vacating the first degree murder conviction on the grounds that Wallace’s federal
constitutional rights were violated and also erred in not concluding that any possible errors
were harmless.
We do not recount the facts and history of this case, which are well-known to the
parties. The Report and Recommendation and the opinion of the District Court are thorough
and well-reasoned, and we readily affirm the judgment of the District Court in full. We do
note that in analyzing whether the Chambers and Confrontation Clause violations amounted
to harmless error, the District Court employed the “substantial and injurious effect” standard
set forth in Brecht v. Ambrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Although the Supreme Court had
yet to decide Fry v. Pliler, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2007 WL 1661463 (June 11, 2007), the District
Court was right to use the Brecht standard, regardless of whether the Pennsylvania courts had
recognized the precise error at issue and reviewed it for harmlessness under the “harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
See Fry 2007 WL 1661463, at *6. 1
Because the writ is granted as to Wallace’s conviction for first degree murder, we will
dismiss as moot his penalty-phase claim under Mills, which goes only to the sentence on that
conviction.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
1
We also note that the Commonwealth had conceded at oral argument that, with regard
to the Chambers and Confrontation Clause violations, we would not be bound by the
harmless error determination made by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
3