United States v. Stokes, Poncevenus , 208 F. App'x 492 ( 2006 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued November 14, 2006
    Decided December 18, 2006
    Before
    Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
    Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge
    No. 05-2598
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                     Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                  Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
    v.                              No. 04-40056-001-JLF
    PONCEVENUS L. STOKES,                         James L. Foreman,
    Defendant-Appellant.                  Judge.
    ORDER
    Poncevenus Stokes entered a plea of guilty to being in possession of a firearm
    after having been convicted of a felony, see 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(a)(2), and to
    conspiring to distribute marijuana, see 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(D), 846. At
    sentencing, the district court determined that Stokes was subject to an advisory
    guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced him to 70
    months. Stokes challenges the reasonableness of the sentence. We affirm.
    I. Background
    Police officers obtained and executed a search warrant for Stokes’s home
    after a confidential informant reported that Stokes was dealing drugs; during the
    search the officers found a handgun and 3.63 kilograms of marijuana. Stokes was
    subsequently charged with possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, see 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(a)(2), and conspiring to distribute marijuana, see 21 U.S.C.
    No. 05-2598                                                                    Page 2
    §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), 846; he later pleaded guilty to both charges without the
    benefit of a plea agreement. The probation officer prepared a presentence
    investigation report (“PSR”), and calculated that Stokes was subject to a guidelines
    range of 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing the district court initially
    adopted the probation officer’s calculation, but after being informed by the
    government that the probation officer applied an incorrect base offense level,
    withdrew the recommended calculation. Stating that it had “an obligation . . . to
    straighten the record out,” the court ordered the probation officer to prepare a
    corrected PSR, and continued the hearing in order that the parties might have an
    opportunity to review the renewed PSR, and, if necessary, file objections.
    The probation officer subsequently submitted a corrected PSR. In it he
    applied a base offense level of 20 because Stokes possessed a firearm after having
    previously having been convicted of a felony, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), added a
    four-level upward adjustment, reasoning that Stokes possessed the handgun in
    connection with his drug offense, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(5), and applied a three-level
    reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1(a)-(b). This resulted in a
    total offense level of 21, which combined with Stokes’s Criminal History Category of
    V to yield an advisory guidelines range of 70 to 87 months.
    At the continued hearing, the court heard arguments from both the
    government and defense counsel regarding the appropriate sentence. The
    government argued that a sentence within the guidelines range was appropriate,
    pointing out that Stokes: (1) had five prior state drug convictions; (2) was on
    probation for a previous state drug conviction at the time of his arrest;
    (3) attempted to flee when the police searched his home; and (4) stored his drugs
    and a handgun in his five-year-old child’s bedroom. Defense counsel asked the
    court to sentence Stokes below the guidelines range, arguing that the incorrect
    guidelines calculation was brought to the court’s attention at the last minute and
    without proper notice. Defense counsel also stated that Stokes would be able to
    obtain treatment for his drug dependency more easily on supervised release than in
    prison. The court noted its authority to impose a sentence below the range, stated
    that it “gave consideration” to the facts as applied to the sentencing guidelines and
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    , and imposed a sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment at the lower
    end of the proper guidelines range.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, Stokes argues that the sentence imposed of 70 months is
    unreasonable. He asserts that the district court’s initial adoption of the
    incorrect guidelines range at the first sentencing hearing, and its repeated
    statements that it relied “heavily” on the guidelines range, demonstrated
    that it “relied exclusively on the Sentencing Guidelines when imposing the
    No. 05-2598                                                                         Page 3
    sentence.” Stokes further argues that the district court considered only his
    criminal history when imposing the sentence, and thus “failed to give
    appropriate weight to all of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors.”
    Stokes’s arguments fail. Stokes concedes that the 70- to 87-month
    guidelines range was properly calculated, and because his sentence falls
    within that range, we presume that it is reasonable under United States v.
    Mykytiuk. 
    415 F.3d 606
    , 607-08 (7th Cir. 2005). Stokes cannot rebut this
    presumption by merely showing that the district court “relied exclusively” on
    the guidelines; rather, he must point to § 3553(a) factors that support a lower
    sentence. See id. This he has failed to do. Rather, he argues only that the
    rebuttable presumption of reasonableness announced in Mykytiuk conflicts
    with United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), because “it has the effect
    of making the Guidelines mandatory, unless the defendant can show that his
    sentence should be outside of the Guidelines.” We have repeatedly rejected
    this argument, holding that a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness is
    consistent with Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Hankton, 
    463 F.3d 626
    ,
    630 n.5 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting argument that applying rebuttable
    presumption renders guidelines mandatory); United States v. Williams, 
    436 F.3d 767
    , 769 (7th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that Mykytiuk avoids conflict with
    Booker).
    We are mindful that the Supreme Court of the United States recently
    granted certiorari on the question of whether Booker allows courts of appeals
    to presume that a sentence is reasonable when it falls within a properly
    calculated guidelines range. See United States v. Rita, 177 F. App’x 357 (4th
    Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 
    2006 WL 2307774
     (U.S. Nov. 03, 2006) (No.
    06-5754). Be that as it may, Rita would not affect the outcome of this case.
    Even if the Court were to hold that a rebuttable presumption of
    reasonableness conflicts with Booker, we would then merely return to a pre-
    Mykytiuk inquiry about whether the sentence is reasonable pursuant to the
    § 3553(a) factors, see Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-62, 264; United States v. Dean,
    
    414 F.3d 725
    , 728-31 (7th Cir. 2005), and Stokes has failed to demonstrate
    that his sentence is unreasonable in light of § 3553(a). Contrary to Stokes’s
    assertion, the court considered the § 3553(a) factors in addition to his
    criminal history. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1). For instance, the district court
    considered Stokes’s history and mitigating characteristics, see 
    id.,
     such as his
    acceptance of responsibility for his crimes, his sincere show of remorse for his
    actions, and his stated willingness to correct his mistakes; in fact, the court’s
    comments reflected that it was very receptive to Stokes’s apology and
    willingness to reform himself. The court also considered a variety of
    sentences available, see 
    id.
     § 3553(a)(3), and also further allowed defense
    counsel to explain why he believed that Stokes would benefit more from a
    No. 05-2598                                                                    Page 4
    term of supervised release rather than imprisonment. The court did not
    agree, and determined that imprisonment was the best option because it
    would provide Stokes the opportunity to receive both treatment for his drug
    dependency as well as additional educational opportunities. See id.
    § 3553(a)(4). The court was not required to address all of the factors in a
    “checklist fashion,” see Dean, 
    414 F.3d at 729
    ; United States v. George, 
    403 F.3d 470
    , 472-73 (7th Cir. 2005), and it did not ignore any of defense
    counsel’s arguments for a lower sentence, see United States v. Cunningham,
    
    429 F.3d 673
    , 675 (7th Cir. 2005). We reiterate that a sentence of 70 months
    that falls within the proper guidelines range is reasonable.
    III. Conclusion
    We AFFIRM Stokes’s 70-month sentence.