Finite Resources, Ltd. v. DTE Methane Resources, LLC ( 2022 )


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  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-1512
    FINITE RESOURCES, LTD.,
    SOUTHERN CROSS ENERGY, LLC,
    and DURANGO GROUP, INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    DTE METHANE RESOURCES, LLC and
    KEYROCK ENERGY, LLC,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Illinois.
    No. 3:19-CV-00802-SMY — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2021 — DECIDED AUGUST 11, 2022
    ____________________
    Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
    Judges.
    JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. The question in this case
    is whether the doctrine of correlative rights prohibits defend-
    ants from using a vacuum pump to extract coal mine methane
    from their property. Plaintiffs Finite Resources, Ltd., Southern
    2                                                   No. 21-1512
    Cross Energy, LLC, and Durango Group, Inc. (collectively,
    “Finite”) take the position that it does, so they sued Defend-
    ants DTE Methane Resources LLC and Keyrock Energy LLC
    for using a vacuum pump to extract valuable gas from de-
    fendants’ property, which abuts Finite’s property. The district
    court concluded that under the rule of capture, Finite did not
    own the gas, which could not be owned until extracted. Be-
    cause Finite’s claims depended on ownership of the gas, the
    district court granted summary judgment for defendants. Fi-
    nite appeals, arguing that the doctrine of correlative rights ne-
    gates the rule of capture and prohibits the use of a vacuum
    pump. To the extent Illinois law is not clear on this issue, Fi-
    nite asks us to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme
    Court. We decline to certify the question and affirm.
    I
    Finite is the majority owner of the Orient #1 Mine, an aban-
    doned coal mine in Franklin County, Illinois. It owns 90.9% of
    the property, while the other 9.1% belongs to the Royal Talon
    Company. In 2004, DTE acquired a lease and interest in the
    Orient #1 Mine for the purpose of extracting coal mine me-
    thane from its section of the property. Coal mine methane is
    gas released from the coal and surrounding strata due to min-
    ing activities. Once treated as a safety hazard, coal mine me-
    thane is now considered a commercially valuable resource.
    To extract coal mine methane from the property, DTE
    drilled two wells on its section of the Orient #1 Mine and, in
    2007, obtained a vacuum permit from the Illinois Department
    of Natural Resources. The permit allowed DTE to use a vac-
    uum pump to assist in extracting coal mine methane from the
    wells. DTE used a vacuum pump until 2012, and then as-
    signed its operations to Keyrock.
    No. 21-1512                                                                3
    For more than ten years, Finite was unaware that defend-
    ants obtained a vacuum permit to extract coal mine methane
    from the wells on the property. Finite discovered defendants’
    use in 2018, after a shut-in test revealed that coal mine me-
    thane had been drained extensively from the Orient # 1 Mine.
    At first, Finite petitioned the IDNR for compulsory unitiza-
    tion, 1 seeking to unitize the parties’ properties and to require
    Keyrock to ratably share their coal mine methane production
    with Finite. But the IDNR denied Finite’s request. So Finite
    sued defendants in state court alleging conversion, trespass,
    accounting, and common law unitization. Finite also sought
    to enjoin defendants from using a vacuum pump to extract
    coal mine methane from the mine.
    Defendants removed the case to federal court, where the
    district court granted summary judgment in favor of defend-
    ants. At summary judgment, the district court determined
    that, under the rule of capture, Finite was not the owner of the
    coal mine methane, which could not be owned until extracted.
    The district court explained that this rule applied regardless
    of whether extraction occurred by means of a vacuum pump.
    Because Finite’s claims hinged on ownership, the district
    court concluded that the rule of capture foreclosed Finite’s
    trespass, conversion, and accounting claims, as well as injunc-
    tive and declaratory relief. The district court also granted
    summary judgment to defendants on Finite’s common law
    1 Unitization is “[t]he collection of producing wells over a reservoir for
    joint operations such as enhanced-recovery techniques.” Black’s Law Dic-
    tionary (11th ed. 2019). It is typically carried out after primary production
    starts to fall off substantially to permit efficient secondary recovery oper-
    ations. Id. And it is done to comply with well-spacing requirements set
    forth by state law or regulation. Id.
    4                                                      No. 21-1512
    unitization claim because the IDNR previously denied Fi-
    nite’s petition for unitization. This appeal followed.
    II
    We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion for
    summary judgment. Flexible Steel Lacing Co. v. Conveyor Acces-
    sories, Inc., 
    955 F.3d 632
    , 643 (7th Cir. 2020). Summary judg-
    ment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to
    any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
    This case concerns two core principles of oil and gas law—
    the rule of capture and correlative rights. The rule of capture,
    which governs the ownership of natural resources including
    gas, provides that “gas that migrates from one property to an-
    other is subject to recovery and possession by the holder of
    the gas estate on the property to which the gas migrates.”
    Cont’l Res. of Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Methane, LLC, 
    364 Ill. App. 3d 691
    , 694 (5th Dist. 2006); see also Brown v. Spilman, 
    155 U.S. 665
    , 670 (1895). Stated simply, the first to “capture” the gas
    becomes the owner of the gas. See 3 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON
    AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 730.3 (3d ed. 2003). The rule
    of capture permits an owner to extract gas from the owner’s
    land, even if the oil and gas migrated from a neighboring
    tract, and even when extraction depletes a single pool or gas
    reservoirs lying beneath adjoining lands. See Briggs v. South-
    western Energy Production Co., 
    224 A.3d 334
    , 337 (Pa. 2020).
    Because the rule of capture allows an owner to extract gas
    from their property without restraint, it limits the “correla-
    tive” rights of neighboring owners. That’s where the doctrine
    of correlative rights comes in. The doctrine of correlative
    rights protects adjoining landowners by permitting them to
    No. 21-1512                                                   5
    “go and do likewise.” Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law,
    4th ed., (1990) §204.4; see also Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas
    Oil & Gas Co., 
    113 Tex. 160
    , 167 (1923) (“[i]f the owners of ad-
    jacent lands have the right to appropriate, without liability,
    the gas and oil underlying their neighbor’s land, then their
    neighbor has the correlative right to appropriate, through like
    methods of drainage, the gas and oil underlying the tracts ad-
    jacent to his own”). This means that “a mineral interest owner
    [has] an opportunity to produce his ‘fair share’” of minerals
    beneath the land. Texas Producing, Inc. v. Fortson Oil Co., 
    798 S.W.2d 622
    , 624 (Tex. App. 1990). But, as relevant here, the
    doctrine of correlative rights also imposes a duty on owners
    not to waste natural resources intentionally or negligently as
    to injure their neighbor. See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 181
    (“[o]ne owner may not waste the product to the injury of a
    neighbor … and has no right to waste, spoil, damage, or ma-
    liciously deplete the common source of supply or do anything
    that deprives another of a reasonable opportunity to extract
    his or her fair share of the deposit”).
    On appeal, Finite does not dispute that the rule of capture
    governs coal mine methane. They insist that they “do not
    claim absolute ownership rights in [the] coal mine[’s] gas.”
    Rather, Finite argues that the defendants’ use of a vacuum
    pump violates their correlative rights because it causes dam-
    age or waste. Therefore, Finite reasons, they should be able to
    proceed on their trespass claim. But we find no support for
    this contention.
    To begin, the IDNR—the state agency tasked with regulat-
    ing oil and gas—specifically issued a vacuum permit to de-
    fendants. Before issuing a permit, the IDNR considers an
    owners’ correlative rights. 62 Ill. Admin. Code § 240.1050. If
    6                                                     No. 21-1512
    the IDNR later determines that a permit violates an owners’
    correlative rights, or causes damage or waste to property, the
    IDNR may revoke a permit. Id. Defendants have maintained
    their vacuum permit for more than a decade, and the record
    indicates that they have never been sanctioned or had their
    permit revoked. Although Finite argued before the district
    court that defendants illegally used a vacuum pump without
    a permit, Finite made clear during oral argument that they do
    not allege that defendants’ use of the vacuum pump violated
    law or regulation (which both parties agree would negate the
    rule of capture). Absent illegality, the IDNR’s issuance of the
    permit alone suggests that defendants’ use of the vacuum
    pump to extract coal mine methane from their property did
    not violate Finite’s correlative rights or otherwise intention-
    ally cause damage and waste.
    Moreover, the limited authority to address this question
    suggests that the use of a vacuum pump to extract gas from
    the property is permitted and does not negate the rule of cap-
    ture. See, e.g., Briggs, 224 A.3d at 337 (citations omitted) (“rule
    of capture applies even where devices such as pumps are
    used to bring the mineral to the surface and thereby reduce
    the production of neighboring wells”); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp.
    v. Garza Energy Trust, 
    268 S.W.3d 1
    , 13 (Tex. 2008) (“[an
    owner] may use hydraulic fracturing to stimulate production
    from his own wells and drain the gas to his own property”);
    Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, 4th ed., (1990) §204.4
    (under the rule of capture, the owner of a tract of land, no
    matter how small, “may by means of a compression or vac-
    uum pump increase the production from his well though the
    result may be to drain his neighbor’s property”). Finite has
    not identified any binding, or even persuasive, authority that
    calls this proposition into question. To the contrary, no court
    No. 21-1512                                                        7
    has held that correlative rights prevent the use of a vacuum
    pump, or that the use of the vacuum pump negates the rule
    of capture.
    Instead, Finite argues that, to the extent it is unclear
    whether the doctrine of correlative rights in Illinois prohibits
    the use of a vacuum pump in coal mine voids, our court
    should certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court. Fed-
    eral courts may ascertain the content of state substantive law
    while sitting in diversity, but we sometimes certify a question
    of state law based on several factors. Those factors include
    whether the case concerns a matter of vital public concern,
    whether the issue in the case is likely to recur in other cases,
    whether the question to be certified is outcome determinative
    of the case, and whether the state supreme court has yet to
    have an opportunity to illuminate a clear path on the issue.
    See Vill. of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 
    876 F.3d 296
    , 302 (7th
    Cir. 2017); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 
    285 F.3d 630
    (7th Cir. 2002) (identifying additional factors). The most im-
    portant factor, however, is whether we feel genuinely uncer-
    tain about an issue of state law. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
    v. Pate, 
    275 F.3d 666
    , 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
    We acknowledge that the Illinois Supreme Court has not
    yet ruled on the issue of vacuum pumps and correlative
    rights, but after considering the above factors, we do not find
    that this is a proper case for certification. Given the limited
    authority on this topic and the IDNR’s regulation of the oil
    and gas industry, including the issuance of vacuum permits,
    we doubt the issue in this case is likely to recur. Finite also has
    not shown how certification would be outcome determina-
    tive. See Allstate, 
    285 F.3d at 639
     (explaining that fact specific
    issues, as well as issues upon which there is no serious doubt
    8                                                   No. 21-1512
    or issues that are not dispositive of the case, are not candi-
    dates for certification). Finite raised claims such as trespass
    that depend on possession of coal mine methane. Finite con-
    ceded that they do not claim absolute ownership of the gas in
    this case, and the doctrine of correlative rights does not grant
    Finite the ownership rights that they need to sustain any of
    their claims. And although Finite argues that the doctrine of
    correlative rights purportedly prevents the use of a vacuum
    pump and therefore negates the rule of capture, the IDNR’s
    actions and other sources suggest otherwise. We therefore
    have no serious doubt about the answer to the question. Fi-
    nite’s request to certify is denied.
    III
    In sum, the rule of capture controls and the doctrine of cor-
    relative rights does not prevent the use of vacuum pumps or
    otherwise vitiate the application of the rule in this case. We
    decline to certify to the Illinois Supreme Court a question
    about whether the doctrine of correlative rights prevents the
    use of a vacuum pump. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district
    court’s judgment.