Freddie James Prewitt v. State of Minnesota ( 2017 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1098
Freddie James Prewitt, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed February 6, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-12-821
Freddie J. Prewitt, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2012, a jury found Freddie Prewitt guilty of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct for sexually assaulting an unconscious woman. This court affirmed his conviction
on direct appeal. State v. Prewitt, No. A12-1456, 2013 WL 3491078, at *1 (Minn. App.
July 15, 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2013).
On March 7, 2016, Prewitt filed a pro se postconviction petition that appeared to
raise the following nine claims: (1) he was convicted under an unconstitutional statute;
(2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial; (3) newly discovered evidence
exists; (4) his due process rights were violated; (5) he was denied equal protection; (6) he
was deprived of his rights “under color of law”; (7) his conviction violated his human
rights; (8) the prosecution intentionally destroyed evidence; and (9) his counsel for his
direct appeal was ineffective. The district court denied the petition without holding an
evidentiary hearing, concluding that the petition is time-barred and that, except for the
ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim, Prewitt’s postconviction claims also are
Knaffla-barred.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
A person claiming that his conviction or sentence violated his constitutional rights
may file a petition for postconviction relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2014). We
review the denial of a postconviction petition, including a request for an evidentiary
hearing, for an abuse of discretion. Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 214 (Minn. 2016).
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We review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its fact-findings for clear
error. Id.I
Prewitt’s postconviction petition is time-barred. A petition for postconviction relief
must be filed within two years of the later of “the entry of judgment of conviction or
sentence if no direct appeal is filed” or “an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s
direct appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1)–(2) (2014). This court affirmed Prewitt’s
conviction on July 15, 2013, and the supreme court denied his petition for further review
on September 25, 2013. Prewitt did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 13 (requiring petitions for writ of certiorari to be
filed within 90 days after the entry of the state court order denying discretionary review).
Prewitt’s conviction therefore became final in December 2013. See Berkovitz v. State, 826
N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 2013) (determining that, for purposes of the two-year limitations
period, the petitioner’s conviction became final 90 days after the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided the direct appeal). Because Prewitt filed his postconviction petition more than two
years later on March 7, 2016, his petition is time-barred.
A petition filed after the two-year time limit may be considered if it satisfies one of
five statutory exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2014). Prewitt argues that the
exceptions for mental disease, newly discovered evidence, and the interests of justice apply
here. Id., subd. 4(b)(1)–(2), (5). Under these exceptions, Prewitt was required to file his
petition within two years of the date the claim giving rise to the invoked exception accrued.
Id., subd. 4(c). “A claim arises when the petitioner objectively knew or should have known
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that he had a claim.” Hooper v. State, 888 N.W.2d 138, 142, (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted).
Mental Disease
A court may hear an untimely postconviction petition when “the petitioner
establishes that a physical disability or mental disease precluded a timely assertion of the
claim.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(1). Prewitt asserts generally that he suffers from
mental illness and has a low education level. But he does not explain why this prevented
him from timely asserting his claims. Prewitt therefore is not entitled to relief under this
exception.
Newly Discovered Evidence
For the newly-discovered-evidence exception to apply, the petitioner must:
(1) allege the existence of newly discovered evidence;
(2) which could not have been ascertained by the exercise of
due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within
the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition;
(3) which is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial; (4) is
not for impeachment purposes; and (5) which establishes by a
clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent of
the offense for which the petitioner was convicted.
Scott v. State, 788 N.W.2d 497, 501–02 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
4(b)(2)). The petitioner must establish all five elements to obtain relief. Riley v. State, 819
N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2012).
Prewitt appears to argue that newly discovered evidence exists “in the form of
hidden hospital medical records that revealed the alleged victim in this case suffered from
two fatal sexually transmitted diseases . . . without being treated for over three months” as
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well as evidence of photographic lineups conducted outside of his presence. But this
evidence is not new. Prewitt states in his petition that he learned of the medical records in
May 2012, prior to his direct appeal. Similarly, the record shows that he received discovery
containing the photographic lineups prior to trial. Because Prewitt knew about the evidence
“within the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition,” he is not entitled to
relief under the newly-discovered-evidence exception. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subds.
4(b)(2), (c).
Interests of Justice
The interests-of-justice exception has two requirements: “(1) that the petition is not
frivolous and (2) that reviewing the petition is in the interests of justice.” Berkovitz, 826
N.W.2d at 209. “[T]he interests-of-justice exception is triggered by an injustice that caused
the petitioner to miss the primary deadline in subdivision 4(a), not the substance of the
petition.” Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn. 2012). Prewitt does not identify
any injustice that caused him to miss the two-year deadline. Rather, the arguments in his
petition are directed entirely to the substance of his claims. The interests-of-justice
exception does not apply.
II
Eight claims in Prewitt’s petition are Knaffla-barred. Under the Knaffla rule, when
a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal, all claims that were raised in the
direct appeal are procedurally barred. Swaney, 882 N.W.2d at 214 (citing State v. Knaffla,
309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976)). “The Knaffla rule also bars all claims
that were known or should have been known at the time of the direct appeal.” Id. at 215
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(footnote omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (“A petition for postconviction
relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have
been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.”). The supreme court has
recognized two exceptions to the Knaffla rule: (1) “a claim is not barred if the claim
involves an issue so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the time of
the direct appeal,” and (2) under “the interests-of-justice exception, the court may review
a claim as fairness requires if the claim has substantive merit and the petitioner did not
deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue in a previous proceeding.” Swaney, 882
N.W.2d at 215.
The first eight of Prewitt’s claims are Knaffla-barred because he could have raised
them on direct appeal but did not do so. And Prewitt does not argue that any exceptions to
the Knaffla rule apply here. Only Prewitt’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel
claim is not procedurally barred because it could not have been raised on direct appeal. See
Schneider v. State, 725 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 2007). But this claim nevertheless is time-
barred, as already discussed.
III
Prewitt suggests that the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition
without an evidentiary hearing. “A postconviction court need not grant a hearing on a claim
if the files and records of the proceeding conclusively establish that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief.” Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 2015) (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2014)). “Accordingly, a postconviction court may summarily deny a
claim that is untimely under the postconviction statute of limitations or procedurally barred
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under Knaffla.” Id. (citation omitted). Because the record shows that Prewitt is not entitled
to relief on any of his claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily
denying his petition.
Affirmed.
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