State Of Iowa Vs. Tyler Ray Oberhart , 789 N.W.2d 161 ( 2010 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–1756
Filed October 1, 2010
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
TYLER RAY OBERHART,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Dale B.
Hagen, Judge.
Defendant seeks further review of the court of appeals’ decision
affirming his first-degree murder conviction. DECISION OF COURT OF
APPEALS VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
Richard E.H. Phelps II of Phelps Law Office, Mingo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant
Attorney General, and Michael K. Jacobsen, County Attorney, for
appellee.
2
TERNUS, Chief Justice.
This matter comes to us on further review of the court of appeals’
decision affirming the first-degree murder conviction of appellant,
Tyler Ray Oberhart. We have taken the case on further review to
consider Oberhart’s argument that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to move to suppress incriminating statements
Oberhart made to law enforcement officers. 1 See State v. Doggett, 687
N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 2004) (declining to exercise discretion on further
review to consider all issues raised on appeal, deciding instead to
consider only the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim). The court of
appeals concluded the record on this issue was sufficient to decide this
claim on direct appeal and then found the record established that trial
counsel had not been ineffective. We believe the court of appeals erred in
finding the record on direct appeal sufficient and, therefore, preserve for
postconviction review the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to move to suppress defendant’s video statement.
On October 6, 2007, Oberhart stabbed Jerry Pittman II during an
attempt to scare Pittman into giving Oberhart and his friends drugs or
money. Oberhart was charged with felony murder based on the
predicate felony of robbery. During the police investigation that ensued,
seventeen-year-old Oberhart was given juvenile Miranda warnings. He
waived his rights and gave a videotaped statement of his participation in
Pittman’s death. He now asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to move to suppress this statement because the Miranda warnings
he was given implied a false promise of leniency, rendering his statement
1The court of appeals’ decision is final as to the other issues raised by the
defendant on appeal. See Everly v. Knoxville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 774 N.W.2d 488, 492
(Iowa 2009).
3
involuntary. See State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 28–29 (Iowa 2005)
(holding trial counsel breached an essential duty by failing to object to
admission of defendant’s statement on ground that it was induced by
promise of leniency rendering statement involuntary and inadmissible).
The juvenile Miranda warnings given to Oberhart included the
following information: “Anything you say can be used against you in a
court of law. This includes the adult criminal court if the juvenile court
waives jurisdiction. Do you understand that?” Oberhart asserts this
warning implied the charges against him would be filed in juvenile court
and would be transferred to adult criminal court only if the juvenile court
waived jurisdiction. He argues this information was inaccurate as to him
because he was being investigated for a forcible felony. A forcible felony
is tried in adult court if the person charged is sixteen years or older,
unless the case is transferred back to juvenile court for good cause. See
Iowa Code § 232.8(1)(c) (2007). Oberhart maintains that, because the
juvenile warnings implied a promise of leniency that did not exist in his
situation, any subsequent statement was not voluntarily given. Based
on this argument, Oberhart asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to move to suppress his video statement.
This court has held that, under Iowa Code section 814.7, a
defendant need not make a record on direct appeal to preserve an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for postconviction review. State v.
Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010). We stated in Johnson:
Based on the provisions of section 814.7, we hold defendants
are no longer required to raise ineffective-assistance claims
on direct appeal, and when they choose to do so, they are
not required to make any particular record in order to
preserve the claim for postconviction relief.
. . . If the defendant requests that the court decide the
claim on direct appeal, it is for the court to determine
whether the record is adequate, and if so, to resolve the
4
claim. If, however, the court determines the claim cannot be
addressed on appeal, the court must preserve it for a
postconviction-relief proceeding, regardless of the court’s
view of the potential viability of the claim.
Id.
Applying these principles here, we note that the court of appeals
concluded the record was sufficient to decide this matter on direct
appeal. Nonetheless, the reasons given by the court of appeals for
finding that Oberhart’s ineffective-assistance claim fails include: (1)
Oberhart did not claim he would not have waived his Miranda rights had
he been told that, if he were charged with a forcible felony, he would be
tried in adult court unless waived back to juvenile court; 2 (2) he
presented no evidence that he lacked sufficient intelligence to
understand his rights or the effect of the waiver; and (3) he made no
claim the circumstances surrounding the questioning caused duress.
These grounds rest on the absence of supporting evidence in the record,
and therefore, we disagree with the court of appeals’ assessment that the
record is adequate to decide Oberhart’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim with regard to suppression of his video statement. Accordingly,
without regard to the ultimate merit of such a claim and pursuant to our
obligation under section 814.7(3), we preserve this claim for
postconviction review. We vacate the court of appeals’ contrary decision.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART;
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
2Our reference to this ground of the court of appeals’ decision should not be
viewed as an indication that it states the correct test for prejudice under an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. See State v. Hrbek, 336 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Iowa 1983)
(finding ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to move to
suppress defendant’s involuntary statement with no requirement that defendant show
he would not have made statement had he not been given a promise of leniency); accord
McCoy, 692 N.W.2d at 26–27.