Jared Stubblefield v. Clerk of the Circuit Court of ( 2020 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted March 26, 2020*
    Decided March 27, 2020
    Before
    DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
    MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
    MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
    No. 19-2567
    JARED STUBBLEFIELD,                               Appeal from the United States
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                         District Court for the Northern District
    of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    v.                                          No. 19 C 2715
    CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF                     Matthew F. Kennelly,
    COOK COUNTY, et al.,                              Judge.
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER
    Jared Stubblefield sued the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, the City of
    Chicago, and the State of Illinois for preventing him from obtaining “attorney’s fees” for
    successfully defending himself against traffic citations in state court. (He later named
    the police officer who issued the traffic citations as a defendant.) He alleged that the
    state traffic court violated his right of equal protection by not allowing him to seek
    *  The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
    appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that
    this case is appropriate for summary disposition. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    No. 19-2567                                                                        Page 2
    $12 million in compensation for his self-representation. After twice dismissing
    Stubblefield’s complaints with leave to amend, the district court dismissed his second
    amended complaint with prejudice as legally frivolous. We affirm the judgment.
    On appeal, Stubblefield does not make any legal argument for disturbing the
    district court’s judgment. But even if we generously construe his pro se appellate brief
    as arguing that he stated a nonfrivolous claim, he must lose. In his second amended
    complaint Stubblefield invoked Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
    Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971), and on appeal he invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On the facts
    alleged, he could not state a plausible claim under either theory. Stubblefield has not
    sued any individual federal defendants, so Bivens does not apply. 
    See 403 U.S. at 395
    ;
    Small v. Chao, 
    398 F.3d 894
    , 898 (7th Cir. 2005). And § 1983 establishes a cause of action
    only for the deprivation of the “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
    Constitution and laws” of the United States. Stubblefield, however, has no right under
    the Constitution or other federal law to receive attorney’s fees (it is unclear from whom)
    for defeating his traffic tickets as a pro se litigant. Simply invoking the phraseology of
    the Constitution in connection with these alleged facts is insufficient to state a claim.
    See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (to state a claim pleading must do more
    than offer “labels and conclusions” or conclusory legal assertions); Avila v. Pappas,
    
    591 F.3d 552
    , 553 (7th Cir. 2010) (simply uttering the word “Constitution” is insufficient
    even to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction). The district court was correct to
    dismiss this case as lacking in merit.
    AFFIRMED