Muhammad Siddique v. Michael Mukasey , 547 F.3d 814 ( 2008 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 08-1127
    M UHAMMAD S IDDIQUE,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    M ICHAEL B. M UKASEY, Attorney General of
    the United States,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    A RGUED O CTOBER 15, 2008—D ECIDED O CTOBER 31, 2008
    Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and C OFFEY and W OOD ,
    Circuit Judges.
    E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. An alien who knowingly
    presents a frivolous application for asylum, after being
    warned that every representation must be truthful, is
    “permanently ineligible for any benefits” under the
    immigration laws. 
    8 U.S.C. §1158
    (d)(6). A regulation
    defines a frivolous application as one any material element
    2                                               No. 08-1127
    of which has been fabricated. 
    8 C.F.R. §1208.20
    . See also
    Matter of Y– L–, 24 I.&N. Dec. 151, 155 (2007). Both an
    immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals
    concluded that Muhammad Siddique knowingly presented
    a frivolous application for asylum; the result is not only a
    removal order but also ineligibility for adjustment of
    status.
    Siddique, a citizen of Pakistan, contended that he had
    been persecuted (and faced future persecution) in Pakistan
    because he worked for and supports the Mohajir Qaumi
    Movement (MQM), a political party of mohajirs—persons
    who immigrated from India when the British colony was
    partitioned in 1947, and their descendants. Siddique
    contends that the police in Karachi, where he lived,
    frequently arrest, beat, and even kill MQM’s members and
    supporters. According to Siddique’s application for asylum
    and testimony at a hearing, the police gunned down his
    wife and two-year-old son as the family was leaving an
    MQM meeting. The police arrested and detained him after
    these events; as soon as he was released on bond, Siddique
    testified, he went into hiding and fled to Canada and,
    eventually, the United States. To bolster his story, Siddique
    submitted autopsy reports for his wife and son, plus a
    police report documenting his arrest (according to this
    report, the police charged Siddique with attempted
    murder).
    The IJ credited Siddique’s story but denied his applica-
    tion for asylum, in part because he had failed to seek
    asylum in Canada before entering the United States. While
    Siddique’s appeal to the BIA was pending, he married a
    No. 08-1127                                               3
    citizen of the United States, who applied on his behalf for
    an immediate-relative visa. Meanwhile immigration
    officials studied the documents that Siddique had submit-
    ted to the immigration judge and concluded that they are
    phony. Both Siddique and the agency asked the BIA to
    remand without reaching the merits—Siddique so that his
    status could be adjusted to that of permanent resident on
    an I-130 visa, and the agency so that the IJ could consider
    the analysis of the documents.
    Faced with proof that the police and autopsy reports had
    been forged, plus proof that he had not married in Pakistan
    or had a child, Siddique confessed during a hearing on his
    wife's visa application that “none of the incidents in [the
    asylum] claim ever happened.” In a new hearing before the
    IJ, Siddique added that he had invented “some of” the
    activities he claimed to have performed as an employee
    and supporter of the MQM. Still, he insisted, all members
    of MQM face persecution in Pakistan, so he renewed his
    request for asylum. The IJ found his application frivolous,
    since it rested on both forgery and perjury, which Siddique
    did not recant until after the agency had tracked down the
    truth. The conclusion that Siddique’s application was
    frivolous disqualified him from adjustment of status, and
    the IJ said that it would therefore be pointless to continue
    the proceedings until the agency resolved his wife’s I-130
    application. The immigration judge also denied asylum as
    an exercise of discretion, given Siddique’s dissembling,
    independent of the formal finding that the application was
    frivolous. The BIA affirmed.
    The   portion   of   the   bureaucracy   responsible   for
    4                                                 No. 08-1127
    immediate-relative applications chugged away and
    approved his wife’s petition in May 2008. Siddique argues
    that by approving this petition, and taking related steps,
    the Citizenship and Immigration Service has “waived” his
    disqualification under §1158(d)(6) and that we should
    therefore remand with instructions to adjust his status to
    that of permanent resident. Neither §1158(d)(6) nor any
    other section of the Immigration and Nationality
    Act allows the agency to “waive” an alien’s permanent
    disqualification. Nor has it done so. The bureau responsible
    for I-130 matters processed his wife’s application—perhaps
    because the left hand does not know what the right hand
    is doing, perhaps to avoid delay should this court vacate
    the disqualification order—but a favorable decision on that
    application is just one step toward permanent residence.
    An approved immediate-relative application is a necessary
    but not a sufficient condition for adjustment of status. The
    motion for remand is denied.
    To the extent that Siddique wants us to review the IJ’s
    order denying his request for a continuance, we lack
    jurisdiction. See 
    8 U.S.C. §1252
    (a)(2)(B)(ii); Ali v. Gonzales,
    
    502 F.3d 659
     (7th Cir. 2007). But the finding that his
    application for asylum was frivolous does not represent an
    exercise of administrative discretion within the scope of
    §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), so Siddique is entitled to judicial review
    of the agency’s conclusion that he is permanently ineligible
    for any benefit under the immigration laws.
    Whether an application rests on false submissions is a
    question of fact. Whether a falsehood is knowing also is a
    question of fact. Likewise whether a given proposition is
    No. 08-1127                                                  5
    “material” is a question of fact. See United States v. Gaudin,
    
    515 U.S. 506
     (1995). It follows that the inquiry for a court of
    appeals is whether the agency’s decision is supported by
    substantial evidence. See Lazar v. Gonzales, 
    500 F.3d 469
    ,
    474 (6th Cir. 2007); Ignatova v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 1209
    , 1214
    (8th Cir. 2005). Siddique relies on several decisions sug-
    gesting that judges should play a larger role because of the
    unyielding consequence prescribed by §1158(d)(6).
    See Luciana v. Attorney General, 
    502 F.3d 273
    , 278–79 (3d Cir.
    2007); Chen v. Mukasey, 
    527 F.3d 935
    , 939 (9th Cir.
    2008); Barreto-Claro v. Attorney General, 
    275 F.3d 1334
    , 1338
    (11th Cir. 2001). But all of these decisions concern de novo
    review (subject to qualification under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
    Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
     (1984))
    of the agency’s legal understandings. There is no conflict
    on the standard of review when the only issue is whether
    particular representations are knowingly false or material.
    Siddique maintains that the IJ and BIA failed to inquire
    whether his fraud was material. That’s not so. Both the IJ
    and the BIA observed that the representations—that
    Siddique’s wife and son had been murdered after a politi-
    cal meeting, and that he had been arrested on trumped-up
    charges—were the application’s principal basis. Take them
    away and the application collapses. Siddique knew that his
    representations were false: Although it is possible to
    submit forged documents thinking them to be genuine
    (someone else may have misled the alien about their
    provenance, see Kourski v. Ashcroft, 
    355 F.3d 1038
     (7th Cir.
    2004)), Siddique knew that he had neither a wife nor a
    child in Pakistan, that the police had not murdered his
    (nonexistent) family, and that he had not been arrested and
    6                                                 No. 08-1127
    charged with attempted murder. He could not have
    believed that his representations were true.
    According to Siddique, people regularly lie to the
    government in Pakistan to get benefits, so he thought that
    he should proceed in the same fashion in the United States.
    We need not decide whether Siddique’s latest representa-
    tion about life in Pakistan is correct (his history does not
    inspire confidence). Aliens must tell the truth to officials in
    the United States. The possibility of cultural differences is
    one reason why Congress directed immigration officials to
    notify aliens, at the outset of the asylum process, that
    honesty is essential, and to foreclose remedies under the
    immigration laws only if an alien tells material lies after
    being informed about the consequences of frivolous
    applications. 
    8 U.S.C. §1158
    (d)(4)(A), (6). Siddique received
    the required notice. He chose to disregard the warning and
    must pay the price of his decision. He should count himself
    lucky that he has not been prosecuted for perjury.
    The petition for review is dismissed for want of jurisdic-
    tion to the extent that it challenges the IJ’s discretionary
    decisions and denied to the extent that it contests the
    permanent bar on any benefit under the immigration laws.
    10-31-08