Sharif Pharmacy Inc. v. Prime Therapeutics LLC ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 18-2725
    SHARIF PHARMACY, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    PRIME THERAPEUTICS, LLC,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 1:17-cv-03464 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.
    ____________________
    No. 18-3003
    HELEN J. SCALE, et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    PRIME THERAPEUTICS, LLC, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 1:17-cv-06837 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
    ____________________
    2                                           Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003
    SUBMITTED OCTOBER 7, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 24, 2020*
    ____________________
    Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
    HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. The issue in these consolidated
    appeals is whether plaintiffs in two similar cases have stated
    viable claims under Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
    U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. They have not. We affirm the judgments of
    both district courts dismissing the cases on the plaintiffs’
    pleadings, though in one case with slight modifications.
    I. The Prime Network and the Plaintiffs
    Defendant Prime Therapeutics LLC is a pharmacy benefits
    manager. Plaintiffs Sharif Pharmacy, Inc. and J&S Commu-
    nity Pharmacy, Inc. were both members of the Prime phar-
    macy network. Under Medicare, Medicaid, and private health
    insurance plans, many patients had significant financial in-
    centives to buy their prescription drugs from pharmacies
    within the network. Prime terminated both Sharif and J&S
    from the network after audits uncovered, in Prime’s view, ir-
    regularities in invoicing for prescription drugs. Prime is
    owned in part by the insurer Blue Cross Blue Shield, and
    plaintiffs suggest that membership in the network is required
    in order for pharmacies in certain states to accept Blue Cross
    *These cases were scheduled for oral argument on September 18,
    2019. On September 12, 2019, new counsel for plaintiffs in both cases
    moved to vacate oral argument and to have the cases submitted on the
    briefs. Two defendants opposed the motion; two others took no position.
    The panel vacated the oral argument and has concluded that the briefs
    presented the cases adequately under these circumstances. See Fed. R.
    App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003                                                 3
    Blue Shield, Medicare, and Medicaid prescription drug insur-
    ance plans. We assume, therefore, that termination from the
    Prime network hurt Sharif’s and J&S’s businesses.1
    Sharif and J&S filed these suits alleging that their termina-
    tions from the Prime network violated the federal Sherman
    Act. Three customers joined the J&S action as plaintiffs who
    had to switch to different, less convenient pharmacies, at least
    for a time. In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the audits
    were pretextual and that Prime really terminated both phar-
    macies’ participation in its network in an attempt to get rid of
    competition with Walgreens, with whom it had entered a joint
    venture in August 2016. Prime sent letters to both pharmacies’
    customers saying that Sharif and J&S would no longer accept
    their insurance and recommending that customers have their
    prescriptions filled at a nearby Walgreens. Prime also retained
    funds from both pharmacies as a result of the audits.
    II. The J&S Suit
    The two cases took different paths through the district
    court and on appeal, presenting different issues. We begin
    with the J&S suit, which has been affected by events while the
    appeal has been pending. First, J&S itself obtained reinstate-
    ment in the Prime network. J&S then moved to dismiss its ap-
    peal voluntarily under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
    42(b). We granted that motion, so J&S itself is no longer as-
    serting any claims in the lawsuit. The reinstatement has also
    rendered moot the customer-plaintiffs’ request for injunctive
    relief restoring J&S to the Prime network. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v.
    1 For example, J&S alleged that more than 80 percent of its prescrip-
    tion-drug customers are insured by Medicare, Medicaid, or Blue Cross
    Blue Shield.
    4                                         Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003
    Flambeau, Inc., 
    846 F.3d 941
    , 949–50 (7th Cir. 2017). We may
    not pass on the merits of “moot questions or abstract propo-
    sitions.” Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc. v. DiMartinis, 
    495 F.3d 500
    ,
    503 (7th Cir. 2007), citing Calderon v. Moore, 
    518 U.S. 149
    , 150
    (1996).
    That leaves only the customers’ claims for damages in the
    J&S lawsuit. Those claims are not moot, but they cannot be
    remedied directly in federal antitrust litigation. It has long
    been recognized that the primary purpose of the federal anti-
    trust laws is to protect the welfare of customers. E.g., NCAA
    v. Board of Regents, 
    468 U.S. 85
    , 107 (1984), citing Reiter v. Son-
    otone Corp., 
    442 U.S. 330
    , 343 (1979), quoting in turn Robert H.
    Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself 66 (1978);
    Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 
    807 F.2d 520
    , 535–36 (7th Cir. 1986);
    
    id. at 585
    (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Perhaps ironically,
    however, it is well established under federal antitrust law’s
    Illinois Brick doctrine that customers of parties more directly
    injured by an alleged antitrust violation do not have standing
    to assert their own claims for damages. See Apple Inc. v. Pep-
    per, 
    139 S. Ct. 1514
    , 1520–21 (2019) (applying Illinois Brick rules
    to section 2 claims for monopolization); Illinois Brick Co. v. Il-
    linois, 
    431 U.S. 720
    (1977); see also Loeb Industries, Inc. v. Sumi-
    tomo Corp., 
    306 F.3d 469
    , 481–82 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining Il-
    linois Brick and its limits).
    The Court explained in Illinois Brick that antitrust defend-
    ants are not permitted to argue that their direct victims were
    not injured because they were able to pass along price in-
    creases to their 
    customers. 431 U.S. at 724
    –26, discussing Han-
    over Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 
    392 U.S. 481
    (1968). Illinois Brick extended the same principle to bar claims
    by indirect purchasers (such as customers) even if they were
    Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003                                          5
    the ultimate victims of the violations. Because J&S Pharmacy
    would have been most directly affected by any alleged anti-
    trust violation, its own customers may not bring their own
    claims for damages under the Sherman Act.
    The customer plaintiffs alleged that they depended on J&S
    Community Pharmacy because it was the only pharmacy
    within walking distance that had accepted their insurance.
    During the time when J&S was excluded from the Prime phar-
    macy network, the customers were injured because they
    could no longer use it to fill their prescriptions and were “too
    poor or physically or mentally weak to regularly travel to a
    distant pharmacy for their medicine,” “particularly during in-
    clement weather.”
    We take these plaintiffs at their word, of course. We do not
    doubt that the exclusion of their familiar and most convenient
    pharmacy from their insurance coverage caused significant
    inconvenience and even hardship to them. Such harms, how-
    ever, have not been treated as injury to “business or property”
    as required to recover damages under the Sherman Act, 15
    U.S.C. § 15(a). Even if we assumed for the sake of argument
    that the exclusion of J&S Pharmacy from the Prime network
    might have violated the Sherman Act (though we reject Sha-
    rif’s similar claims on the merits, below), its customers would
    not be entitled to sue for damages under that Act.
    Courts and commentators have long been concerned with
    calibrating antitrust standing doctrine in order both to cap-
    ture “the full cost of an antitrust violation … by looking to the
    injuries to all victims,” and to ensure that “the defendant
    should not be made to pay twice for the very same injury.”
    Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An
    Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 339a (4th
    6                                            Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003
    ed. 2019). Here, the relief sought by the customer-plaintiffs
    would duplicate any relief that J&S could have sought on its
    own behalf. Their claims are barred because they would “sub-
    stantially increase[] the possibility of inconsistent adjudica-
    tions [ ]and therefore of unwarranted multiple liability for the
    defendant[.]” Illinois 
    Brick, 431 U.S. at 730
    .2
    III. The Sharif Pharmacy Suit
    Although we affirm the dismissal of the J&S suit for rea-
    sons unrelated to the merit or lack of merit of the allegations
    of Sherman Act violations, the Sharif Pharmacy appeal pre-
    sents the merits squarely. Sharif alleges in essence that Prime
    Therapeutics and Walgreens have created a joint venture that
    encourages patients insured through Prime to buy their pre-
    scription drugs at Walgreens and not at other competing retail
    pharmacies like Sharif. The allegations fail to state a viable
    claim under either Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
    so we affirm.
    In antitrust parlance, Sharif alleges a variant on a claim for
    exclusive dealing and/or a refusal to deal. Sharif alleges in ef-
    fect that Prime prefers to deal with Walgreens rather than Sha-
    rif. Sharif has not alleged a horizontal agreement (i.e., among
    competitors) to fix prices or divide markets, so the case is not
    subject to the rule of per se illegality under Section 1 of the
    Sherman Act. Under the rule of reason for Section 1 cases, ex-
    clusive dealing or refusals to deal could violate Section 1 only
    if a defendant has monopoly or market power in a relevant
    2  Given our holdings here as to mootness and antitrust standing, we
    have considered but see no need to reach the arguments raised by the State
    of Illinois under the Eleventh Amendment and the Sherman Act state ac-
    tion immunity doctrine.
    Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003                                          7
    market. See generally, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products,
    Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
    551 U.S. 877
    , 885–87 (2007) (summarizing
    per se illegality and rule of reason).
    Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization
    and attempts to monopolize, but with narrow exceptions it al-
    lows even firms with monopoly power to choose with whom
    they deal and on what terms and conditions. Even monopo-
    lists “are free to choose the parties with whom they will deal,
    as well as the prices, terms, and conditions of that dealing.”
    Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 
    555 U.S. 438
    , 448 (2009), citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 
    250 U.S. 300
    , 307 (1919).
    There are “limited circumstances” under which a monop-
    olist’s refusal to deal with a competitor will be illegal anticom-
    petitive conduct. Id.; see generally Verizon Communications Inc.
    v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
    540 U.S. 398
    (2004); Aspen
    Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
    472 U.S. 585
    (1985);
    Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1800c5 (“Section 2 of
    the Sherman Act reaches unilateral refusals to deal when the
    refusals constitute monopolization … .”). To begin even to try
    to fit this case into these relatively narrow exceptions, Sharif
    would need to allege that Prime and/or Walgreens either have
    or are dangerously likely to obtain monopoly power in a rel-
    evant market.
    So, in the absence of an alleged per se violation of Section
    1, Sharif’s federal claims require it to identify a relevant prod-
    uct and geographic market in which Prime and/or Walgreens
    have or were dangerously likely to obtain monopoly power.
    Even at the pleading stage, it is sufficiently clear that Sharif
    cannot identify an appropriate geographic market where a
    defendant had or threatened to have monopoly power.
    8                                       Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003
    A “relevant market” under the Sherman Act is comprised
    of the “commodities reasonably interchangeable by consum-
    ers for the same purposes.” United States v. E.I. Du Pont de
    Nemours & Co., 
    351 U.S. 377
    , 395 (1956). “A properly defined
    market excludes other potential suppliers (1) whose product
    is too different (product dimension) or too far away (geo-
    graphic dimension) and (2) who are not likely to shift
    promptly to offer defendant’s customers a suitably proximate
    (in both product and geographic terms) alternative.” Areeda
    & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 530a.
    Geographic Market: Sharif has not plausibly alleged that ei-
    ther Prime or Walgreens has or threatens to gain monopoly
    power in a relevant geographic market. In its proposed sec-
    ond amended complaint, Sharif identified three areas that
    might serve as relevant geographic markets. In the section en-
    titled “The Geographic Market,” Sharif alleges that the rele-
    vant market in this case is “nation-wide for Prime and
    Walgreens.” Sharif argues, quoting a Dow Jones wire article,
    that Prime and Walgreens were joining forces to give
    Walgreens “more muscle to compete against CVS Health’s in-
    tegrated model that combines a retail pharmacy chain with a
    large PBM [pharmacy benefits manager].” The proposed
    complaint construes this news coverage as “a public admis-
    sion by Defendants that through their partnership, and the
    scheme Plaintiff alleges above where Prime terminates phar-
    macies’ ability to sell prescription drugs, they will violate an-
    titrust laws nation-wide to increase their market share of pre-
    scription drugs.” Elsewhere in the proposed complaint, Sharif
    asserts that “the five-block area” surrounding its pharmacy
    and “the Chicago market area” are geographic regions in
    which Prime is seeking to terminate the network participation
    of possible Walgreens competitors.
    Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003                                           9
    The United States as a whole and the Chicago metropoli-
    tan area are plausible geographic markets for retail prescrip-
    tion drug sales, but we see no plausible allegation that Prime
    and/or Walgreens have or threaten to gain monopoly power
    in a nationwide or metropolitan Chicago market for retail pre-
    scription drug sales. Plaintiff’s assertion that the defendants
    merely sought to increase their market shares does not come
    close to satisfying the requirement of actual or threatened mo-
    nopoly power. Antitrust law assumes that all competitors
    seek to increase their respective market shares, especially by
    business arrangements that will offer more attractive prod-
    ucts and services to their customers.
    Sharif’s assertion that the five-block radius around its lo-
    cation is a relevant market is not plausible. The antitrust stat-
    utes require a “pragmatic” and “factual” approach to defining
    the geographic market. Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 
    370 U.S. 294
    ,
    336 (1962). The market must “correspond to the commercial
    realities of the industry.” 
    Id., quoted in
    Federal Trade Comm’n
    v. Advocate Health Care Network, 
    841 F.3d 460
    , 468 (7th Cir.
    2016) (quotations omitted). Where geographic convenience is
    important to consumers, retail markets can be small, see
    United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 
    374 U.S. 321
    , 358 (1963),
    but not this small. It defies belief to suggest that a hypothetical
    monopolist retail pharmacy could raise its drug prices sub-
    stantially without losing customers to competitors outside
    that tiny area. See also 42nd Parallel North v. E Street Denim Co.,
    
    286 F.3d 401
    , 406 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting as “absurdly small”
    a proposed market for retail designer jeans and tee-shirts
    comprising only the “central business district” of Highland
    Park, Illinois).
    10                                      Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003
    Product Market: Though we could affirm the judgment of
    the district court solely on the basis of our geographic market
    analysis, for two reasons, we also address plaintiffs’ failure to
    plead a proper product market. First, though its discussion
    was brief, the district court did address the issue, and its anal-
    ysis would have been sufficient to support its decision. Sec-
    ond, Prime Therapeutics has taken an aggressive position on
    appeal: that “claiming a market of all ‘prescription drugs’ is
    meaningless” and that “attempting to measure the inter-
    changeability of countless unnamed ‘prescription drugs’ is an
    impossible task.” Sharif has not pleaded facts sufficient to
    support an inference that defendants have the requisite mar-
    ket power within a viable product market for retail prescrip-
    tion drugs. Sharif’s failure, however, does not mean that no
    future antitrust plaintiff may be able to do so.
    “The outer boundaries of a product market are deter-
    mined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the
    cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and sub-
    stitutes for it.” Brown 
    Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325
    . Sharif asserts that
    the relevant product market is retail prescription drugs. De-
    fendants contend that this product market is not plausible be-
    cause more than 39,000 prescription drugs are sold in the
    United States, and of course one prescription drug may be in-
    terchangeable with only a few or perhaps no others. Contrary
    to the defense arguments, however, and subject to appropri-
    ate proof, we see no necessarily fatal flaw in treating that bun-
    dle or cluster of prescription drugs that are typically sold in
    brick-and-mortar retail pharmacies as a relevant product mar-
    ket.
    A cluster of products can comprise a relevant product
    market “if the cluster is itself an object of consumer demand.”
    Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003                                         11
    Advocate Health Care 
    Network, 841 F.3d at 467
    (quotations omit-
    ted). As the Tenth Circuit noted in Green Country Food Market,
    Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC, 
    371 F.3d 1275
    , 1283–85 (10th Cir.
    2004), the Supreme Court has recognized such “cluster” mar-
    kets in banking, see United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank &
    Trust Co., 
    399 U.S. 350
    , 360–61 (1970); United States v. Philadel-
    phia Nat’l Bank, 
    374 U.S. 321
    , 356–57 (1963), and central-station
    home security products, see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 
    384 U.S. 563
    , 572–73 (1966). The Court said in Grinnell Corp. that
    “We see no barrier to combining in a single market a number
    of different products or services where that combination re-
    flects commercial realities.”
    Health care services can be suitable subjects for such “clus-
    ter” product markets. In Advocate Health Care Network, we rec-
    ognized “inpatient general acute care services—specifically,
    those services sold to commercial health plans and their mem-
    bers” as a product market, including those “medical services
    and procedures that require admission to a hospital, such as
    abdominal surgeries, childbirth, treatment of serious infec-
    tions, and some emergency 
    care.” 841 F.3d at 468
    . See also,
    e.g., Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem, 
    669 F.3d 802
    (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing bundled hospital services as
    product market); Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc.,
    
    864 F.2d 1409
    , 1412 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989) (retail supermarkets de-
    fined relevant product market); see generally Grinnell 
    Corp., 384 U.S. at 572
    –73 & n.6 (commercial realities showed that
    central-station alarm companies needed to offer all or nearly
    all types of property-protection services, making cluster of
    services a relevant product market); Areeda & Hovenkamp,
    ¶ 565c (recognizing that surgical services might be appropri-
    ate “cluster” product market, but criticizing other attempts to
    establish cluster product markets).
    12                                      Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003
    We close with a note about resolving these appeals on the
    pleadings, with the federal claims dismissed with prejudice.
    Since federal civil pleading standards changed so dramati-
    cally in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    (2007), and
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    (2009), it has been especially im-
    portant for district courts to give leave freely to amend plead-
    ings. E.g., Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago and North-
    west Indiana, 
    786 F.3d 510
    , 519–20 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting
    cases). Uncertainty about application of the Twombly-Iqbal
    standard means that a plaintiff whose original complaint has
    been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) should ordinarily be
    given at least one opportunity to try to amend its complaint
    before the action itself is dismissed with prejudice. 
    Id. In these
    cases, however, it is apparent that the federal antitrust claims
    are based on misunderstandings about foundational princi-
    ples of antitrust law. It is evident from the proceedings in the
    district courts and the arguments in plaintiffs’ appellate briefs
    that the defects in these cases cannot be corrected, so that fur-
    ther amendment would be futile. E.g., 
    Runnion, 786 F.3d at 520
    ; Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 
    499 F.3d 663
    , 666–67 (7th Cir. 2007). The district courts thus did
    not err in dismissing these federal antitrust claims with prej-
    udice.
    * * * * *
    The judgment of the district court in the J&S Pharmacy
    case dismissing the Sherman Act claims of J&S customers
    Scale, Thomas, and Brown with prejudice is AFFIRMED as to
    plaintiffs’ damage claims; dismissal of those plaintiffs’ claims
    for injunctive relief is AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED to dismiss
    those claims as moot; and dismissal of those plaintiffs’ state-
    law claims without prejudice is also AFFIRMED. In the Sharif
    Nos. 18-2725 & 18-3003                                    13
    Pharmacy case, the dismissal of the Sherman Act claims with
    prejudice and dismissal of the state-law claims without prej-
    udice are AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-2725

Judges: Hamilton

Filed Date: 2/24/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/25/2020

Authorities (23)

Green Country Food Market, Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC , 371 F.3d 1275 ( 2004 )

Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC , 499 F.3d 663 ( 2007 )

Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc. v. DiMartinis , 495 F.3d 500 ( 2007 )

42nd-parallel-north-v-e-street-denim-company-western-glove-works-buffalo , 286 F.3d 401 ( 2002 )

loeb-industries-incorporated-los-angeles-scrap-iron-metal-corporation , 306 F.3d 469 ( 2002 )

indiana-grocery-inc-and-preston-safeway-inc-cross-v-super-valu , 864 F.2d 1409 ( 1989 )

United States v. Colgate & Co. , 39 S. Ct. 465 ( 1919 )

Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. ... , 124 S. Ct. 872 ( 2004 )

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. , 99 S. Ct. 2326 ( 1979 )

United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. , 76 S. Ct. 994 ( 1956 )

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States , 82 S. Ct. 1502 ( 1962 )

United States v. Philadelphia National Bank , 83 S. Ct. 1715 ( 1963 )

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 127 S. Ct. 1955 ( 2007 )

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. , 127 S. Ct. 2705 ( 2007 )

United States v. Grinnell Corp. , 86 S. Ct. 1698 ( 1966 )

Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe MacHinery Corp. , 88 S. Ct. 2224 ( 1968 )

United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co. , 90 S. Ct. 2035 ( 1970 )

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc. , 129 S. Ct. 1109 ( 2009 )

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937 ( 2009 )

National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of ... , 104 S. Ct. 2948 ( 1984 )

View All Authorities »