Laura Ann Harris Patterson v. Andrew Saul ( 2021 )


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  •                               NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued January 26, 2021
    Decided February 1, 2021
    Before
    DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
    FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
    THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
    No. 20-1805                                                   Appeal from the United
    States District Court for the
    LAURA ANN HARRIS-PATTERSON,
    Western District of Wiscon-
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    sin.
    v.
    No. 19-cv-487-bbc
    ANDREW M. SAUL,                                               Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.
    Commissioner of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Order
    An administrative law judge denied Laura Harris-Patterson’s application for disabil-
    ity benefits, and a district judge affirmed that decision. 
    2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64149
     (W.D.
    Wis. Apr. 13, 2020). On appeal to this court, Harris-Patterson has dropped most of the
    arguments presented to the ALJ and the district court. She now concentrates on her con-
    tention that urinary incontinence would have diverted so much time from each working
    day that she would have been unable to perform any of the jobs that a vocational expert
    testified she can perform.
    No. 20-1805                                                                        Page 2
    The district court found that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision on the
    incontinence issue. 
    2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64149
     at *13–18. In this court Harris-Patterson
    emphasizes one argument that the district judge did not mention: she contends that the
    ALJ made a mistake of fact by finding that Harris-Patterson needed bathroom breaks 10
    to 15 times a calendar day, when Harris-Patterson testified that she needed 10 to 15 in a
    working day. The latter frequency would have precluded gainful employment, the voca-
    tional expert stated.
    We may assume that when Harris-Patterson said “day” she meant working day. But
    the ALJ was not obliged to accept her contention. The record as a whole contains sub-
    stantial contrary evidence. An ultrasound and a CT scan both revealed no physical ab-
    normalities that could have explained Harris-Patterson’s asserted degree of inconti-
    nence. She declined to follow some physicians’ suggestions of exercises or treatments
    that could have brought the problem under control. At least four times she told a physi-
    cian that she did not have any incontinence problem at all. She said this to Dr. Garrett
    McNulty in January 2015, to Dr. Alan Reinicke in July 2015, to Dr. Reinicke again in
    February 2018, and to Dr. Jaymin Shah in March 2018. Two months later she testified at
    the hearing that she needed to be in the bathroom 24 hours a day. When challenged by
    the ALJ, she conceded that this was an overstatement. Indeed so. In light of the lack of
    objective medical support for her claim, the fact that she has been inconsistent in what
    she tells physicians, her failure to follow medical advice, and her exaggeration, the ALJ
    made it clear that he was giving Harris-Patterson the benefit of the doubt by treating
    her as needing 10 to 15 bathroom breaks in a 24-hour period.
    We examine the record and the ALJ’s decision as a whole. Harris-Patterson’s request
    to treat the meaning of “day” as a mistake of fact that requires the entire administrative
    process to start anew does not carry the day. We agree with the district judge that sub-
    stantial evidence supports the agency’s decision.
    Harris-Patterson’s other arguments are well covered by the district court’s opinion
    and do not need separate treatment here.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-1805

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/1/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/1/2021