Committee for the Illinois Dem v. Jesse White ( 2020 )


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  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 20-1801
    WILLIAM MORGAN, et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State of Illinois, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 20 C 2189 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Chief Judge.
    ____________________
    SUBMITTED JULY 6, 2020 — DECIDED JULY 8, 2020
    ____________________
    Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM. Illinois permits voters to place initiatives
    and referenda on both local and statewide ballots, but it also
    requires proponents to collect enough signatures to show
    that each proposal is likely to have a decent amount of sup-
    port. The state allows 18 months for proponents to collect
    signatures. This year that period ended for the State of Illi-
    2                                                  No. 20-1801
    nois on May 3, 2020, and will end for the City of Evanston on
    August 3.
    Seven plaintiffs filed this suit under 
    42 U.S.C. §1983
     con-
    tending that the state’s requirements are too onerous, and
    hence unconstitutional, given the social-distancing require-
    ments adopted by the Governor of Illinois in light of the
    COVID-19 pandemic. A district judge expressed skepticism
    that any of the plaintiffs has standing but found it unneces-
    sary to resolve that question because she denied relief on
    other grounds. 
    2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86618
     (N.D. Ill. May 18,
    2020). Plaintiffs have appealed. We expedited the briefing,
    and all litigants have agreed to waive oral argument to facili-
    tate a faster decision.
    The district court’s approach, sometimes called hypothet-
    ical standing, was disapproved by the Supreme Court
    in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Be=er Environment, 
    523 U.S. 83
    (1998). But because at least one plaintiff, William Morgan,
    has standing, the district court had jurisdiction. Morgan be-
    gan his petition campaign (he seeks to amend the state’s
    constitution) before filing suit. Relief such as reducing the
    number of signatures required, permifing electronic rather
    than physical signatures, and extending deadlines would
    materially improve his chances. Other plaintiffs also want to
    amend the state’s constitution, and one proposes a change
    that would affect Evanston alone. Federal judges routinely
    adjudicate suits filed by persons who have encountered
    difficulty obtaining the signatures required to put candi-
    dates’ names or substantive proposals on the ballot.
    This is as far as plaintiffs get, however. District judges
    have discretion when weighing the considerations relevant
    to requests for preliminary relief. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural
    No. 20-1801                                                   3
    Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
    555 U.S. 7
     (2008). One im-
    portant question, when a plaintiff seeks emergency relief, is
    whether the plaintiff has brought the emergency on himself.
    The district judge concluded that Morgan had done so. Dur-
    ing most of the time available to seek signatures, Morgan did
    absolutely nothing. He did not evince any interest in the
    subject until early April 2020, several weeks after the Gover-
    nor began to issue orders requiring social distancing. The
    other plaintiffs did not do anything of substance until the
    suit was on file. Plaintiffs had plenty of time to gather signa-
    tures before the pandemic began. That’s a good reason to
    conclude that they are not entitled to emergency relief.
    We add that plaintiffs also have not established that the
    Governor’s orders limit their speech. The orders concern
    conduct (social distancing), not what anyone may write or
    say. Orders regulating conduct often have incidental effects
    on speech, but this does not require courts to treat them as if
    they were regulations of speech. See, e.g., Clark v. Community
    for Creative Non-Violence, 
    468 U.S. 288
     (1984). Plaintiffs do not
    question the propriety of those orders. Cf. Jacobson v. Massa-
    chuse=s, 
    197 U.S. 11
     (1905); Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church
    v. PriJker, No. 20-1811 (7th Cir. June 16, 2020). Although the
    orders surely make it hard to round up signatures, so would
    the reluctance of many people to approach strangers during
    a pandemic.
    One more consideration bears emphasis. The federal
    Constitution does not require any state or local government
    to put referenda or initiatives on the ballot. That is wholly a
    mafer of state law. See, e.g., Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush,
    
    892 F.3d 935
     (7th Cir. 2018). If we understand the Governor’s
    orders, coupled with the signature requirements, as equiva-
    4                                                 No. 20-1801
    lent to a decision to skip all referenda for the 2020 election
    cycle, there is no federal problem. Illinois may decide for it-
    self whether a pandemic is a good time to be soliciting signa-
    tures on the streets in order to add referenda to a ballot.
    The order denying the motion for a preliminary injunc-
    tion is affirmed. The plaintiffs remain free to contend to the
    district court that a permanent injunction would be justified
    if social-distancing rules are indefinitely extended, but that
    long-term question does not require immediate resolution.