United States v. Wade Bonk ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 19-1948
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    WADE BONK,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Central District of Illinois.
    No. 1:17-cr-10061-JES-JEH-1 — James E. Shadid, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED JUNE 1, 2020 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2020
    ____________________
    Before RIPPLE, WOOD, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury returned a supersed-
    ing indictment charging Wade Bonk and his two codefend-
    ants, Darcy Kampas and Timothy Wood, with conspiracy to
    possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in viola-
    tion of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
     and 841(b)(1)(A), and with posses-
    sion of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in viola-
    tion of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).
    2                                                             No. 19-1948
    Wood and Kampas pleaded guilty to the conspiracy
    count in accordance with their plea agreements. Mr. Bonk
    also pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count, but without the
    benefit of a cooperation plea agreement. He was sentenced
    1
    to 262 months’ imprisonment. Final judgment was entered,
    2
    and Mr. Bonk timely filed a notice of appeal.
    I
    BACKGROUND
    A.
    From May until September 2017, Mr. Bonk conspired
    with Kampas and Wood to distribute ice methampheta-
    3
    mine. Some of the 1.5 kilograms of ice methamphetamine
    for which Mr. Bonk was held responsible was allegedly for
    4
    his personal consumption. Mr. Bonk fronted and sold the
    rest in varying quantities to distributors.
    Mr. Bonk was arrested on September 13, 2017, on an out-
    5
    standing warrant. The conspiracy ended two days later,
    1 The district court’s jurisdiction is premised on 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    .
    2 Our jurisdiction to review Mr. Bonk’s sentencing claim is secure under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a).
    3 Note (C) to the drug quantity table, in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, defines “[i]ce”
    as the weight of “a mixture or substance containing d-methamphetamine
    hydrochloride of at least 80% purity.”
    4 R.156 at 96 (“Mr. Bonk reported that up towards 44 percent of that was
    for personal use.”).
    5 R.133 ¶ 16.
    No. 19-1948                                                   3
    when Kampas and Wood, who were under surveillance for
    suspected drug trafficking, were stopped for speeding. After
    seeing suspected methamphetamine in plain view, the of-
    ficer conducted searches of the vehicle, of both Wood’s and
    Kampas’s persons, and of Kampas’s purse. The searches re-
    sulted in the seizure of about 111 grams of ice methamphet-
    amine.
    In addition to the federal drug conviction that is central
    to this appeal, Mr. Bonk has numerous other previous
    convictions, many of them violent in nature. Namely, he has
    two felony convictions for battery; two convictions for
    bodily-harm domestic battery; and convictions for a hate
    crime, unlawful restraint, aggravated driving under the
    influence, obstruction of justice, theft of a motor vehicle,
    driving on a revoked license two separate times, violation of
    bail bond, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
    6
    convicted felon.
    Indeed, his Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) re-
    flected thirty-four criminal history points, which is almost
    three times the minimum criminal history points required to
    7
    trigger the criminal history category of VI. His final total of-
    fense level of thirty-five, combined with his criminal history
    category of VI, resulted in an guidelines range of 292 to 365
    8
    months’ imprisonment. Because Mr. Bonk’s criminal history
    6 Id. ¶¶ 40, 44, 46–47, 49, 51–52, 54–56, 58–60.
    7 Id. ¶ 62; see also U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table.
    8 R.133 ¶ 120.
    4                                                    No. 19-1948
    did not include a prior felony drug offense, he faced a man-
    9
    datory minimum sentence of ten years in prison.
    At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel submitted
    that the guidelines range for methamphetamine mixture
    should be used, a range of 188 to 235 months, instead of the
    10
    higher guidelines range for ice methamphetamine. He not-
    ed mitigating factors, including that the conspiracy was rela-
    tively short in duration; that Mr. Bonk personally consumed
    up to one-third of the drugs; and that Mr. Bonk was a
    first-time drug offender. He further contested the unfairness
    of the sentencing differences between ice methamphetamine
    and a methamphetamine mixture and contended that the
    career-offender guideline is not based on empirical evi-
    11
    dence.
    The Guidelines distinguish between a methamphetamine
    mixture that is less pure and ice methamphetamine, a
    higher-purity methamphetamine. Mr. Bonk noted that the
    recommended sentence for a defendant in possession of ice
    methamphetamine is longer than the recommended
    sentence for a defendant in possession of a
    methamphetamine mixture because “[t]he fact that a
    defendant is in possession of unusually pure narcotics may
    indicate a prominent role in the criminal enterprise and
    9 Id. ¶ 119.
    10 R.156 at 110.
    11 Id. at 98–104.
    No. 19-1948                                                       5
    12
    proximity to the source of drugs.” He contended, however,
    that “it is not unusual anymore for anybody to have pure
    meth in their possession. So what the courts have started to
    do is they have taken this into consideration, and that’s why
    you are seeing more and more sentences of meth offenders
    13
    come in below the guideline range.” The Government, in
    contrast, asked the court to view the conspiracy “through
    the lens of [Mr. Bonk’s] criminal history” that included “13
    14
    felony convictions,” “[m]any of them violent in nature.”
    The Government also noted that Mr. Bonk’s extensive
    criminal history and the large amount of drugs that he
    trafficked resulted in a “very rare” scenario where the
    guidelines calculations resulted in a higher adjusted offense
    level than the level required by the career-offender
    15
    guideline.
    The district court sentenced Mr. Bonk to 262 months’ im-
    prisonment followed by five years of supervised release. The
    court entered final judgment, and Mr. Bonk filed a timely
    notice of appeal.
    B.
    On August 15, 2019, we appointed counsel for Mr. Bonk.
    On September 1, 2019, counsel filed an emergency motion
    with the district court requesting access to all sealed docu-
    12 Id. at 98 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Application Note 27(C)).
    13 Id. at 100.
    14 Id. at 77–78.
    15 Id. at 78.
    6                                                 No. 19-1948
    ments for Mr. Bonk and both of his codefendants. He stated
    that he required access to all the sealed documents “for the
    crucial purpose of analyzing, or ruling-out, whether dispari-
    ty and/or excessiveness of sentencing was committed by the
    trial court in separately sentencing the three defendants, up-
    16
    on their pleas.” The district court called counsel to inform
    him that he had access to the sealed documents that had
    17
    been available to Mr. Bonk’s counsel in the district court.
    On this call, counsel confirmed that he was requesting “ac-
    18
    cess to each and every sealed document in this case.”
    The district court granted the motion in part and denied
    the motion in part. Because the Pretrial Services Report had
    been disclosed to trial counsel, the district court ordered the
    Clerk’s Office to make the Pretrial Services Report available
    to counsel. The district court further noted that counsel’s re-
    quest for the Presentence Investigation Reports for Mr. Bonk
    was moot because he already had access to them. Although
    counsel made no specific request for it, the district court or-
    dered the Clerk’s Office to make the Third Revised Presen-
    tence Investigation Report available to counsel if he lacked
    access.
    The court denied access to documents such as the Sen-
    tencing Recommendations for Mr. Bonk because they “are
    confidential and are not disclosed unless otherwise ordered
    16 R.162 at 2.
    17 R.163 at 2.
    18 Id.
    No. 19-1948                                                                     7
    19
    by the presiding judge.” With respect to a handful of the
    sealed documents relating to Kampas and Wood, the court
    explained that “[m]any of the requested documents are
    simply original signed versions of publicly available docu-
    20
    ments.” With respect to the remaining documents relating
    to Kampas and Wood, the court ruled that counsel had
    failed to “‘make a specific showing of need for access to the
    21
    document[s].’”
    On September 7, 2019, counsel filed an amended emer-
    22
    gency motion with the district court. He reiterated that it
    was “imperative and beyond question that [he] requires ac-
    cess to all sealed documents for the two co-defendants’ ac-
    tions … for the crucial purpose of analyzing, or ruling-out,
    whether disparity and/or excessiveness of sentencing was
    committed by the trial court in separately sentencing the
    23
    three defendants.” He submitted, “[t]hat specific need can-
    24
    not and need not be explicated with ‘more specificity.’” The
    district court denied the motion with respect to every re-
    quest except the request for the plea agreements and accom-
    panying exhibits for Kampas and Wood; because counsel
    19 Id. at 3.
    20 Id. at 4.
    21 Id. (quoting United States v. Corbitt, 
    879 F.2d 224
    , 228 (7th Cir. 1989)).
    22 R.165.
    23 
    Id.
     at 1–2.
    24 Id. at 2.
    8                                                 No. 19-1948
    would have had access to these documents if he had pro-
    ceeded to trial, the court directed the Clerk’s Office to make
    25
    them available. In denying the rest of the requests, the dis-
    trict court explained that it did
    not believe [counsel’s] cursory argument—that
    access is needed to all sealed documents
    relating to codefendants Kampas and Wood so
    counsel can analyze whether the sentence
    imposed on Defendant Bonk was disparate or
    excessive compared to the sentences of his
    codefendants—raises to the level of a
    “compelling,      particularized   need   for
    26
    disclosure.”
    Mr. Bonk renewed his request by motion in this court. After
    the Government responded and Mr. Bonk replied, one of our
    colleagues, sitting as motions judge for that period, denied
    27
    Mr. Bonk’s motion.
    II
    DISCUSSION
    A.
    We first examine whether we have jurisdiction to consid-
    er whether the district court erred in denying counsel access
    to all sealed documents in Mr. Bonk’s case and the cases of
    25 R.168 at 4–5, 9.
    26 Id. at 9 (quoting Corbitt, 
    879 F.2d at 239
    ).
    27 See App. R.25.
    No. 19-1948                                                                9
    his codefendants. The answer to this question is straightfor-
    ward: we do not have jurisdiction.
    We begin by setting forth the principles that must guide
    our inquiry. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 provides
    in relevant part that “[a]n appeal permitted by law as of
    right from a district court to a court of appeals may be taken
    only by filing a notice of appeal” and that the notice “must
    … designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being
    appealed … .” Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1), (c)(1)(B). Rule
    4(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
    provides in relevant part that, “[i]n a criminal case, a
    defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district
    court within 14 days after … the entry of either the judgment or
    the order being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i)
    (emphasis added); see also Manrique v. United States, 
    137 S. Ct. 1266
    , 1270 (2017). Thus, “[t]o secure appellate review of a
    judgment or order, a party must file a notice of appeal from
    that judgment or order.” Manrique, 
    137 S. Ct. at 1271
    .
    The Supreme Court has stated that “a notice [of appeal]
    and its contents are jurisdictional prerequisites.” Gonzalez v.
    28
    Thaler, 
    565 U.S. 134
    , 147 (2012). Mr. Bonk filed his notice of
    28 The Supreme Court has warned us not to make non-jurisdictional is-
    sues jurisdictional. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 
    562 U.S. 428
    , 435 (2011).
    Even if we were not convinced that the requirement to file a notice of
    appeal is jurisdictional in nature, it is at least a mandatory
    claim-processing rule. Mandatory claim-processing rules are not jurisdic-
    tional. They “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requir-
    ing that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified
    times.” 
    Id. at 435
    . The Supreme Court held that, where “[t]he Govern-
    ment timely raised petitioner’s failure to file a notice of appeal … [,] ‘the
    court’s duty to dismiss the appeal was mandatory.’” Manrique v. United
    (continued … )
    10                                                            No. 19-1948
    appeal on May 17, 2019, “from the conviction, judgment, and
    order of the district court … entered on May 15, 2019, sen-
    29
    tencing the Defendant … .” This notice therefore brought to
    this court all matters occurring on or before the date of final
    judgment. The district court’s September 5, 2019, order
    denying the emergency motion to gain access to sealed doc-
    30
    uments is therefore not included in his notice of appeal.
    We liberally construe the rules of procedure, including
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. Smith v. Barry, 
    502 U.S. 244
    , 248 (1992); Badger Pharmacal, Inc. v.
    Colgate-Palmolive Co., 
    1 F.3d 621
    , 624 (7th Cir. 1993). “Thus, if
    a litigant files papers in a fashion that is technically at
    variance with the letter of a procedural rule, a court may
    nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule
    if the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of what the
    rule requires.” Badger Pharmacal, Inc., 
    1 F.3d at 624
     (quoting
    Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 
    487 U.S. 312
    , 316–17 (1988)).
    ( … continued)
    States, 
    137 S. Ct. 1266
    , 1272 (2017) (quoting Eberhart v. United States, 
    546 U.S. 12
    , 18 (2005)). Here, we are satisfied that filing a notice of appeal
    from the district court’s order denying Mr. Bonk’s emergency motion is a
    jurisdictional requirement.
    29 R.137 at 1.
    30 There is no doubt that, after Mr. Bonk filed his notice of appeal, the
    district court retained jurisdiction to decide ancillary matters such as
    whether the appellate counsel was entitled to view the sealed record
    documents. See Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 
    808 F.2d 1228
    , 1240 (7th
    Cir. 1986) (explaining that the district court retains jurisdiction to decide
    issues “in aid of the appeal”); see also United States v. Ramer, 
    787 F.3d 837
    ,
    838 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (collecting cases).
    No. 19-1948                                                              11
    That is, a deficient notice of appeal will not deprive us of
    jurisdiction where “the intent to appeal from the contested
    judgment may be inferred from the notice [of appeal].”
    31
    United States v. Dowell, 
    257 F.3d 694
    , 698 (7th Cir. 2001).
    We have held that the intent to appeal from a particular
    judgment may be inferred where the judgment occurred be-
    fore the notice of appeal was filed or where the judgment is
    obviously related to the judgment that is mentioned in the
    notice of appeal. See, e.g., Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic
    Market Dev., 
    476 F.3d 436
    , 440–41 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding
    that jurisdiction existed because the notice of appeal men-
    tioned the district court’s order that, in effect, brought up for
    review the court’s earlier quasi-interlocutory order (emphasis
    added)); see also United States v. Taylor, 
    628 F.3d 420
    , 424 (7th
    Cir. 2010) (holding that the defendant’s “intent to appeal
    from both components of his sentencing package may fairly
    be inferred from his notice of appeal, despite the fact that he
    only included one case number” where “[b]oth sentences
    arose from the same set of facts” (emphasis added)). Neither
    of these exceptions are applicable here; Mr. Bonk seeks to
    appeal from an order that was issued after he filed his notice
    of appeal, and, the order, which addresses appellate coun-
    sel’s emergency request for access to all documents, is not
    obviously related to the sentencing order from which he ap-
    peals.
    31 We also have held that jurisdiction exists despite a technical failure to
    comply with Rule 3 where the notice of appeal does not mislead or oth-
    erwise prejudice the appellee. Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 
    649 F.3d 526
    ,
    528–29 (7th Cir. 2011).
    12                                                           No. 19-1948
    We would have jurisdiction over this order only if
    Mr. Bonk had filed a second notice of appeal in conformity
    with Rules 3 and 4 that included the district court’s ruling on
    the emergency motion. Alternatively, he could have amend-
    ed the original notice of appeal to include this emergency
    motion. Although “[t]he court of appeals may, in its discre-
    tion, overlook defects in a notice of appeal other than the
    failure to timely file a notice,” “[i]t may not overlook the
    failure to file a notice of appeal at all.” Manrique, 
    137 S. Ct. at 1274
    . Mr. Bonk “did not file a defective notice of appeal … ,
    but rather failed altogether to file a notice of appeal … .” 
    Id.
    Mr. Bonk was required to—but did not—file a separate
    notice of appeal regarding the district court’s order denying
    his request to access all the documents in his case and in the
    cases of his codefendants. “Rule 3’s dictates are jurisdictional
    in nature, and their satisfaction is a prerequisite to appellate
    review.” Smith, 
    502 U.S. at 248
    . “[N]oncompliance is fatal to
    an appeal.” 
    Id.
     We do not have jurisdiction to review the dis-
    32
    trict court’s denial of Mr. Bonk’s request.
    B.
    Finally, we conclude that there is no merit to Mr. Bonk’s
    complaint about the reasonableness of his sentence.
    32 As noted above, one of our colleagues, sitting as a motions judge for
    that period, denied Mr. Bonk’s motion. See App. R.25. Mr. Bonk has
    waived review of our colleague’s decision because he does not ask us to
    review it. See Appellant’s Br. 10 (“[T]he assignment of errors herein are
    from the district court, not the circuit court.”); see Fed. R. App. P. 27(c)
    (“The court may review the action of a single judge.”).
    No. 19-1948                                                   13
    We review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
    for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith, 
    860 F.3d 508
    , 514 (7th Cir. 2017). Our review of the reasonableness of
    the sentence “is limited; we are to ensure that ‘the district
    judge imposed the sentence for reasons that are logical and
    consistent with the § 3553(a) factors.’” United States v.
    Wachowiak, 
    496 F.3d 744
    , 754 (7th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other
    grounds by Nelson v. United States, 
    555 U.S. 350
     (2009) (quot-
    ing United States v. Williams, 
    425 F.3d 478
    , 481 (7th Cir.
    2005)). We will “uphold a sentence so long as the judge of-
    fers an adequate statement of his reasons consistent with the
    sentencing factors enumerated in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).” United
    States v. Porraz, 
    943 F.3d 1099
    , 1104 (7th Cir. 2019); see United
    States v. Fogle, 
    825 F.3d 354
    , 358 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining
    that the sentencing court’s “explanation need not be exhaus-
    tive” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Because Mr. Bonk’s sentence falls below the guidelines
    range, we presume that his sentence is substantively reason-
    able. United States v. Patel, 
    921 F.3d 663
    , 672 (7th Cir. 2019)
    (“[W]e presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reason-
    able: ‘it follows that a sentence below the range also is pre-
    sumptively not too high.’” (citation omitted)). This presump-
    tion is rebuttable, but only if the defendant “show[s] that the
    sentence does not comport with the factors outlined in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).” 
    Id. at 672
     (citation omitted).
    In his opening brief, Mr. Bonk contends that the district
    court erred by “not granting [him] a downward departure”
    from the guidelines range, and he urges us “to remand … for
    33
    re-sentencing” for that reason. The district court, however,
    33 Appellant’s Br. 11, 39.
    14                                                      No. 19-1948
    imposed a sentence that was below the guidelines range.
    The Guidelines provided a suggested range of 292 to 365
    34
    months’ imprisonment; the district court sentenced him to
    35
    262 months’ imprisonment.
    In his reply brief, Mr. Bonk clarifies that he meant to state
    “that the district court erred in not sentencing [him] to a
    greater downward departure, the requested 15 ½ years to 19
    36
    ½ years.” Thus, on appeal, Mr. Bonk’s argument appears to
    be that the district court erred in not adopting the range of
    188 to 235 months’ imprisonment as requested by defense
    37
    counsel at sentencing.
    The district court, in explaining its sentencing decision,
    provided an adequate explanation that permits meaningful
    appellate review and promotes the perception of fair sen-
    tencing. See United States v. Scott, 
    555 F.3d 605
    , 608 (7th Cir.
    2009). Before imposing the sentence, the district court
    acknowledged that the conspiracy did not last long, “but it
    38
    moved a lot of drugs in the process.” The court character-
    ized Mr. Bonk’s upbringing as “bad,” but it noted that
    Mr. Bonk had been provided with resources in the past and
    he had been “either unable or unwilling to take advantage of
    34 R.133 ¶ 120.
    35 R.156 at 119.
    36 Reply Br. 5–6 (emphasis added).
    37 R.156 at 110 (“Your Honor, we are asking you to adopt the guideline
    range for meth mixture, which is 188 to 235 months.”).
    38 Id. at 116.
    No. 19-1948                                               15
    39
    them.” The court said that because of his criminal history,
    Mr. Bonk “didn’t give [his attorney] much to work with” in
    40
    asking for “a much lower sentence.” “[Y]our criminal activ-
    ity,” the court observed, “doesn’t just consist of drugs or a
    gun case but also consists of much violence. The violence
    consists of punching and beating people, generally in a do-
    mestic relationship situation, pushing and hitting females[,]
    as well as hitting someone in a bar” because of the victim’s
    41
    race.
    Ultimately, the court explained that it was imposing a
    sentence of 262 months’ imprisonment, less than the guide-
    lines range but more than what Mr. Bonk had requested, due
    to the nature and extent of Mr. Bonk’s past criminal conduct,
    combined with the nature of the offense of conviction. There
    is nothing substantively unreasonable about this sentence.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment of the district court.
    AFFIRMED
    39 Id. at 117.
    40 Id.
    41 Id. at 117–18.