NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 17, 2011*
Decided August 17, 2011
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 11‐2029
MICHAEL A. BLACKMON, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
v. No. 10‐C‐978
GARY H. HAMBLIN and Rudolph T. Randa,
RICK RAEMISCH, Judge.
Defendants‐Appellees.
O R D E R
In this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Wisconsin prisoner Michael Blackmon challenges
as unconstitutional the conditions of his parole, which has since been revoked. Blackmon
was ordered back to prison because he refused to obtain a psychological evaluation.
Blackmon concedes this fact but insists that he is “of sound mind” and that forcing him to
seek a psychological evaluation amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. He demands
*
The defendants‐appellees were not served with process in the district court and are
not participating in this appeal. After examining the plaintiff‐appellant’s brief and the
record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted
on the plaintiff‐appellant’s brief and the record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 11‐2029 Page 2
unspecified injunctive relief plus $6 million in damages. The district court dismissed his suit
at screening. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
We agree with the district court that Blackmon has selected the wrong vehicle to
pursue his grievances. A person convicted of a crime may not use § 1983 to attack the fact of
his confinement or the conditions of his parole. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973);
Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579‐80
(7th Cir. 2003); Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1224‐25 (7th Cir. 1977). Nor may a
prisoner use § 1983 to obtain damages if success on the merits necessarily would imply the
invalidity of the revocation of his parole. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994);
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006); Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 219 n.2
(5th Cir. 2004); Knowlin v. Thompson, 207 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 2000). If Blackmon wanted to
challenge the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s requiring him to obtain a psychological
evaluation, then he should have filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.
