United States v. Guillermo Patlan ( 2022 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 21‐1500
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff‐Appellee,
    v.
    GUILLERMO PATLAN,
    Defendant‐Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Central District of Illinois.
    No. 2:18‐cr‐20034‐SEM‐EIL‐1 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.
    ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2021 — DECIDED APRIL 12, 2022
    Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and JACKSON‐AKIWUMI, Circuit
    Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Guillermo Patlan appeals from the
    sentence that the district court imposed after his second
    revocation of supervised release. He asserts that the court erred
    by failing to recognize its discretion to treat a failed drug
    screening as a Grade C rather than a Grade B violation. He also
    2                                                   No. 21‐1500
    claims that the court erred when it imposed a term of home
    confinement without justifications as part of his new condi‐
    tions of supervised release. We affirm.
    I.
    In 2012, Guillermo Patlan pled guilty to conspiracy to
    distribute controlled substances in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    and 846, and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    . The district court sentenced him to
    ninety‐five months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a four‐
    year term of supervised release. After a retroactive amendment
    to the sentencing guidelines, the district court reduced his term
    of imprisonment to seventy‐nine months. Patlan completed
    that term of imprisonment and began his first period of
    supervised release in April 2017. Because of positive drug tests
    and other violations, in January 2019, the court modified the
    terms of his release to include six months of home confine‐
    ment. In June of that year, Patlan’s probation officer filed a
    petition to revoke his supervised release, alleging that Patlan
    had failed to participate in substance abuse treatment and had
    possessed controlled substances on five occasions, as evi‐
    denced by positive drug tests. Patlan admitted the violations
    and the district court revoked his supervision and sentenced
    him to a term of eighteen months’ imprisonment. The court
    also imposed a three‐year term of supervised release with
    conditions that included six months of home confinement.
    Patlan completed the prison term and began his second
    period of supervised release in September 2020. Although he
    initially complied with the conditions imposed, in December
    2020, he tested positive for amphetamine and methamphet‐
    amine. The following month, he committed domestic battery,
    No. 21‐1500                                                           3
    a charge for which he pled guilty in state court. His probation
    officer filed a petition to revoke supervision, alleging that he
    twice violated the condition that he not commit another
    federal, state, or local crime. In particular, the petition alleged
    two new crimes: first, Patlan “possessed and used amphet‐
    amine and methamphetamine” as evidenced by a positive
    drug test. Second, he committed domestic battery, a misde‐
    meanor under Illinois law, when he attacked his girlfriend.1
    Prior to the revocation hearing, the Probation Office filed a
    “Violation Memorandum” with the district court, detailing the
    history of Patlan’s supervision as well as the alleged violations
    underlying the petition to revoke. R. 36. The Memorandum
    asserted that Patlan possessed and used amphetamine and
    methamphetamine as evidenced by a positive drug test, and
    that he had committed the offense of domestic battery when he
    battered his girlfriend. According to the Probation Office, the
    drug possession was classified as a Grade B violation of the
    terms of supervised release. In combination with Patlan’s
    Criminal History Category V, the Probation Office calculated
    the guidelines range as eighteen to twenty‐four months of
    imprisonment, and noted that the guidelines recommended
    imposing the unserved portion of home confinement, in this
    case sixty‐one days, as an additional term of imprisonment.
    The Violation Memorandum also included proposed condi‐
    tions for supervised release, together with justifications for
    each condition.
    1
    The petition also alleged a number of unauthorized absences during the
    period of home confinement but because the government ultimately agreed
    to dismiss those charges, we need not address them.
    4                                                    No. 21‐1500
    The district court circulated its own tentative Conditions of
    Supervised Release along with justifications for those condi‐
    tions so that the parties would have an opportunity to review
    them before the revocation hearing. R. 39. The court noted that,
    prior to sentencing, Patlan would have an opportunity to read
    the conditions and justifications, discuss them with his
    attorney, and object. The court directed Patlan to initial each of
    the conditions to confirm that he had read them, to sign the last
    page to affirm that he had reviewed the conditions and
    justifications, and to indicate whether he waived oral reading
    of the conditions at the hearing. The court noted that, with one
    exception, the conditions tracked those proposed by the
    Probation Office in its Violation Memorandum, and included
    two additional discretionary conditions that did not appear in
    that Memorandum. Those two conditions provided that Patlan
    would serve six months of home confinement at the start of his
    release from custody, and that he would comply with condi‐
    tions of home confinement and monitoring during that term,
    leaving home only for a medical emergency, drug treatment,
    or with the advance permission of the Probation Office. The
    court did not include any justifications specifically addressing
    those last two discretionary conditions.
    In its Commentary on Sentencing Factors, the government
    urged the court to impose a twenty‐four month term of
    imprisonment plus the sixty‐one days to account for the
    unserved period of home confinement. R. 38. In Patlan’s
    Sentencing Commentary, he objected “to the application of the
    Grade B guideline range for policy reasons[.]” R. 40, at 1. He
    proposed that the court treat the drug charge as a Grade C
    violation and impose a below‐guidelines sentence of thirteen
    No. 21‐1500                                                       5
    months. He contended that treating a positive drug screening
    as possession of a controlled substance overstates the serious‐
    ness of the violation conduct and leads to sentencing dispari‐
    ties, contradicts the plain language of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    , and is
    at odds with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements
    and intent. Citing United States v. Trotter, 
    270 F.3d 1150
     (7th Cir.
    2001), Patlan acknowledged that failed drug screens may
    support an inference of possession but that courts were not
    required to draw the inference. Instead, courts possess the
    discretion to conclude that a positive drug test is insufficient to
    establish possession. Alternatively, he continued, the court
    retained discretion to vary from the Grade B guideline range
    and impose a sentence within the Grade C range of seven to
    thirteen months. He contended that the government’s pro‐
    posed sentence was far greater than was necessary and
    suggested that thirteen months was sufficient.
    Importantly, Patlan also “stipulate[d] to the violation
    conduct alleged in Violation Numbers 1 and 2, as listed in the
    Petitions [sic] for Warrant or Summons for Offender under
    Supervision.” R. 40, at 4. Violation Number 1 in that Petition
    described the drug offense:
    1. LAW VIOLATION: POSSESSION OF A
    CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE … On or about
    December 28, 2020, Mr. Patlan possessed and used
    amphetamine and methamphetamine as determined
    by Alere Toxicology Services, after a urine specimen
    provided by the offender tested positive for amphet‐
    amine and methamphetamine. Mr. Patlan denied
    using amphetamine and methamphetamine.
    6                                                    No. 21‐
    1500 R. 25
    , at 2. In addition to the stipulation, Patlan waived his
    right to a revocation hearing, and “plead[ed] guilty to those
    violations as alleged[.]” R. 40, at 3–4.
    At the revocation hearing, the court listed the two charged
    violations, describing the first as “possessing and using
    amphetamine and methamphetamine,” and the second as
    “[c]ommitting the offense of domestic battery.” R. 45, at 5.
    Counsel for Patlan indicated that he was “willing to accept
    guilt” for both charged violations. 
    Id.
     The court explained to
    Patlan directly that his “alleged violations involving the
    possession of amphetamine and methamphetamine [are] all
    within the scope of 18 United States Code Section 3583(g)(1)
    which mandates revocation.” R. 45, at 8. Patlan indicated that
    he understood and that he wished to waive his right to a
    hearing. R. 45, at 8–9. Based on Patlan’s concession that he was
    guilty of the charged violations, the court then found by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Patlan violated the terms
    of his supervised release by possessing and using amphet‐
    amine and methamphetamine, and by committing domestic
    battery. R. 45, at 9–10. In response to the court’s questions,
    Patlan also confirmed that he had read the violation memoran‐
    dum and reviewed it with his lawyer. R. 45, at 10.
    The court then entertained Patlan’s “policy objection” to the
    violation memorandum. Counsel argued that although Trotter
    allows courts to infer that a failed drug screen is a Grade B
    “possession” violation, the court is not required to so infer, and
    may instead treat a failed drug screen as a Grade C violation,
    which would result in a lower sentencing range. The govern‐
    ment disagreed and contended that Trotter was binding and
    required the court to treat the failed drug screen as a Grade B
    No. 21‐1500                                                    7
    violation “because the defendant possessed amphetamine and
    methamphetamine.” R. 45, at 11–12. The government explained
    that the court possessed the discretion to sentence Patlan as if
    the violation were Grade C rather than Grade B, but discour‐
    aged the court from doing so for a variety of reasons. The
    district judge noted that she had read Trotter again and
    concluded that government counsel was “correct in all of his
    points.” R. 45, at 13. The court then found that the most serious
    offense was a Grade B violation.
    Patlan’s counsel then affirmed that she reviewed the court’s
    conditions of supervision with her client and had no objections.
    R. 45, at 14. Patlan personally indicated that he had adequate
    time to review the conditions with his lawyer, and affirmed
    that he had initialed each condition and signed the last page.
    R. 45, at 14. The court then warned Patlan and his lawyer that
    “the failure to object at this time may result in waiver of any
    objection to the conditions on appeal.” R. 45, at 14. In response
    to the court’s question, Patlan indicated that he had no
    objections to the conditions as the court had amended them. 
    Id.
    Patlan then expressly waived an oral reading of the conditions
    and justifications. R. 45, at 14–15.
    After the government requested a sentence of twenty‐four
    months of imprisonment followed by forty‐eight months of
    supervised release, Patlan’s counsel argued vigorously for a
    “variance to the Grade C guideline range of 7 to 13 months.” R.
    45, at 20. The court noted that the policy statements of the
    Sentencing Commission are advisory, not mandatory, and then
    sentenced Patlan to eighteen months’ imprisonment (which
    included the sixty‐one days of home confinement that were
    8                                                    No. 21‐1500
    remaining when his supervision was revoked), followed by
    twenty‐four months of supervised release.
    II.
    On appeal, Patlan asserts that the district court erred when
    it failed to recognize that it had discretion to reject the infer‐
    ence that he possessed controlled substances from a positive
    drug test. He also maintains that we must remand for
    resentencing because the court failed to provide justifications
    for the six‐month term of home confinement imposed as a
    condition of supervised release, and because the court failed to
    pronounce that condition orally during the hearing. Both of
    Patlan’s arguments miss the mark.
    At a revocation hearing, the government must prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a
    condition of supervised release. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3). In
    general, we review the revocation of supervised release for
    abuse of discretion, and we review the district court’s factual
    findings supporting that revocation for clear error. United
    States v. Raney, 
    797 F.3d 454
    , 463 (7th Cir. 2015). We review the
    district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de
    novo, and the findings of fact supporting the sentence for clear
    error. United States v. McLaughlin, 
    760 F.3d 699
    , 703 (7th Cir.
    2014). Our review of a sentence imposed in a revocation
    proceeding is highly deferential; we will sustain the sentence
    so long is it is not plainly unreasonable. United States v.
    Boultinghouse, 
    784 F.3d 1163
    , 1177 (7th Cir. 2015).
    In general, simple use of a drug constitutes a Grade C
    violation of the conditions of supervised release, the lowest
    level violation. Possession of a drug potentially supports a
    No. 21‐1500                                                     9
    Grade B violation, depending on whether it fits the section
    7B1.1(a)(2) definition of Grade B, which encompasses “conduct
    constituting any other federal, state, or local offense punishable
    by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” But in Trotter,
    we considered whether use of marijuana permits the district
    judge to infer that the user committed the crime of possessing
    that drug:
    This question has a simple answer. Of course use
    may support an inference of possession. A person
    might test positive for marijuana if he never touched
    the stuff but spent a lot of time around heavy smok‐
    ers and ended up with some of the drug in his lungs.
    This is unlikely, but possible, and a district judge
    therefore might treat one or even two positive tests
    as inadequate to prove possession of the drug. But
    a judge also could infer from the presence of mari‐
    juana metabolites in the blood that the user pos‐
    sessed that drug, if only in the process of smoking a
    communal joint. Trotter tested positive at least 3
    times and skipped a further 7 tests, which could
    support a conclusion that he knew that he would
    have tested positive on those occasions too. That is
    more than enough to permit a rational trier of fact to
    infer that Trotter possessed marijuana. The burden
    of persuasion for revocation of supervised release is
    a preponderance of the evidence, and the finding of
    possession on a record such as this cannot be
    deemed clearly erroneous. Inferring possession of a
    drug from the consumption of that drug is just as
    sensible as inferring, from the statement “I ate a
    10                                                   No. 21‐1500
    hamburger for lunch,” that the person possessed the
    hamburger before wolfing it down.
    Trotter, 
    270 F.3d at 1153
    . That passage makes clear that the
    inference of possession is permissible but not required,
    depending on the circumstances.
    But in this case, there was no need for the court to draw any
    inference at all. Patlan repeatedly admitted that he both used
    and possessed amphetamine and methamphetamine. Based on
    Patlan’s repeated admission that he possessed the controlled
    substances, the court appropriately found by a preponderance
    of the evidence that he had violated the terms of his supervised
    release. Raney, 797 F.3d at 463. As the court informed Patlan,
    possession of a controlled substance mandated revocation of
    his supervised release. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (g)(1). Because
    Patlan’s possession of methamphetamine is a felony punish‐
    able by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year under both
    Illinois law, 720 ILCS 646/60(b)(1), and federal law, 
    21 U.S.C. § 844
    (a), the court properly categorized his violation as Grade
    B. Specifically, possession of a controlled substance is punish‐
    able by up to two years in prison for defendants like Patlan
    with prior controlled substance convictions. See 
    21 U.S.C. § 844
    (a), and Trotter, 
    270 F.3d at
    1154–55 (holding that courts
    may consider a defendant’s prior drug conviction in determin‐
    ing whether an offense is punishable by a term of imprison‐
    ment exceeding one year under section 7B1.1(a)(2)). And
    Illinois law treats possession of even small amounts of meth‐
    amphetamine as a Class 3 felony. 720 ILCS 646/60(b)(1). The
    court therefore correctly calculated the guidelines range when
    it concluded that Patlan’s conduct constituted a Grade B
    No. 21‐1500                                                     11
    violation. United States v. Shockey, 
    941 F.3d 282
    , 283–84 (7th Cir.
    2019).
    Although on appeal Patlan attempts to frame his admis‐
    sions as being limited to use of controlled substances, the
    record simply does not bear that out. His repeated admissions
    that he possessed controlled substances are clear on the face of
    the record. We add for the sake of completeness that if Patlan
    had not conceded that he was guilty of possession, the court
    would have had discretion to treat his positive drug test as use
    only and not possession. Trotter, 
    270 F.3d at 1153
    . But he
    presented no facts to the court supporting that inference. That
    is, unlike a defendant who may have tested positive for
    marijuana simply because he was in close proximity to heavy
    smokers of that substance, Patlan does not claim that his
    ingestion of controlled substances was accidental or inadver‐
    tent or in any way not in his control. In his case, the more
    natural inference was that he possessed the drugs before using
    them, in the same way that a “person possessed the hamburger
    before wolfing it down.” Trotter, 
    270 F.3d at 1153
    .
    Because of Patlan’s admission of possession, the district
    court properly understood Patlan’s “policy” argument to
    address discretion as a sentencing matter, not discretion
    whether to infer a lesser Grade violation. The court fully
    acknowledged its discretion to sentence a Grade B violation as
    if it were a Grade C violation. The court simply declined to do
    so, finding the Grade B guidelines range to be more appropri‐
    ate. There was no error in that conclusion and the court’s
    within‐guidelines sentence was reasonable.
    12                                                    No. 21‐1500
    We turn to Patlan’s claim that the court erred in imposing
    a term of home confinement as a condition of supervised
    release and that the court further erred by failing to support
    that condition with justifications. The government contends
    that Patlan waived any objections to the conditions of super‐
    vised release, barring appellate review of this claim. In general,
    we review preserved challenges to the conditions of super‐
    vised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Paul, 
    542 F.3d 596
    , 599 (7th Cir. 2008). But when a defendant does not
    object to the conditions of confinement, we must decide
    whether the defendant has forfeited or waived any objections.
    United States v. Flores, 
    929 F.3d 443
    , 447 (7th Cir. 2019).
    “Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquishes a
    known right and forfeiture arises when a party inadvertently
    fails to raise an argument in the district court.” Flores, 929 F.3d
    at 447. Patlan insists that the failure to object to the home
    confinement conditions was inadvertent. Counsel asserts that
    she saw the references to home confinement in the court’s
    Conditions of Supervised Release, discussed them with Patlan
    prior to the hearing, believed them to have been included in
    error because neither party requested home confinement, and
    fully intended to raise the issue with the district court at the
    hearing. For his part, Patlan initialed those conditions and
    signed the document as the court had requested, and also
    waived the reading of the conditions of confinement at the
    hearing. Counsel explains on appeal that she simply forgot to
    raise the issue with the district court at the hearing. Counsel
    concedes that issues regarding the quality of representation are
    usually better addressed on collateral attack, where a factual
    record may be developed. See United States v. Rucker, 766 F.3d
    No. 21‐1500                                                      13
    638, 647 (7th Cir. 2014) (a defendant who presents an ineffec‐
    tive‐assistance claim for the first time on direct appeal has little
    to gain and everything to lose as the record is unlikely to lend
    sufficient support to such a claim, and by raising it on direct
    appeal, the defendant will be foreclosed from pursuing the
    same claim on collateral review). In this instance, counsel’s
    claim that she fully intended to object to the term of home
    confinement and simply forgot to do so is not supported by
    anything in the direct appeal record. We must decide whether
    the claim was forfeited or waived on the basis of the record as
    it exists in the district court.
    In this case, we find that Patlan waived any challenges to
    the conditions of confinement.
    When a defendant does not address supervised
    release conditions in the district court, this court will
    assess whether she waived those challenges. We will
    find waiver, as we do here, when the defendant has
    notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful
    opportunity to object, and she asserts (through
    counsel or directly) that she does not object to the
    proposed conditions, waives reading of those
    conditions and their justifications, challenges certain
    conditions but not the one(s) challenged on appeal,
    or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic
    decision not to object.
    Flores, 929 F.3d at 450. Patlan meets every one of those factors.
    The Probation Office’s Violation Memorandum advised
    Patlan of the conditions that Office was proposing to the court.
    The court then issued its own pre‐hearing Conditions of
    14                                                 No. 21‐1500
    Supervised Release, adopting the conditions proposed by the
    Probation Office with a modification to one of those conditions,
    and adding two of its own conditions related to home confine‐
    ment. At the hearing, the court referenced the Conditions of
    Supervised Release that it had issued prior to the hearing and
    then made one small, additional change to one of the condi‐
    tions. Patlan and his lawyer affirmatively indicated that they
    had reviewed the conditions, that Patlan had initialed them
    and signed the document, and they did not have any objec‐
    tions. The court then warned Patlan that a failure to object at
    the hearing might result in a waiver to any objections on
    appeal. Patlan indicated he had no objections and confirmed
    that he waived an oral reading of the conditions and justifica‐
    tions. After the court imposed the sentence, including the
    mandatory and discretionary conditions that the court had
    previously mentioned, the court gave Patlan and his attorney
    yet another opportunity to object, and both declined. On this
    record, we must conclude that: (1) Patlan had notice of the
    conditions; (2) he had a meaningful opportunity to object to
    them; (3) both he and his lawyer affirmatively indicated that
    they did not object to any of the conditions; and (4) he waived
    the reading of those conditions and their justifications. Al‐
    though he did not challenge any of the conditions, he did
    object to being sentenced for a Grade B violation, and so he
    challenged part of the sentence but not the part to which he
    now objects, which tends to show that the failure to object was
    strategic, the final factor we delineated in Flores. 929 F.3d at
    450. Neither Patlan nor his attorney gave the district court any
    reason to believe that this was anything other than an inten‐
    tional or strategic decision not to object.
    No. 21‐1500                                                    15
    We therefore conclude that Patlan waived any objections to
    the conditions of supervised release, including any lack of
    justifications for the home confinement conditions. Waiver
    extinguishes any claim of error, precluding appellate review.
    United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 733 (1993); United States v.
    Picardi, 
    950 F.3d 469
    , 473–74 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v.
    Aslan, 
    644 F.3d 526
    , 537 (7th Cir. 2011). Finally, we note that
    even defendants who waive challenges to supervision condi‐
    tions on direct appeal may petition the court for a modification
    of those conditions. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(2); Flores, 929 F.3d at
    451. If Patlan finds the term of home confinement too onerous
    or if circumstances change during imprisonment or after
    release, Patlan may seek a modification of the conditions
    before the district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-1500

Judges: Rovner

Filed Date: 4/12/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/13/2022