United States v. Roosevelt Spencer , 739 F.3d 1027 ( 2014 )

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No.  13-­‐‑2622
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,
Plaintiff-­‐‑Appellee,
v.
ROOSEVELT  L.  SPENCER,
Defendant-­‐‑Appellant.
____________________
Appeal  from  the  United  States  District  Court
for  the  Western  District  of  Wisconsin.
No.  13-­‐‑cr-­‐‑33-­‐‑bbc  —  Barbara  B.  Crabb,  Judge.
____________________
ARGUED  JANUARY  6,  2014  —  DECIDED  JANUARY  10,  2014
____________________
Before  EASTERBROOK,  WILLIAMS,  and  TINDER,  Circuit  Judg-­‐‑
es.
EASTERBROOK,   Circuit   Judge.   A   person   who   accumulates
three  convictions  for  violent  felonies  or  serious  drug  offens-­‐‑
es,  then  commits  a  federal  firearms  offense,  is  an  armed  ca-­‐‑
reer   criminal   and   must   be   sentenced   to   at   least   15   years   in
prison.   18   U.S.C.   §924(e).   Roosevelt   Spencer   pleaded   guilty
to  possessing  a  firearm,  despite  his  prior  felony  convictions,
in  violation  of  18  U.S.C.  §922(g).  The  district  court  concluded
No.  13-­‐‑2622   2
that  he  is  an  armed  career  criminal  and  sentenced  him  to  the
minimum   term.   He   concedes   that   two   of   his   convictions
qualify   under   §924(e)   but   denies   that   the   third,   for   a   meth-­‐‑
amphetamine  crime,  meets  the  statutory  standard  for  a  “se-­‐‑
rious   drug   offense”,   which   for   state   convictions   means   one
“involving   manufacturing,   distributing,   or   possessing   with
intent   to   manufacture   or   distribute,   a   controlled   substance
(as   defined   in   section   102   of   the   Controlled   Substances   Act
(21   U.S.C.   802)),   for   which   a   maximum   term   of   imprison-­‐‑
ment   of   ten   years   or   more   is   prescribed   by   law”.   Spencer
maintains  that  Wis.  Stat.  §961.41(1)(e)(1),  which  prohibits  the
manufacture  or  delivery  of  methamphetamine,  does  not  car-­‐‑
ry  “a  maximum  term  of  imprisonment  of  ten  years  or  more”.
Spencer’s  Wisconsin  conviction  is  for  a  Class  F  felony.  A
separate   statute,   Wis.   Stat.   §939.50(3)(f),   provides   that   the
maximum  punishment  for  a  Class  F  felony  is  12½  years’  im-­‐‑
prisonment.  But  for  felonies  committed  in  2000  and  later  (as
Spencer’s   was)   the   judge   must   impose   a   “bifurcated   sen-­‐‑
tence”  that  “consists  of  a  term  of  confinement  in  prison  fol-­‐‑
lowed   by   a   term   of   extended   supervision”.   Wis.   Stat.
§973.01(2).   For   a   Class   F   felony,   the   longest   permissible
“term   of   confinement   in   prison”   is   7½   years.   Wis.   Stat.
§973.01(2)(b)(6m).   “Extended   supervision”   must   be   at   least
25%   of   the   “term   of   confinement   in   prison”,   see
§973.01(2)(d),  and  may  be  as  long  as  the  rest  of  the  term  au-­‐‑
thorized   by   §939.50(3).   The   consequences   of   “extended   su-­‐‑
pervision”  are  laid  out  in  Wis.  Stat.  §302.113.  The  state’s  De-­‐‑
partment  of  Corrections  can  extend  an  inmate’s  time  in  pris-­‐‑
on  by  as  much  as  10  days  for  the  first  violation  of  any  prison
rule,  20  days  for  the  second,  40  days  for  the  third,  and  50%  of
any  time  spent  in  segregation;  all  of  these  extensions  togeth-­‐‑
er  cannot  exceed  the  term  of  extended  supervision.  A  convict
3   No.  13-­‐‑2622
released   from   custody,   but   still   on   extended   supervision,
may  be  returned  to  prison  for  the  balance  of  the  term  if  the
convict  violates  any  condition  of  supervision  imposed  by  the
judge,  either  initially  or  on  petition  by  the  Department.
The   United   States   contends,   and   the   district   judge   held,
that  the  “maximum  term  of  imprisonment”  for  the  purpose
of  §924(e)  is  the  one  provided  by  §939.50(e).  Bifurcation  be-­‐‑
tween   initial   confinement   and   extended   supervision   under
§973.01   does   not   matter,   the   judge   held,   because   §302.113
and  §939.50(e)  together  show  that  a  Class  F  felon  in  Wiscon-­‐‑
sin  can  spend  as  much  as  12½  years  behind  bars  without  the
need   for   a   further   criminal   conviction—indeed,   without   the
need   for   a   state   judge   to   act,   if   the   inmate’s   behavior   is   so
poor   that   the   Department   of   Corrections   extends   the   in-­‐‑
mate’s   confinement   to   the   limit   of   the   extended   release   in-­‐‑
cluded  in  the  sentence.  This  meant  that  Spencer  faced  a  max-­‐‑
imum   prison   stay   of   12½   years   for   his   methamphetamine
crime,  giving  him  a  total  of  three  violent  felonies  or  serious
drug  offenses.
The  principal  difficulty  with  this  understanding  is  that  it
uses   “maximum   term   of   imprisonment”   in   a   non-­‐‑standard
way.  When  lawyers  refer  to  a  “maximum  term”  they  usually
mean  the  time  the  judge  could  impose,  on  the  worst  offend-­‐‑
er,  on  the  date  of  sentencing,  rather  than  the  amount  of  time
a   given   person   is   likely   to   serve.   United   States   v.   Rodriquez,
553   U.S.   377   (2008),   shows   this   in   holding   that   the   “maxi-­‐‑
mum   term”   for   the   purpose   of   §924(e)   includes   recidivist
enhancements  even  if  state  or  federal  guidelines  will  lead  the
judge   to   select   a   term   below   the   highest   possible   one.
McNeill  v.  United  States,  131  S.  Ct.  2218  (2011),  adds  that  the
“maximum   term”   means   the   maximum   on   the   date   of   sen-­‐‑
No.  13-­‐‑2622   4
tencing,  without  regard  to  what  happens  later—parole,  par-­‐‑
don,  or  a  statutory  change  (in  McNeill,  a  reduction  in  the  cap
for   future   offenders,   something   the   Justices   held   does   not
matter  when  ascertaining  the  maximum  a  particular  convict
faced  on  the  day  he  was  sentenced).
Post-­‐‑sentencing   events   that   affect   how   long   a   person
spends  in  prison  do  not  change  the  “maximum  term”  as  the
legal   system   customarily   uses   that   phrase.   Consider   federal
practices   before   the   Sentencing   Reform   Act   of   1984.   Most
prisoners   were   eligible   for   parole   after   serving   a   third   of
their   sentences;   some   prisoners   could   be   released   on   parole
almost  immediately  after  entering  prison.  After  serving  two-­‐‑
thirds   of   a   sentence,   a   person   was   entitled   to   release   unless
the  Parole  Board  had  a  strong  reason  to  keep  him  locked  up.
United  States  v.  Addonizio,  442  U.S.  178  (1979),  describes  this
system.   But   judges   and   lawyers   understood   the   “maximum
term”   to   be   the   longest   confinement   authorized   by   statute,
not  how  long  a  given  felon  was  likely  to  spend  in  prison  be-­‐‑
fore   release.   Good-­‐‑time   credits   are   treated   the   same   way.
Prisoners   sentenced   under   federal   law   receive   15%   off   their
time  if  they  follow  prison  rules.  See  18  U.S.C.  §3624(b);  Bar-­‐‑
ber  v.  Thomas,  560  U.S.  474  (2010).  The  statutory  maximum  is
unaffected  by  this  possibility,  however;  it  reflects  the  highest
imposable  sentence  rather  than  how  much  will  be  served  in
light  of  events  that  occur  after  imprisonment  begins.
The   prosecutor   wants   us   to   view   Wisconsin’s   bifurcated
sentencing  as  a  form  of  reverse  good  time.  Instead  of  setting
a   maximum   less   rewards   for   good   behavior,   as   federal   law
does,   Wisconsin   sets   a   minimum   plus   penalties   for   bad   be-­‐‑
havior.   Good-­‐‑time   and   bad-­‐‑time   systems   come   to   the   same
thing  by  different  routes,  the  prosecutor  insists,  and  should
5   No.  13-­‐‑2622
be  treated  the  same  way,  so  that  the  “maximum  term  of  im-­‐‑
prisonment”   under   either   system   is   the   longest   time   a   con-­‐‑
vict  may  spend  in  custody  without  the  need  for  a  new  con-­‐‑
viction.
If  that  is  so,  however,  then  supervised  release  under  fed-­‐‑
eral   law   also   increases   the   “maximum   term.”   Every   federal
sentence  imposed  since  the  1984  Act  took  effect  in  1987  has
been   bifurcated   in   a   way   similar   to   Wisconsin’s.   The   judge
pronounces  a  term  of  incarceration,  to  be  followed  by  a  term
of   supervised   release   under   18   U.S.C.   §3583.   Anyone   who
violates  the  conditions  attached  to  supervised  release  may  be
returned  to  prison  for  the  full  length  of  the  supervised  term.
Commission   of   another   crime   is   unnecessary.   So   if   a   felon
refuses  to  submit  to  drug  tests  required  by  the  conditions  of
release,   or   leaves   the   state   without   permission,   or   balks   at
paying  restitution,  these  and  other  acts  may  put  him  back  in
prison.
Treating  a  prospect  of  longer  imprisonment  as  augment-­‐‑
ing   the   “maximum   term”   for   the   purpose   of   §924(e)   would
increase  the  number  of  persons  who  qualify  as  armed  career
criminals.  According  to  18  U.S.C.  §3559(a)(4),  a  crime  with  a
maximum   penalty   of   five   or   more   years,   but   less   than   10
years,  is  a  Class  D  felony.  According  to  §3583(b)(2),  a  person
convicted   of   a   Class   D   felony   may   have   three   years’   super-­‐‑
vised  release  tacked  onto  the  sentence.  Thus  a  crime  with  a
statutory  maximum  of  seven  years  would  have  a  “maximum
term”  of  10  years,  adding  together  imprisonment  and  super-­‐‑
vised   release   in   the   same   way   the   prosecutor   proposes   to
add   imprisonment   plus   extended   supervision   under   Wis-­‐‑
consin   law.   And   that’s   not   all.   For   crimes   involving   terror-­‐‑
ism,  crimes  in  which  the  victim  is  a  minor,  and  a  variety  of
No.  13-­‐‑2622   6
other   offenses,   the   maximum   term   of   supervised   release   is
life.   18   U.S.C.   §3583(j),   (k).   A   long   list   of   crimes   would   be
added   to   those   qualifying   under   §924(e)   for   stiff   recidivist
sentences.  This  strikes  us  as  an  unlikely,  backhanded  way  to
bring   additional   predicate   crimes   within   §924(e).   It   is   more
sensible  to  read  “maximum  term”  as  lawyers  and  judges  or-­‐‑
dinarily  do—a  reference  to  the  maximum  sentence  the  judge
can  pronounce  on  the  worst  offender,  with  neither  additions
nor   subtractions   reflecting   probabilities   about   what   may
happen   in   the   future   (pardon,   parole,   commutation,   good
time,   bad   time,   statutory   amendments,   retroactive   changes
to  sentencing  guidelines,  and  so  on).
Counsel  for  the  United  States  contended  at  oral  argument
that   supervised   release   under   federal   law   differs   from   ex-­‐‑
tended   supervision   under   Wisconsin   law   because   only   a
judge   can   revoke   a   federal   prisoner’s   supervised   release,
while   Wisconsin’s   Department   of   Corrections   can   require   a
state   prisoner   to   serve   in   prison   some   or   all   of   a   sentence’s
term   of   extended   supervision.   That’s   true   enough,   though
the  separation  between  administrative  and  judicial  action  is
not  complete:  decisions  adding  prison  time  in  Wisconsin  are
reviewable  in  the  state  courts  by  common-­‐‑law  writ  of  certio-­‐‑
rari,  and  in  the  federal  courts  by  petitions  for  writs  of  habeas
corpus   under   28   U.S.C.   §2254.   No   matter.   The   allocation   of
tasks   between   executive   and   judicial   personnel   is   unrelated
to   the   meaning   of   “maximum   term   of   imprisonment”   in
§924(e).  If  Congress  were  to  amend  §3583  so  that  supervised
release  could  be  revoked  by  the  court’s  Probation  and  Pretri-­‐‑
al   Services   System—as   parole   used   to   be   revocable   by   the
Parole   Commission—that   change   would   not   suddenly   add
the   longest   possible   duration   of   supervised   release   to   the
“maximum  term”  under  §924(e).
7   No.  13-­‐‑2622
Classifying   offenses   according   to   the   usual   legal   under-­‐‑
standing   of   “maximum   term”   allows   federal   judges   to   de-­‐‑
termine  their  sentences  without  a  need  to  dig  into  the  back-­‐‑
ground   and   administration   of   the   many   different   state   sys-­‐‑
tems.   Wisconsin   appears   to   be   unique   in   implementing   a
“bad-­‐‑time”   split   sentence   that   looks   like   a   mirror   image   of
the   federal   good-­‐‑time-­‐‑plus-­‐‑supervised-­‐‑release   system,   but
other  states  have  their  own  variations.
The   prosecutor   has   invited   us   to   consider   the   nature   of
Wisconsin’s   truth-­‐‑in-­‐‑sentencing   reforms   and   to   conclude
that   the   introduction   of   the   bifurcated   sentence   under   Wis.
Stat.   §973.01(2)   didn’t   “really”   change   the   maximum   term,
despite  what  §973.01(2)(b)(6m)  says.  The  maximum  through
1999   was   12½   years,   and   the   prosecutor   maintains   that   it   is
still   12½   years;   the   substitution   of   “extended   supervision”
for  five  years  of  the  old  statutory  cap  is  just  the  means  that
Wisconsin   used   to   end   parole   and   adopt   a   system   of   deter-­‐‑
minate  sentences  parallel  to  those  under  the  federal  Sentenc-­‐‑
ing  Reform  Act  of  1984.  That  may  be  an  accurate  description
of  some  (even  many)  state  legislators’  thinking,  but  if  federal
recidivist  statutes  such  as  §924(e)  are  to  be  administrable,  we
must  go  on  what  the  state  statute  books  say,  rather  than  on
why   they   say   what   they   do   or   how   they   got   that   way   com-­‐‑
pared  with  predecessor  statutes.†  Avoiding  the  need  for  de-­‐‑
†   Wisconsin’s   history   provides   an   illustration.   The   text   of   this   opin-­‐‑
ion  greatly  simplifies  the  developments,  at  the  expense  of  some  impreci-­‐‑
sion.  A  more  complete  description  would  cover  the  initial  changes  enact-­‐‑
ed  in  June  1998  and  effective  at  the  beginning  of  2000,  and  a  second  set  of
changes  enacted  in  July  2002  and  effective  February  1,  2003.  This  second
set   created   the   Class   F   felony;   until   then   §939.50(3)(f)   and
§973.01(2)(b)(6m)   did   not   exist.   The   1998   legislation   changed   the   length
of  imprisonment  plus  extended  release  at  the  same  time  as  it  created  the
No.  13-­‐‑2622   8
tours  is  one  reason  why  federal  recidivist  sentences  depend
on  the  terms  of  the  statute  of  conviction,  rather  than  on  what
the  defendants  did  in  fact.  See,  e.g.,  Descamps  v.  United  States,
133  S.  Ct.  2276  (2013).
The   normal   legal   understanding   of   “maximum   term”   is
the   highest   sentence   a   judge   can   mete   out   to   anyone   for   a
particular  crime.  To  the  extent  that  there  is  ambiguity  in  the
text  and  structure  of  §924(e),  the  Rule  of  Lenity  calls  for  us  to
read   the   federal   statute   favorably   to   the   accused.   Skilling   v.
United  States,  130  S.  Ct.  2896,  2932  (2010);  Scheidler  v.  National
Organization   for   Women,   Inc.,   537   U.S.   393,   409   (2003).   The
highest  custodial  sentence  a  judge  in  Wisconsin  was  author-­‐‑
ized   to   impose   on   Spencer   for   his   Class   F   felony   was   7½
years.   This   is   the   “maximum   term”   as   §924(e)   uses   that
phrase.   The   upshot   is   that   Spencer   has   only   two   qualifying
predicate  convictions  and  may  not  be  sentenced  as  an  armed
career  criminal.
The  judgment  is  vacated,  and  the  case  is  remanded  with
instructions  to  resentence  Spencer  without  the  enhancement
under  §924(e).
bifurcated  sentence  (at  one  point  the  total  was  only  5  years),  and  the  cur-­‐‑
rent  total  of  12½  years  comes  from  the  2002  statute.  A  summary  of  these
and   other   changes   may   be   found   in   Thomas   J.   Hammer,   The   Long   and
Arduous  Journey  to  Truth-­‐‑in-­‐‑Sentencing  in  Wisconsin,  15  Federal  Sentencing
Reporter  15  (2002).  As  we  say  in  the  text,  our  reading  of  §924(e)  enables
us  to  resolve  the  appeal  without  getting  into  these  complexities.