United States v. Scott Njos ( 2023 )

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-3412
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SCOTT NJOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 3:07-cr-50036-1 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2023 — DECIDED MAY 22, 2023
____________________
Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Counsel in criminal appeals and
their clients sometimes disagree about which issues to raise
on appeal. Unresolved disagreements can pose problems for
defendants, their lawyers, and the appellate court. This ap-
peal presents an unusual version of those problems. This
court helped create the problem when we denied the
2 No. 21-3412
defendant’s motion to dismiss his appellate counsel and al-
lowed a form of “hybrid” representation on appeal by allow-
ing appellant to file his own brief. We have said before,
though, that such hybrid representation is “forbidden” on ap-
peal. United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 672–73 (7th Cir.
2001). Such hybrid representation may work in some cases,
but not when the client expressly disavows the one argument
raised by counsel. So, with thanks to counsel, we revisit ap-
pellant’s motion to dismiss his counsel, grant it now, and af-
firm on the merits of the issues that appellant wished to raise.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2007, appellant Scott Njos pleaded guilty to six federal
crimes arising from robberies of several stores and a bank,
and for attempted escape and assault of an FBI agent after his
arrest. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 1951(a), 751(a), and 111(a).
Following two appeals, the district court eventually sen-
tenced Njos to 170 months in prison, to be followed by three
years of supervised release for each count, to be served con-
currently.
In January 2021, Njos began his three-year term of super-
vised release. He almost immediately violated several condi-
tions of supervised release. The probation office reported to
the district court that he tested positive for illegal substances,
failed to report to his probation officer, and failed to report for
drug testing and mental health treatment. Soon after, Njos
pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to eight new robberies.
The state courts sentenced him to concurrent 20- and 25-year
sentences. The federal government then petitioned for the
revocation of Njos’s federal supervised release.
No. 21-3412 3
Njos proceeded pro se during the revocation process after
the district court confirmed that his decision to represent him-
self was knowing and voluntary. See Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 835 (1975); United States v. Johnson, 980 F.3d 570, 577
(7th Cir. 2020). Throughout the revocation proceedings, Njos
expressed concern about being held in the federal Bureau of
Prisons. He repeatedly asked to be returned to the Illinois De-
partment of Corrections as soon as possible so that he could
obtain what he believed was better mental health treatment.
After Njos had been convicted and sentenced in state court
for the new robbery charges, the federal district court found
at the revocation hearing that Njos had violated the condition
of supervised release not to commit another federal, state, or
local crime. The federal government withdrew seven other
charged violations that did not relate to the state offenses.
In a later hearing to address sentencing for those super-
vised release violations, the district court found that the five
violations of supervised release (all committing new crimes)
were Grade A, that Njos’s criminal history category was VI,
and that under the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the
Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing range was 33 to 41
months. The maximum possible revocation sentence based on
18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) was 144 months, if maximum 24-month
sentences for each of the six supervised-release terms ran con-
secutively. The probation office recommended, and the gov-
ernment argued for, a total 82-month sentence.
Njos requested a 24-month sentence to run concurrently
with his 20– and 25–year concurrent state sentences. He as-
serted that his underlying federal convictions were class C
and D felonies, so he believed 24 months would be the statu-
tory maximum sentence upon revocation. He argued that his
4 No. 21-3412
long history of mental illness—including being adjudicated
guilty but mentally ill in state court on two of the charges
stemming from his latest robbery spree—weighed against a
lengthy sentence.
At the time of the sentencing hearing for the revocation,
however, the district court did not have access to the presen-
tence investigation report from the original 2008 convictions,
nor to the psychological assessments submitted for Njos’s
original sentencing hearings. Njos told the district court he
was eager to begin serving his state sentence so he could re-
ceive better mental health treatment. Noting Njos’s desire to
expedite the proceedings, the court said: “You don’t need to
be in court for this,” explaining that, instead of reconvening
the hearing at a later date, it would enter a written order im-
posing sentence. The court added: “I don’t think you need to
be physically in front of me for the announcement of the sen-
tence.” Njos thanked the judge for speeding up the process,
and neither Njos nor the government objected to proceeding
in this fashion.
In a written order released 20 days later, the court imposed
a total of 82 months in prison for the six revocations—three
24-month terms each for the bank and two store robberies,
consecutive to a 10-month term for one store robbery, all to
run concurrently with two concurrent 24-month terms for the
escape and assault convictions.
II. Analysis
A. The Right to be Present for Sentencing
The only issue that appointed counsel deemed strong
enough to raise on appeal is whether the district court erred
by imposing a prison sentence upon revocation in a written
No. 21-3412 5
order rather than face-to-face in a hearing with the defendant
present in person. When counsel was not receptive to raising
the other issues that Njos wished to argue, he filed a motion
to dismiss counsel along with a brief setting forth his pre-
ferred arguments. We denied Njos’s motion to dismiss coun-
sel but allowed him to file the supplemental brief pro se.
Counsel’s brief argues only that the district court proce-
durally erred by imposing a sentence in writing and without,
counsel asserts, a knowing waiver of the right to be present.
The government does not even try to defend the district
court’s choice to impose the prison sentence in writing, with-
out having the defendant in court. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
32.1(b)(2); United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 598–99 (7th
Cir. 2010) (construing Rule 32.1(b)(2) as requiring defendant
to be physically present with judge for revocation of super-
vised release); United States v. Dillard, 910 F.2d 461, 465
(7th Cir. 1990) (noting that court revoking supervised release
must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the
particular sentence”), citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
The government argues, however, that Njos waived any
basis for relief from the district court’s error in two ways: first
by agreeing with the district court’s suggested procedure and
second by expressly denouncing counsel’s pursuit of the is-
sue.
Although Njos expressed gratitude to the court for trying
to speed up the process, there is no indication in the record
that he understood the right to be present or why his presence
could matter. See United States v. Turner, 47 F.4th 509, 526
(7th Cir. 2022). Given the importance of the right, Njos’s per-
sonal and medical reasons for wishing to get the sentencing
over with, and the court’s questionable statement that Njos
6 No. 21-3412
“did not need to be in court” for sentencing, we doubt that
Njos understood himself to be giving up an important right.
See United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir.
2015) (asking whether defendant had “a sufficient grasp of a
particular right or consequence of the waiver”).
But we need not decide that question of waiver in the dis-
trict court. Njos has intentionally waived the argument on ap-
peal. He has made clear that he has no interest in challenging
the legality of imposing a sentence in writing. He has said so
numerous times, even using the word “waiver” to describe
his decision. After seeing his attorney’s brief for him, he can-
not have been ignorant of the right at stake. See United States
v. Davis, 29 F.4th 380, 387 (7th Cir. 2022), citing United States v.
Cavender, 228 F.3d 792, 803 (7th Cir. 2000). Still, his appointed
counsel persisted with the argument rather than requesting to
withdraw because she does not believe the issue is frivolous.
See generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
We agree that the issue is not frivolous. We also under-
stand counsel’s reluctance to concede that her client’s state-
ments in this court amount to waiver. Yet it is now clear that
this court’s and counsel’s effort to balance counsel’s obliga-
tions to her client and the court with Njos’s right to represent
himself has become untenable. The most prudent step is to
reconsider our earlier decision that placed the defendant and
counsel in this position. A merits panel may re-examine a rul-
ing by a motions judge or panel. Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497,
498 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Alcantar, 83 F.3d 185, 191
(7th Cir. 1996). Doing so is appropriate if the merits panel is
more equipped to make the decision. United States v. Hender-
son, 536 F.3d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 2008). In this case, events since
No. 21-3412 7
the initial ruling let us appreciate better the effect of the con-
flict between client and counsel here.
On our own initiative, therefore, we reconsider the order
of August 19, 2022, denying defendant-appellant's motion to
discharge court-appointed counsel. The motion is hereby
granted, and counsel’s representation of Njos is terminated.
This action allows us to accept Njos’s decision not to argue
about his right to be present without creating troubling impli-
cations for future cases.
We commend counsel for her vigorous representation of
her now-former client and her efforts to preserve, despite the
difficult circumstances, the important argument about a crim-
inal defendant’s right to be sentenced in person for a revoca-
tion of supervised release. We need not decide whether Njos
waived the in-person issue on appeal before he expressly dis-
avowed counsel’s pursuit of the issue, nor whether the district
court plainly erred when it imposed a prison sentence in writ-
ing.
B. The Maximum Guideline Range
We turn now to Njos’s pro se arguments. Njos argues that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum and the applica-
ble range under the Guidelines. He contends that the table in
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) prescribes a reimprisonment range of 33–
41 months. But he asserts that, based on his criminal history
score and Grade A violations, § 7B1.4(b)(3)(A) substitutes a
maximum of 24 months, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), because
each underlying crime was a Class C felony. But 24 months is
the maximum for each Class C or Class D conviction. See id.Njos has six such convictions and six concurrent terms of su-
pervised release. We have held that “a district court has
8 No. 21-3412
discretion to impose consecutive prison terms upon revoking
concurrent terms of supervised release.” United States v.
Deutsch, 403 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 2005). The district court
thus did not exceed the maximum possible sentence of 144
months—six consecutive 24-month terms—when it sentenced
him to 82 months in prison.
C. Substantive Reasonableness
Next, Njos contends that his revocation sentence is unrea-
sonably long. Our substantive review of a revocation sentence
is “highly deferential.” United States v. Ford, 798 F.3d 655, 663
(7th Cir. 2015), citing United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403
(7th Cir. 2014). We will overturn a revocation sentence only if
it is “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Childs, 39 F.4th
941, 944–45 (7th Cir. 2022). The guideline ranges for super-
vised release were advisory even before Booker made the bulk
of the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, and the supervised re-
lease ranges “inform rather than cabin” the district court’s
discretion. United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 438 (7th Cir.
2008); see generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
To determine a reasonable sentence, a district court should
start with U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 and consider the § 3553(a) factors.
The district court here followed these procedures and de-
cided to make the prison terms partially consecutive, which
was within its discretion. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f); United States
v. Taylor, 628 F.3d 420, 423 (7th Cir. 2010). The court also pro-
vided sufficient explanation for this decision. The court thor-
oughly considered the required mitigation factors, including
Njos’s need for mental health and drug dependency treat-
ment, and it balanced them against the number and serious-
ness of the violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The sentence it
No. 21-3412 9
selected based on these considerations is not plainly unrea-
sonable. See Neal, 512 F.3d at 439.
For these reasons, upon our reconsideration, Njos’s mo-
tion of July 22, 2022, to discharge appointed counsel is
GRANTED, and the appointment of Johanna M. Christiansen
and the Office of the Federal Defender is terminated. She has
the thanks of the court. Njos’s revocation sentence is
AFFIRMED.