In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-1473
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CASH R. OTRADOVEC,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 3:21-cr-44 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.
____________________
ARGUED DECEMBER 2, 2022 — DECIDED JULY 6, 2023
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, SCUDDER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2015 Congress enacted
18 U.S.C.
§ 3014 and thereby directed certain “non-indigent” sex of-
fenders to pay a $5,000 special assessment within twenty
years from the entry of criminal judgment or their release
from imprisonment. This appeal requires us to decide what it
means to be “indigent” within the meaning of the statute.
Consistent with the approach of every other circuit to con-
sider the issue, we hold that indigency covers two things:
2 No. 22-1473
eligibility for appointed counsel and the financial capacity to
provide for oneself. Under the second meaning of indigency,
district courts should consider a defendant’s financial pro-
spects for repaying the special assessment in future years. We
therefore vacate and remand for the district court to apply this
analysis to Cash Otradovec.
I
A
Otradovec pleaded guilty in 2021 to producing child por-
nography in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2251, an offense subject
to the $5,000 special assessment under § 3014. At sentencing
he contended that his financial condition at the time rendered
him indigent for purposes of § 3014. He explained that he had
spent the last of his money paying for a private attorney, alt-
hough he qualified for appointed counsel. So he believed that
the special assessment did not apply to him. But the govern-
ment disagreed. Taking a broader view of Otradovec’s finan-
cial situation, the government focused on his future prospects
and underscored that his college degree, military service, and
consistent work history would probably allow him to secure
a job after his release—making him non-indigent for purposes
of the statute.
Without explaining how it considered Otradovec’s pre-
sent and future financial condition, the district court imposed
the special assessment and fashioned a payment plan requir-
ing Otradovec to pay $100 a month starting after his release.
The court explained that it had a “hard time finding indigency
here,” although it acknowledged that Otradovec could not af-
ford to pay other criminal fines.
No. 22-1473 3
On appeal, Otradovec insists that the proper analysis
should have been much more limited—he was indigent be-
cause he was eligible for appointed counsel at the time of sen-
tencing. The government, as it did in the district court, urges
an interpretation of indigency that would allow district courts
to consider an offender’s future earnings capacity. The gov-
ernment has the better argument under the language and
structure of § 3014.
B
We begin with a word on the proper standard of review.
The government suggests that we treat Otradovec’s argu-
ments as forfeited because he did not articulate below the def-
inition of indigency that he now advances. But Otradovec ob-
jected to the special assessment in the district court and did so
on the same essential grounds—his present financial condi-
tion—that he presses on appeal. Nothing prevents Otradovec
from amplifying and elaborating on appeal a properly pre-
served argument. See Lawson v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.,
791
F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2015). So we decline to review his ap-
peal for plain error and instead take our own independent
look at the statute.
Section 3014(a) provides that district judges “shall assess
an amount of $5,000 on any non-indigent person or entity con-
victed of [a covered offense].”
18 U.S.C. § 3014(a). The statu-
tory formulation is odd: Congress not only left the key term
undefined but also employed a negative formulation in using
the term “non-indigent” rather than “indigent.” But deter-
mining what it means to be non-indigent, or not indigent, re-
quires us to first determine what it means to be indigent. So
we start there, interpreting the term “indigent” according to
its “‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning’ … when the
4 No. 22-1473
statute was enacted.” United States v. Melvin,
948 F.3d 848, 852
(7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
571 U.S.
220, 227 (2014)).
Contemporary dictionaries offer two meanings. People
are indigent if they are eligible to receive appointed counsel
and other official assistance. They are also indigent if, on a
more general level, they “lack[ ] the means of subsistence.”
Indigency, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (providing
both definitions); see also Indigence, Oxford English Dictionary
(3d ed. 2022) (same). Although the first definition grounds it-
self in the defendant’s current financial condition, the sec-
ond—by homing in on the defendant’s capacity to subsist—
looks to the future. See United States v. Graves,
908 F.3d 137,
141 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The ordinary meaning of ‘indigent’ there-
fore includes … someone who lacks the means to earn the ne-
cessaries of life in the future.”).
We hold that district courts should consider both defini-
tions, asking whether the defendant is eligible for appointed
counsel at the time of sentencing and whether the defendant
generally lacks the resources to provide for himself going for-
ward. The ultimate question is whether the defendant can pay
the special assessment now or over the 20-year statutory pe-
riod. If he can—because the facts show he is non-indigent un-
der one or both meanings of the term—then the district court
must impose the assessment. Every other circuit to consider
the issue has similarly held that district courts can consider
future earnings capabilities when assessing whether a de-
fendant is indigent within the meaning of § 3014(a). See
United States v. Rosario,
7 F.4th 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2021) (adopting
a forward-looking definition of indigency and collecting cases
No. 22-1473 5
from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits).
Section 3014 itself supplies additional support for our in-
terpretation of what it means to be indigent. Congress al-
lowed a 20-year period for defendants to pay the special as-
sessment. See
18 U.S.C. § 3014(g) (incorporating the 20-year
period set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3613(b)). The availability of a
lengthy payment period suggests that district courts should
consider the future: the relevant inquiry, after all, is whether
the defendant will have the means to pay the full $5,000 as-
sessment over the next two decades. See United States v. Shep-
herd,
922 F.3d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Because the defend-
ant’s obligation to pay persists for at least twenty years after
his sentencing, it would make little sense for the district court
to consider only the defendant’s financial condition at the time
of sentencing.” (emphasis in original)).
Section 3014 also specifies that the assessment “shall … be
collected in the manner that fines are collected in criminal
cases.”
18 U.S.C. § 3014(f). In the context of criminal fines, dis-
trict courts consider whether a defendant is or is not “likely to
become able to pay any fine.” U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). The same
forward-looking consideration is appropriate here.
Nothing we have said invites freewheeling guesswork
about a defendant’s financial prospects. Section 3014 requires
taking a practical and realistic view of a defendant’s financial
condition and earnings capacity, grounded in the education,
skills, work experience, or assets the defendant has today. As-
sessing human capital in this way is not a forbidden form of
speculation. To be sure, not every defendant with an educa-
tion or employment history will be able to continue providing
for himself following a serious conviction qualifying for the
6 No. 22-1473
special assessment under § 3014. See
18 U.S.C. § 3014(a) (ap-
plying the special assessment to defendants convicted of hu-
man trafficking, sexual abuse, and sexual exploitation of chil-
dren, among others). Nor do we limit the district court’s dis-
cretion to fashion fair payment plans for defendants, such as
the monthly installments the district court imposed in this
case.
C
Otradovec urges a different interpretation. He maintains
that the word “indigent” is now primarily used to describe
persons who are eligible for appointed counsel, no matter
their future financial prospects. The forward-looking defini-
tion of indigency, Otradovec contends, fell by the wayside be-
fore Congress enacted § 3014. In his view, then, district courts
should limit themselves to assessing a defendant’s current fi-
nancial state and, even more specifically, the ability to afford
counsel.
Otradovec may be right that the counsel-based definition
of indigency reflects the more common usage of the term. But
that observation does not preclude an understanding of the
term aligned with the more general, poverty-based definition
of indigency. Put differently, Otradovec has not explained
why Congress did not use indigency in § 3014 to refer to both
eligibility for appointed counsel and a general state of pov-
erty.
Otradovec stands on firmer ground comparing § 3014 to
18 U.S.C. § 2259A. Section 2259A imposes a special assess-
ment on certain child pornography offenders. Congress ex-
pressly provided in § 2259A that district courts “shall con-
sider” the factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3572, including the
No. 22-1473 7
defendant’s earning capacity. 18 U.S.C. § 2259A(c); see also
18
U.S.C. § 3572(a)(1). According to Otradovec, Congress would
have included the same, express direction in § 3014 if it in-
tended for district courts to consider the same factors.
We are not convinced. To be sure, no other circuit has con-
sidered the salience of § 2259A. And Otradovec rightly em-
phasizes that Congress’s failure to use similar language in
§ 3014 is all the more striking when we consider that Congress
requires defendants to pay the fines due under § 2259A before
paying the § 3014 assessment. See
18 U.S.C. § 3014(b). But
nothing prevents Congress from using different words in dif-
ferent statutes to direct a similar inquiry. And that is what
Congress did by imposing the special assessment in § 3014(a)
on non-indigent defendants, while also expressly directing
district courts to consider earnings capacities for the special
assessment in § 2259A.
Given the ordinary meaning of indigency and Congress’s
allowance of a 20-year payment period, we believe district
courts should consider a defendant’s financial condition at
sentencing and earnings capacity in determining whether to
impose the $5,000 special assessment otherwise required by
§ 3014(a).
II
A
Returning to Otradovec’s case, we are not certain what
definition of indigency the district court considered. Recall
that Otradovec maintained he was indigent because, by the
time his case reached sentencing, he had exhausted his assets
to pay for a private attorney. The government, for its part,
stressed that Otradovec was capable of supporting himself in
8 No. 22-1473
the future. Although the district court ultimately imposed the
assessment, its reasons for doing so are unclear. At the outset
the court found that Otradovec did not have the means to pay
other fines without impairing his ability to support himself.
The court also suggested that Otradovec might be indigent
because his few assets “went to his defense.” When the court
imposed the assessment, it said only that it had “a hard time”
concluding that Otradovec was indigent. In short, it is uncer-
tain what the district court understood the term “non-indi-
gent” to mean and whether, if the district court considered
Otradovec’s future earnings capacity, it did so within the
bounds described here.
In these circumstances, remand is appropriate to allow the
district court to consider whether to impose the special assess-
ment under the standards articulated in this opinion. We ac-
cordingly VACATE and REMAND, leaving it to the sound
discretion of the district court to apply this analysis to Otra-
dovec.
