United States v. Palani Bear-Gardipe ( 2022 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 20-3694
    No. 20-3703
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Palani Sam Bull Bear-Gardipe
    Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of South Dakota - Western
    ____________
    Submitted: October 19, 2021
    Filed: January 26, 2022
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Palani Bull Bear pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1153
     and 1112, discharge of a firearm during the commission of a crime
    of violence in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(iii), and bank robbery in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
    (a). The district court 1 sentenced Bull Bear to 120
    months’ imprisonment on the voluntary manslaughter conviction, varying upward
    from an advisory sentencing guideline range of 78 to 97 months, and a concurrent
    sentence of 78 months’ imprisonment on the bank robbery conviction. Bull Bear
    also received a term of 120 months’ consecutive imprisonment on the conviction for
    discharge of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(iii) (stating that a 120-month sentence consecutive to that of the
    underlying crime is required for a violation of the statute). Thus, Bull Bear was
    sentenced to a total of 240 months’ imprisonment. Bull Bear appeals, arguing that
    the district court committed procedural errors and that his sentence is substantively
    unreasonable.
    “When we review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the
    Guidelines range, we apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United
    States v. Hayes, 
    518 F.3d 989
    , 995 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). “We review a sentence first for procedural error.” United States v.
    Dengler, 
    695 F.3d 736
    , 739 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In
    the procedural error analysis, a district court’s interpretation and application of the
    guidelines is reviewed de novo and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error.”
    
    Id.
     “Procedural error includes failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
    Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18
    U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
    failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence,” “including an explanation for any
    deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 461
    (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
    Bull Bear raises several claims of procedural error. First, to the extent he
    argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions for
    downward departures based on victim conduct under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10, age under
    1
    The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Court for the District
    of South Dakota.
    -2-
    § 5H1.1, and mental and emotional conditions under § 5H1.3, “[t]he discretionary
    denial of a motion for downward departure is unreviewable unless the court failed
    to recognize its authority to depart.” United States v. Andreano, 
    417 F.3d 967
    , 970
    (8th Cir. 2005). Here, the district court considered each of these grounds for a
    downward departure explicitly and made clear it did not consider Bull Bear
    deserving of a downward departure on any of them. From this, we conclude that the
    district court recognized its authority to depart but determined that a discretionary
    departure was unwarranted. See United States v. Left Hand Bull, 
    901 F.2d 647
    , 650
    (8th Cir. 1990) (holding unreviewable the discretionary decision to deny a
    downward departure under USSG § 5K2.10); United States v. Jefferson, 
    816 F.3d 1016
    , 1021 (8th Cir. 2016) (same for § 5H1.1); United States v. Dixon, 
    650 F.3d 1080
    , 1084 (8th Cir. 2011) (same for § 5H1.3).
    Second, Bull Bear claims that the district court based its sentence on clearly
    erroneous fact findings. His claim that the district court relied on erroneous fact
    findings regarding who started the verbal altercation between Bull Bear and Brycee
    Red Owl, the victim of the voluntary manslaughter, is unreviewable because it
    challenges the district court’s denial of his § 5K2.10 downward departure motion.
    See Andreano, 
    417 F.3d at 970
    . To the extent that Bull Bear’s challenge is broader,
    there is no plain error. Bull Bear also argues that the district court relied on “facts
    outside the record” when it said that the bank teller robbed by Bull Bear was “going
    to have nightmares for the rest of her life,” and that it will be “hard for her to do that
    job” because she will wonder if every customer plans to rob her and “if she’s going
    to be able to go home that night alive.” Because Bull Bear did not object to the
    court’s statements when they were made, we review for plain error. See United
    States v. Harrell, 
    982 F.3d 1137
    , 1140 (8th Cir. 2020). We conclude that the court
    did not plainly err because “[t]he record does not support a conclusion that these
    remarks were a ‘principal basis’ for the court’s choice of sentence.” See United
    States v. Eagle Pipe, 
    911 F.3d 1245
    , 1248 (8th Cir. 2019).
    Third, Bull Bear argues that the district court “failed to consider or discuss the
    [§] 3553(a) factors or even mention them.” When reviewing for procedural error,
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    “[w]e do not require a district court to provide a mechanical recitation of the
    § 3553(a) factors when determining a sentence. Rather, it simply must be clear from
    the record that the district court actually considered the § 3553(a) factors in
    determining the sentence.” Feemster, 
    572 F.3d at 461
    . Here, the record makes clear
    that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors in arriving at Bull Bear’s
    sentence. For example, the district court discussed Bull Bear’s age, background, and
    upbringing, see § 3553(a)(1) (directing the court to consider “the history and
    characteristics of the defendant”); the fact that Bull Bear committed “crimes of
    violence” that “involved a firearm,” see id. (directing the court to consider “the
    nature and circumstances of the offense”); the impact of Bull Bear’s actions on the
    victims and the community, see § 3553(a)(2)(A) (directing the court to consider “the
    need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense”); and the fact
    that Bull Bear’s actions indicated that he was “not somebody that was trying to
    follow the law,” see id. (directing the court to consider “the need for the sentence
    imposed . . . to promote respect for the law”).
    Finally, Bull Bear argues that the district court “failed to offer any explanation
    for the sentence imposed,” including “any reasons for deviating from the guideline
    range.” As noted above, however, the district court explained its sentence in terms
    of the § 3553(a) factors. And it addressed the upward variance specifically,
    explaining that it was appropriate because “[the killing of Red Owl] happened a
    month after the armed bank robbery, . . . both [crimes] involved a firearm, and [one
    of them] resulted in [a] death, when there was really no provocation at all for that
    death.”2 We conclude that the district court provided a sufficient explanation of the
    sentence imposed. See United States v. Hill, 
    552 F.3d 686
    , 691-92 (8th Cir. 2009).
    2
    The district court first referred to the 120-month sentence on the voluntary
    manslaughter conviction as an “upward departure.” However, upon Bull Bear’s
    objection to lack of notice for a departure, the district court corrected its error when
    it denied the objection, stating, “I did not upward depart. I upward varied.” Because
    the district court properly treated the deviation from the Guidelines as a variance,
    we accept this correction. Cf. United States v. Chase, 
    560 F.3d 828
    , 830-31 (8th Cir.
    2009) (rejecting the district court’s interchangeable use of “departure” and
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    In the absence of procedural error, we then consider the “substantive
    reasonableness” of a sentence “under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Dengler,
    695 F.3d at 739. “When conducting this review, the court will, of course, take into
    account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from
    the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007). Here, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion when it varied upward on the voluntary
    manslaughter count. The district court considered the seriousness of the offenses,
    as well as the fact that they occurred just one month apart. See United States v.
    Senior, 
    935 F.2d 149
    , 151 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that proximity in time is an
    appropriate factor to consider when deviating from the guidelines range). In light of
    the seriousness of the offenses and the close proximity in time between the two
    offenses, the sentence is not substantively unreasonable. See id.; United States v.
    Cunningham, 
    593 F.3d 726
    , 733 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that a sentence was not
    substantively unreasonable when the “seriousness of th[e] offense” was a large part
    of the district court’s consideration).
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    “variance” because it was unclear whether the district court “properly consider[ed]
    the factors it was required to consider”).
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