Canaan Wildlife Preserve v. Caruso Law Firm, P.C. , 638 F. App'x 564 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 15-2499
    ___________________________
    Canaan Wildlife Preserve, Inc. an Arkansas Corporation; Willena Herman; Billy C.
    Looney; Janet K. Speare; Joseph Flanagan; Siloam Minerals, LLC an Arkansas
    limited liability company; Fred Herman
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellees
    v.
    Chesapeake Energy Corporation, an Oklahoma corporation; Chesapeake
    Operating, Inc. an Oklahoma corporation; Chesapeake Energy Marketing, Inc. an
    Oklahoma corporation; Chesapeake Midstream Operating, LLC an Oklahoma
    limited liability company; Arkansas Midstream Gas Services, Corp. an Arkansas
    corporation; Chesapeake Midstream Gas Services, LLC an Oklahoma limited
    liability company; BP America Production Company, a Delaware corporation; BP
    Energy Company, a Delaware corporation; BHP Billiton Petroleum (Fayetteville),
    LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; BHP Billiton Petroleum (Arkansas),
    Inc. an Arkansas corporation; BHP Billiton Marketing, Inc. a Delaware corporation
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants
    ------------------------------
    Caruso Law Firm, P.C.; Smolen, Smolen, & Roytman, PLLC
    lllllllllllllllllllllMovants - Appellants
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith
    ____________
    Submitted: March 21, 2016
    Filed: March 24, 2016
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    The Caruso Law Firm, P.C. (Caruso) and Smolen, Smolen & Roytman, PLLC
    (Smolen) appeal the district court’s1 order declaring that their fee agreements with the
    individual plaintiffs did not entitle them to a lien on a class recovery. Caruso and
    Smolen argue that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing to assert this issue, that the
    issue was not ripe, and that the order was an impermissible advisory opinion. We
    conclude that the issue was justiciable, as in the absence of a declaration from the
    district court the individual plaintiffs were unable to secure counsel or prosecute their
    pending suit because of Caruso and Smolen’s claimed lien; moreover, the issue was
    decided based on existing, not hypothetical, facts. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
    
    504 U.S. 555
    , 559-61 (1992) (standing requires that party suffered concrete, not
    hypothetical injury fairly traceable to defendant’s challenged action; and that injury
    would likely be redressed by favorable decision); Maytag Corp. v. Int’l Union, United
    Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 
    687 F.3d 1076
    , 1081-82
    (8th Cir. 2012) (in context of request for declaratory judgment in dispute between
    parties to contract, Article III considerations include whether contractual dispute is
    real and not factually hypothetical, whether it can be resolved by judicial declaration
    of parties’ contractual rights, and whether declaration is necessary for plaintiff to carry
    on with business; parties need not wait for actual breach or violation to seek
    declaratory judgment); Jones v. Gale, 
    470 F.3d 1261
    , 1265 (8th Cir. 2006) (appellate
    1
    The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Arkansas.
    -2-
    court reviews de novo whether plaintiffs had standing); Pub. Water Supply Dist. No.
    8 v. City of Kearney, 
    401 F.3d 930
    , 932 (8th Cir. 2005) (advisory opinion is one that
    advises what law would be based on hypothetical state of facts); McCarney v. Ford
    Motor Co., 
    657 F.2d 230
    , 233 (8th Cir. 1981) (issue of standing is part of concept of
    justiciability that includes questions of advisory opinions and ripeness).
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -3-