Jane Roe v. Skillz, Inc. ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 9 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANE ROE, No. 20-17221
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:20-cv-00888-JAD-BNW
and
ALYSSA BALL; JOHN PRIGNANO, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiffs,
v.
SKILLZ, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: SILER,*** CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Appellant Jane Roe raised claims against Skillz Inc., arising out of her use of
Skillz’s mobile app, including violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection
Act. Roe filed a certificate of interested parties under seal, a motion to file the
certificate under seal, and a motion to proceed under a fictitious name. Skillz then
moved to compel arbitration and dismiss claims for declaratory judgment.
Thereafter, the magistrate judge denied Roe’s motions to proceed under a
fictitious name and to file the certificate of interested parties under seal. The
magistrate judge stated that the “court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s past
psychological issues and is comforted by her choice to obtain help” but Roe
“cannot show that the need for anonymity in this case outweighs the public’s
interest in the proceedings.” The district court overruled Roe’s objections, granted
Skillz’s motion to compel arbitration, dismissed the action without prejudice, and
denied Skillz’s motion to dismiss as moot.
We review a district court’s decision not to seal judicial records and its
denial of leave to proceed anonymously for an abuse of discretion. See Kamakana
v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006); Does I
Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Roe argues that the district court erred in denying her leave to proceed under
a fictitious name. “[W]e allow parties to use pseudonyms in the ‘unusual case’
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when nondisclosure of the party’s identity ‘is necessary . . . to protect a person
from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.’” Does I Thru XXIII,
214 F.3d at 1067–68 (quoting United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir.
1980)). Because there is a presumption that parties’ identities are public
information, anonymity is only proper under “special circumstances when the
party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the
public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Id. at 1068.
Roe maintains that special circumstances warrant her need for anonymity
because her claims relate to her compulsive gambling and the impact on her mental
health, her suicidal ideations, and personal harms she suffered. She generally
states that disclosure could negatively affect her professional standing, as her
employer is unaware of her struggles and her work requires interaction with the
public who may “weaponize” it against her.
However, this court has made clear that use of a pseudonym should only be
permitted occasionally and in “unusual” cases. United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d
988, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (“As a general rule, the identity of the parties . . . should
not be concealed except in an unusual case, where there is a need for the cloak of
anonymity.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the magistrate
judge did not find Roe’s case to be unusual, noting that “in today’s environment, a
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past gambling addiction with accompanying mental health problems is not so out
of the norm as to constitute sensitive and highly personal in nature.”
Roe has not presented medical evidence that supports the assertion that she
will suffer substantial additional mental injury if her identity is disclosed. Instead,
she states conclusory and general statements without explanation or support.
Further, while there is no identifiable prejudice to Skillz should Roe remain
anonymous, Roe failed to address and therefore show that the need for anonymity
outweighs the public’s interest in the proceedings. See Does I Thru XXIII, 214
F.3d at 1068.
Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Roe’s motion to proceed under a
fictitious name is AFFIRMED. And in light of the district court’s decision to
compel arbitration and dismiss the case, the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1
disclosure statement shall remain under seal.
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