United States v. Ivan Clark , 932 F.3d 1064 ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 18-2309
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Ivan Deandre Clark
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
    ____________
    Submitted: April 15, 2019
    Filed: July 31, 2019
    ____________
    Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    MELLOY, Circuit Judge.
    Defendant Ivan Clark pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 137 months’ imprisonment.
    At his sentencing hearing, the district court1 determined that Clark qualified as an
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of Iowa.
    armed career criminal and calculated a base offense level of 34 with a criminal history
    category VI. On appeal, Clark argues that the district court erred in making those
    determinations. We affirm.
    I. Background
    On October 10, 2017, Clark’s wife filed a written report with the police stating
    that Clark had twice pointed a revolver at her and threatened to shoot her. Several
    days later, Clark’s wife reported a domestic disturbance and officers arrested Clark.
    During the arrest, officers recovered the revolver. Clark was charged with being a
    felon in possession of a firearm. Later, before a grand jury, Clark’s wife testified
    about the event and told the grand jury that the revolver Clark was arrested with was
    the same revolver he had pointed at her.
    At his sentencing hearing, the district court determined that Clark was an armed
    career criminal because he had three prior convictions for serious drug offenses that
    were “committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
    In 1999, Clark was convicted in Illinois of conspiring to distribute cocaine. And in
    2011, Clark was convicted in Iowa on two counts of distributing cocaine base (one
    on July 25, 2011 and one on August 1, 2011). The district court also calculated a
    base offense level of 34 with a criminal history category VI after finding that Clark
    had used and possessed the revolver in connection with a crime of violence. See
    U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A); 
    id. § 4B1.4(c)(2).
    Specifically, the district court found,
    based on Clark’s wife’s statements to the police and the grand jury, that Clark
    displayed the revolver while assaulting his wife in violation of various Iowa Code
    -2-
    sections, including Iowa Code § 708.1(2)(c), which is a crime of violence. See
    United States v. McGee, 
    890 F.3d 730
    , 736–37 (8th Cir. 2018).
    Clark timely filed this appeal.
    II. Discussion
    Clark first argues that he should not be considered an armed career criminal
    because his convictions for two counts of distributing cocaine base in 2011 were
    charged in the same indictment along with a conspiracy-to-distribute count that was
    ultimately dismissed.2 The conspiracy count, according to Clark, suggests that the
    two distribution counts were part of a continuous course of conduct rather than
    distinct criminal episodes, and therefore he has only two prior convictions for serious
    drug offenses—the 1999 conspiracy count and the combined 2011 distribution
    counts. “We review de novo whether a prior conviction is a predicate offense under
    [18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)].” United States v. Van, 
    543 F.3d 963
    , 966 (8th Cir. 2008).
    We addressed and rejected a similar argument in United States v. Melbie, 
    751 F.3d 586
    (8th Cir. 2014). In Melbie, we considered whether a drug conspiracy
    conviction and a possession-with-intent-to-deliver conviction “that occurred during
    the period of the conspiracy and was related to the object of the conspiracy” were
    “separate qualifying predicate offenses” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
    Id. at 587.
    We
    held that the possession conviction was a separate predicate offense despite the fact
    that it overlapped in time with the conspiracy conviction because it was “a punctuated
    2
    Clark also argues that he did not “receive[] sufficient notice at the time of his
    original plea as to how pleading to two counts would affect him rather than pleading
    simply to conspiracy.” But “[a] court is not required to inform a defendant of the
    possibility of being sentenced more severely as a recidivist.” United States v.
    Johnston, 
    220 F.3d 857
    , 862 (8th Cir. 2000). Clark’s argument on this point is
    therefore meritless.
    -3-
    event within [the] conspiracy.” 
    Id. at 589.
    In other words, “[a]lthough related to the
    entire course of events in the ongoing conspiracy,” the possession charge was a
    separate predicate event because it “formed a separate unit within the whole.” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Johnston, 
    220 F.3d 857
    , 862 (8th Cir. 2000)). While in this
    case, Clark was only charged with conspiracy rather than convicted, Melbie’s analysis
    still applies. Under Melbie, Clark’s convictions for two counts of distributing
    cocaine base are properly considered separate predicate offenses because they would
    have been punctuated events within the conspiracy. Accordingly, Clark’s first
    argument fails.
    Clark next argues that his wife’s statements to the police and grand jury were
    unsubstantiated. Consequently, he argues that the district court should not have relied
    on them in concluding that he used or possessed the revolver in connection with a
    crime of violence. “We review the factual findings underlying a sentence
    enhancement for clear error.” United States v. Cook, 
    356 F.3d 913
    , 917 (8th Cir.
    2004).
    When finding sentencing facts, district courts apply a preponderance-of-the-
    evidence standard. United States v. Mustafa, 
    695 F.3d 860
    , 862 (8th Cir. 2012) (per
    curiam). In addition, “[a] district court has wide discretion at sentencing as to the
    kind of information considered or its source.” United States v. Pratt, 
    553 F.3d 1165
    ,
    1170 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This means that, “[i]n resolving any
    reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the
    court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the
    rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient
    indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” 
    Id. (emphasis omitted)
    (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)). That relevant information may include “criminal
    activity for which the defendant has not been prosecuted and ‘uncorroborated
    hearsay, provided the [defendant is] given a chance to rebut or explain it.’” 
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (citation omitted). Here, Clark’s wife’s statements, though
    -4-
    hearsay, were made under circumstances indicating sufficient reliability, and Clark
    offered no evidence to rebut them. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err
    in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Clark used or possessed the
    revolver in connection with a crime of violence.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgement of the district court.
    ______________________________
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-2309

Citation Numbers: 932 F.3d 1064

Filed Date: 7/31/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023