Nwaubani v. Grossman , 806 F.3d 677 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-2250
CHIDIEBERE NWAUBANI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DIVINA GROSSMAN, in her official capacity as Chancellor,
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, and in her individual
capacity, et al.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Selya and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Eric Nwaubani on brief for appellant.
Maura Healey, Attorney General, Dierdre Heatwole, Special
Assistant Attorney General, General Counsel, and Denise Barton,
Assistant Counsel, on brief for appellees.
November 25, 2015
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of a
district court's decision to combine a preliminary injunction
hearing with trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2).
We dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
In 2005, Chidiebere Nwaubani ("Nwaubani") was hired as
the director of the African American Studies Program at the
University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, and then subsequently
also appointed as a tenured Associate Professor in the university's
History Department.
Over the years, Nwaubani's relationship with the
university got rocky. For our purposes, we need not delve too far
into these details, but suffice it to say that the crux of the
conflict centered on disagreements about Nwaubani's performance as
director of the African American Studies Program and on Nwaubani's
efforts to get out from under the thumb of the History Department,
whose negative annual evaluations in 2006-07 and 2007-08, Nwaubani
says, resulted in his being passed over for a promotion to full
Professor status in subsequent years. Things came to a head and
Nwaubani was placed on unpaid administrative leave on July 10,
2013, and then notified on November 8, 2013 that the university
had commenced termination proceedings against him.
This prompted Nwaubani, represented by counsel, to file
suit, alleging various causes of action, including claims under 42
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U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Nwaubani filed his original complaint on October 11, 2013,
but filed on January 28, 2014 an amended complaint and a separate
motion for preliminary injunction, requesting that the district
court order the ongoing termination proceedings be halted and
Nwaubani be reinstated as director of the African American Studies
Program.1 The defendants moved to dismiss this first amended
complaint on the ground that it failed to comply with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a).2 The district court denied the motion
without prejudice, and instead directed Nwaubani to amend the
complaint to comply with Rule 8.
On March 14, 2014, Nwaubani filed his second amended
complaint, along with an amended motion for preliminary injunction
(which more or less requested the same relief as the first motion
for preliminary injunction). Now here is how the case came to be
before us today. The defendants moved to dismiss the second
amended complaint on April 18, 2014, again arguing that it still
1 Nwaubani also asked for backpay, release of various
documents related to his salary, reinstatement of access to his
official mailbox, and that the defendants be enjoined from all
further communication with him.
2 The defendants argued that Nwaubani's 721-paragraph first
amended complaint was not a "short and plain statement" of his
claims, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, and that the allegations and claims
were excessively long and redundant.
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suffered from the same pleading defects, and as such did not comply
with Rule 8. They also contended that the claims against some of
the defendants should be dismissed on administrative exhaustion
grounds. On June 10, 2014, the district court held a hearing on
the motion to dismiss, at which Nwaubani's counsel did not show
up.3 By electronic order issued that day, the district court both
granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint (on the written briefs, since no hearing was
held), and also sua sponte combined the motion for preliminary
injunction with a trial on the merits, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65.4
3
The district court gave the parties notice of the hearing
on May 14, 2014. On May 23, 2014, Nwaubani's counsel filed a
consent motion to continue the hearing, citing the death of a
family member in Nigeria as the reason for the request. The
district court denied the request by electronic order that same
day. Nwaubani's counsel then filed, on the morning of the hearing,
an Emergency Motion to Continue the Hearing, explaining that
because of flight delays on his trip back from Nigeria, he could
not be present at the hearing after all. The district court again
denied the emergency motion by electronic order that morning.
Nwaubani's counsel then informed the court's clerk by telephone
that he would, in fact, attend the hearing, but after the court
waited an hour, it became clear Nwaubani's counsel would not show
up, and the court proceeded to call the matter.
4 The full text of the entry on the electronic docket reads:
ELECTRONIC Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before
Judge William G. Young: Motion Hearing held on 6/10/2014
re 33 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed
by William Hogan, Deborah Majewski, Anthony Garro, Alex
Fowler, Mark Santow, Carol Santos, Jean MacCormack,
James Griffith, Robert Caret, Henry Thomas, III,
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The university terminated Nwaubani on June 18, 2014.
The next week, Nwaubani's counsel filed two motions for
reconsideration of the district court's June 10, 2014 order, which
combined the preliminary injunction hearing with trial. He now
appeals that order, along with the district court's denials of his
motions for reconsideration.
During the pendency of this interlocutory appeal, the
district court has proceeded with the case, which is currently in
the summary judgment phase below.5
Jeannette Riley, John Farrington, Divina Grossman.
Counsel for the plaintiff does not appear. The Court
enters the following Order without oral argument and
based only on the papers granting in part and denying in
part 33 Motion to Dismiss; Counts 2-28, 48 and 51 are
dismissed because they don't state a cause of action;
denying 41 Motion to Substitute Response. The motion for
preliminary injunction is combined with trial on the
merits according to Rule 65(b). This Court will continue
to preside over this case based on this ruling. The Court
requests defense counsel confer with plaintiff's counsel
to determine a trial date.
5As a general matter, an "interlocutory injunction appeal
under § 1292(a)(1) does not defeat the power of the trial court to
proceed further with the case." 16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3921.2 (3d ed. 1998).
Before dispositive motions were filed, the case was also referred
to a magistrate judge for a settlement conference, but the
settlement effort failed.
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DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2)6 provides that
"[b]efore or after beginning the hearing on a motion for a
preliminary injunction, the court may advance the trial on the
merits and consolidate it with the hearing." Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(a)(2). Nwaubani does not dispute that the district court had
authority under Rule 65(a)(2) to consolidate the preliminary
injunction hearing with trial, but argues that it did so improperly
when it ordered consolidation without also expediting trial. As
we discuss below, we lack jurisdiction to review the district
court's order, so the appeal is dismissed.
Although, as a general rule, an order must be final
before we may consider it on appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have
appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders "granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions," 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). Section 1292(a)(1)'s limited exception to the
finality principle, however, must be "strictly construed" and any
"[d]oubts as to [its] applicability . . . are to be resolved
against immediate appealability," Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303
6 The district court's electronic order incorrectly cites
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), which governs temporary
restraining orders, for the authority to consolidate a preliminary
injunction hearing with the trial on the merits, but we will assume
the district court intended to cite Rule 65(a)(2), which permits
such consolidation.
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F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2002), in keeping with the "general
congressional policy against piecemeal review," Carson v. Am.
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981).
Where an interlocutory order does not expressly deny
injunctive relief, as is the case here, a party may only appeal if
(1) the district court's decision had the practical effect of
denying injunctive relief; (2) the denial of injunctive relief
would "cause serious (if not irreparable) harm"; and (3) the order
can effectively be challenged only through an immediate appeal.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Colombani, 712 F.3d
6, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Carson, 450 U.S. at 83-84). Here,
even if we assume Nwaubani has met the first and second
requirements, he cannot meet the third, so we lack appellate
jurisdiction.
As to the first requirement, Nwaubani argues that
because the district court consolidated the preliminary injunction
hearing with trial but never held an expedited trial, the
consolidation order had the effect of denying a preliminary
injunction. Indeed, the district court's docket reveals that in
the year-and-a-half since the consolidation order was entered, the
court has continued to proceed with the case, but to date has
neither held nor scheduled a consolidated merits proceeding. In
the last line of its consolidation order, the district court did
request that "defense counsel confer with plaintiff's counsel to
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determine a trial date," but it is unclear from the record and
from the parties' briefs whether the consolidated proceeding was
never scheduled because of a failure on the court's part or because
the parties failed to follow up on the court's request.7 If, for
example, the district court improperly refused to hold an expedited
merits proceeding, Nwaubani's argument that the consolidation
order effectively foreclosed him from a preliminary injunction may
have some merit. Cf. Fideicomiso De La Tierra Del Caño Martín
Peña v. Fortuño, 582 F.3d 131, 133-34 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(holding that the district court's denial of a temporary
7 Regardless, we are troubled that the district court, in
consolidating the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on
the merits may have unfairly put Nwaubani (over his objection) in
a position where he was forced to forego a ruling on his
interlocutory request for injunctive relief in order to conduct
adequate discovery to prepare for a trial on the merits. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment
("The fact that the proceedings have been consolidated should cause
no delay in the disposition of the application for the preliminary
injunction, . . . [in fact,] to consolidate the proceedings will
tend to expedite the final disposition of the action.").
As Judge (later Justice) Stevens, writing for the Seventh
Circuit, has observed, "[a]t times, particularly if the parties
consent, if discovery has been concluded or if it is manifest that
there is no occasion for discovery, consolidation may serve the
interests of justice," but "[a] litigant applying for a preliminary
injunction should seldom be required either to forego discovery in
order to seek emergency relief, or to forego a prompt application
for an injunction in order to prepare adequately for trial."
Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1057
(7th Cir. 1972). We are concerned that the district court may
have inappropriately used Rule 65(a)(2) to impose such a Hobson's
choice here.
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restraining order did not have the practical effect of denying a
preliminary injunction because "further interlocutory relief"
remained available, and the court "gave every indication that it
[was] working to resolve threshold matters in order to clear the
way for a definitive, reviewable ruling on the preliminary
injunction"). For our purposes today, however, we need not decide
whether the consolidation was an effective denial -- we will assume
it had the practical effect of denying a preliminary injunction
and that the first requirement is met.
Moving on to the second requirement, we likewise assume,
favorably to Nwaubani, that it is also met, though we are doubtful
that he has shown the denial of injunctive relief has caused
serious, if not irreparable harm.8
8Nwaubani argues that he suffers irreparable harm in the form
of "loss of his salary and benefits and the resulting consequences
like health complications, and diminished living standards," as
well as from the continued deprivation of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. While the loss of salary and its collateral
consequences may be difficult circumstances for the bearer, they
infrequently rise to the level of irreparable harm required for a
preliminary injunction, see Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 91-92
(1974) (holding that a terminated government employee's loss of
income and damage to reputation "falls far short of the type of
irreparable injury which is a necessary predicate to the issuance
of a temporary injunction"), and we are doubtful that the
circumstances of Nwaubani's case clear that hurdle here. It is
likewise unclear that Nwaubani has shown a threat of ongoing harm
from the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights, such
that he would be entitled to injunctive relief. Our doubts
notwithstanding, the irreparable harm question is one that
overlaps with the merits of the preliminary injunction motion, and
we decline to reach the question before the district court has an
opportunity to do so.
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Yet, even assuming these first two requirements are met,
we lack jurisdiction because Nwaubani fails to meet the third
requirement in that he cannot show that the order is only
effectively challenged on immediate appeal. Colombani, 712 F.3d
at 12.
Nwaubani argues that immediate appeal is necessary
because if he "awaits the final determination of his case, the
damage to his property interest in continued employment at [the
university] will have already been done." But at the time of the
filing of this appeal, Nwaubani had already been terminated, so
the damage to which he refers was already past. Furthermore,
Nwaubani does not argue that any rights he may have if he succeeds
on the merits, whether they be rights to back pay and money
damages, or equitable remedies like declaratory judgment or
reinstatement, are somehow less available to him after final
judgment than they are now. Thus, we have no basis on which to
conclude that this order can only be challenged effectively through
immediate review, and so the third requirement is not met. Cf.
Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding
the third requirement met because an interlocutory order
effectively denying services to a severely disabled child could
have resulted in deterioration of the child's cognitive and social
skills and deny her a public education). We conclude we lack
jurisdiction.
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Having no jurisdiction over the underlying decision to
consolidate the motion for preliminary injunction with trial, we
also lack jurisdiction over the district court's denials of
Nwaubani's motions to reconsider its order. Accordingly, this
appeal is dismissed.
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