Garry Denson v. Steak 'n Shake, Inc. , 910 F.3d 368 ( 2018 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 18-1039
    ___________________________
    Garry Denson
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Steak ‘n Shake, Inc.
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
    ____________
    Submitted: September 27, 2018
    Filed: December 3, 2018
    ____________
    Before WOLLMAN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Garry Denson appeals from the district court’s1 order granting Steak ‘n Shake’s
    motion for summary judgment on his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
    discrimination claim and his Missouri Workers’ Compensation claim. We affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    Denson broke his hip in 2010 and underwent total hip replacement surgery.
    His surgeon determined that Denson had reached “maximum medical improvement”
    in the fall of 2011 and permanently restricted Denson to clerical or sedentary work,
    with no lifting. An administrative law judge deemed Denson disabled in September
    2012 and awarded him Social Security benefits.
    In November 2014, Steak ‘n Shake hired Denson as a fountain operator at its
    O’Fallon, Missouri, location. The fountain operator job required employees to stand,
    bend, stretch, and walk throughout the shift, as well as to lift and carry up to thirty
    pounds. Denson informed Steak ‘n Shake that he suffered back problems and had
    undergone hip replacement surgery. In contrast with his permanent medical
    restrictions, Denson stated that he could lift approximately fifteen to thirty pounds.
    Denson fell twice at Steak ‘n Shake in early 2015. Denson commenced
    physical therapy in October 2015 through Steak ‘n Shake’s workers’ compensation
    program. In January 2016, David King, M.D., examined Denson and initially
    restricted him to: no lifting more than thirty pounds; no kneeling, squatting, stooping,
    or climbing; and no walking or standing for more than forty-five minutes per hour.
    Dr. King examined Denson again on February 5, 2016, and concluded that he had
    reached “maximum medical improvement.” Dr. King rescinded his former opinion
    and recommended that Denson remain on the original surgeon’s medical restrictions
    of clerical or sedentary work with no lifting. Steak ‘n Shake thereafter removed
    Denson from the work schedule for a safety evaluation and later terminated Denson’s
    employment.
    Denson subsequently filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri
    Commission on Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    (EEOC). In the charge questionnaire, Denson claimed that Steak ‘n Shake could have
    accommodated his disability by transferring him to “the host, dishroom, and/or prep
    person” position, all of which required periods of standing. The EEOC issued
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    Denson a right to sue letter. Denson then filed suit in federal district court, alleging
    that Steak ‘n Shake had terminated his employment because of his disability in
    violation of the ADA and that Steak ‘n Shake had retaliated against him in violation
    of the Missouri Workers’ Compensation statute. Steak ‘n Shake moved for summary
    judgment on both claims.2
    We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, “viewing all evidence and
    reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Barstad
    v. Murray Cty., 
    420 F.3d 880
    , 883 (8th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate
    where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff “must
    show that he (1) has a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a ‘qualified
    individual’ under the ADA, and (3) ‘suffered an adverse employment action as a
    result of the disability.’” Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 
    327 F.3d 707
    , 711
    (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Duty v. Norton–Alcoa Proppants, 
    293 F.3d 481
    , 490 (8th
    Cir. 2002)). “To be a ‘qualified individual’ within the meaning of the ADA, an
    employee must ‘(1) possess the requisite skill, education, experience, and training for
    h[is] position, and (2) be able to perform the essential job functions, with or without
    reasonable accommodation.’” 
    Id. at 712
    (alteration in original) (quoting Heaser v.
    Toro Co., 
    247 F.3d 826
    , 830 (8th Cir. 2001)).
    Denson failed to show that he was a qualified individual within the meaning
    of the ADA. Although he believed that he could perform the essential job functions
    of the fountain operator, Denson’s permanent medical restrictions barred him from
    2
    Denson did not respond to Steak ‘n Shake’s arguments in support of summary
    judgment on the retaliation claim, and the district court correctly deemed the claim
    waived.
    -3-
    performing the duties laid out in the job description, which he admitted were accurate.
    We have held that “[t]he ADA does not require an employer to permit an employee
    to perform a job function that the employee’s physician has forbidden” and that an
    employee’s subjective belief that he or she can perform the essential functions of the
    job is irrelevant. Alexander v. Northland Inn, 
    321 F.3d 723
    , 727 (8th Cir. 2003).
    Denson also argued that Steak ‘n Shake could have accommodated him by
    transferring him to the dish room, prep person, or host position at any Steak ‘n Shake
    location within the St. Louis metropolitan area. But Denson admitted that these jobs
    were not sedentary or clerical when he conceded that these positions required
    employees to stand for long periods of time. According to his medical restrictions,
    Denson could not perform the essential functions of these jobs. Denson was thus not
    a qualified individual and his prima facie case of discrimination fails. For the same
    reasons, a failure-to-accommodate claim would also fail. See Moses v. Dassault
    Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp., 
    894 F.3d 911
    , 921, 924 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding
    that plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim failed when plaintiff could not show he
    was a qualified individual).
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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