Dan Lee, Sr. v. D. Matthew Edwards ( 2016 )


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  •              United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 16-6020
    ___________________________
    In re: Dan Lee, Sr.
    lllllllllllllllllllllDebtor
    ------------------------------
    Dan Lee, Sr.
    lllllllllllllllllllllDebtor - Appellant
    v.
    D. Matthew Edwards1
    lllllllllllllllllllllTrustee - Appellee
    ____________
    Appeal from United States Bankruptcy Court
    for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau
    ____________
    Submitted: October 21, 2016
    Filed: November 15, 2016
    ____________
    Before FEDERMAN, Chief Judge, KRESSEL and SHODEEN, Bankruptcy
    Judges.
    KRESSEL, Bankruptcy Judge
    1
    Edwards is a nominal Appellee only. He did not participate in the proceeding
    below or on appeal.
    Dan Lee Sr. appeals from an order of the bankruptcy court2 denying his third
    motion to reconsider the order dismissing his chapter 7 case. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On April 26, 2016, Lee filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the United States
    Bankruptcy Code. On his bankruptcy petition, Lee checked a box certifying that he
    had requested credit counseling services from an approved agency, but was unable
    to obtain those services during the seven days after the request, and exigent
    circumstances merited a 30-day temporary waiver of the request. He did not file the
    required statement setting forth the exigent circumstances. Inconsistently, Lee also
    attached Exhibit D to his bankruptcy petition stating that within the 180 days before
    the filing of his bankruptcy case, he had received a briefing from credit counseling
    agency, but did not have a certificate from the agency.
    Later on April 26, 2016, the bankruptcy court entered an Order and Notice of
    Documents Due, notifying Lee that certain documents were missing and due within
    14 days.3 The order also notified him that failure to timely file the documents or file
    a written request for an extension of time within the 14-day period would result in the
    dismissal of his case.
    On April 27, 2016, Lee filed some but not all of the required Schedules and a
    Statement of Affairs. He failed to file the credit counseling certificate or a certificate
    of exigent circumstances.
    On May 11, 2016, fifteen days after the April 26 order the court entered an
    Order and Notice of Dismissal of the case for failure to file required Schedules,
    Statement of Affairs and Credit Counseling Certificate indicating compliance, a
    2
    The Honorable Barry S. Schermer, United States Bankruptcy Judge for The
    Eastern District of Missouri
    3
    The Notice and Order did not set the deadlines. The deadlines are all set by the
    Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Practice.
    2
    certificate of exigent circumstances or a motion for exemption from credit counseling
    under 109(h)(4). On the same day, after the dismissal, Lee filed what was titled
    “certificate of exigent circumstances that merit a waiver from complying with the
    credit counseling requirement.” However, the document filed by Lee was merely a
    duplicate Exhibit D filed previously, adding a hand-written statement that his “credit
    card was compromised and wiped [me] out financially (listed in filings) no money to
    pay for counseling till after 5/3/2016. Now waiting for appointment.”
    On May 18, 2016, Lee filed a “Motion to Reinstate Case and Motion to
    Vacate,” asking the court to reconsider his pleadings and reinstate his case. Lee had
    still not filed all the required Schedules, statements or certificates. On May 19, 2016,
    the court denied his motion.
    On May 27, 2016, Lee filed a letter, which the bankruptcy court treated as a
    second motion, asking the court to reinstate his case because he did not have
    sufficient time to gather the required documents because of library hours. He also
    attached unsigned Schedules G and H. On the same day, the court entered an order
    denying the second motion because it was untimely and his schedules G and H were
    not signed. The court also denied Lee’s request to waive the credit counseling
    requirement because he failed to present exigent circumstances.
    On June 7, 2016, Lee filed a document titled Personal Financial Management
    Course Certificate, stating that he completed a course on personal financial
    management on June 6, 2016. On June 10, 2016, he filed signed Schedules G and H.
    On June 13, 2016, he filed a Certificate of Credit Counseling stating that he received
    credit counseling on June 8, 2016.
    On June 16, 2016, Lee filed his third motion to “Reconsider and Reinstate
    Case,” asking the court to reconsider the court’s decision on May 27, 2016 because
    he stated that he satisfied the required filings. On the same day, the court entered an
    order denying his motion because there were no new issues presented and the
    certificate of credit counseling from June 13, 2016 did not cure his eligibility
    3
    problem. On June 24, 2016, Lee filed this Notice of Appeal, appealing the June 16,
    2016 order. He does not appeal the May 11, 2016 order dismissing his case.
    ANALYSIS
    Jurisdiction
    We have an independent duty to examine our own jurisdiction. Nebraska v.
    Strong (In re Strong), 
    305 B.R. 292
    , 295 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2004) (citing Weihs v.
    Kenkel (In re Weihs), 
    229 B.R. 187
    , 189 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999)).
    Lee appeals only from the bankruptcy court’s order denying his third motion
    to reconsider filed on June 16, 2016.
    Lee filed three different motions to “reconsider” or to “reinstate his case.”
    There are no such motions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules
    of Bankruptcy Procedure or the Bankruptcy Code. We could consider Lee’s first
    motion as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 52, a motion for
    a new trial under Rule 59 or a motion for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b),
    incorporated by FRBP 7052, 9023 and 9024 respectively. He had fourteen days under
    Rule 52 and Rule 59 to file such motions. He had a reasonable time under Rule 60 to
    file a motion under that Rule.
    Lee filed his first motion on May 18, seven days after the court dismissed his
    case. This motion was filed timely under all three rules and tolled the period to
    appeal. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b). The court entered an order denying his motion on
    May 19. He did not appeal from this order or the May 11 dismissal order.
    Lee filed his second motion on May 27, sixteen days after the court dismissed
    his case. The bankruptcy court held that his second motion was untimely and denied
    it. The motion was filed outside the 14-day window for Rule 52 and Rule 59 motions.
    The bankruptcy court did not consider it timely under Rule 60. Lee did not appeal
    from this order.
    4
    Lee filed his third motion on June 16, thirty-six days after the court dismissed
    his case. Again, under Rule 52 and Rule 59, his third motion was filed after more than
    14 days after the court’s order dismissing his case and was untimely. The only
    possible relief available to Lee at this point, was under Rule 60(b). On June 16, the
    bankruptcy court denied the third motion as untimely and without merit.
    Lee filed his notice of appeal on June 24, 2016, appealing the court’s June 16
    order. In his notice of appeal, he states four grounds for reversal: impropriety,
    violation of Rule 2, violation of separation of powers, and bias and prejudice.
    Impropriety
    We interpret “impropriety” to mean that the bankruptcy court erred in denying
    his third motion.
    We review the bankruptcy court's decision denying relief under Rule 52, 59 or
    Rule 60, for an abuse of discretion. Murphy v. O'Donnell (In re Murphy), 
    474 F.3d 143
    , 149 (4th Cir.2007); Storey v. Pees (In re Storey), 
    392 B.R. 266
    , 268 (B.A.P. 6th
    Cir. 2008). The bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when it fails to apply the
    proper legal standard or bases its order on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.
    In re Johnson, 
    458 B.R. 745
    , 747–48 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011) (Citing Stalnaker v.
    DLC, Ltd., 
    376 F.3d 819
    , 825 (8th Cir.2004)).
    The court’s denial of the third motion was proper because, as the bankruptcy
    court determined, the motion was not filed timely and Lee failed to demonstrate
    cause.
    Rule 2
    Lee also mentions violations of Rule 2 as ground for reversal. In his brief, he
    never mentions what Rule 2 he is talking about or how it applies to his appeal, nor
    could we identify one that would apply to this situation.
    5
    Separation of Powers
    Likewise, Lee never mentions how the doctrine of separation of powers applies
    to his situation and we cannot think of how it would.
    Bias and Prejudice
    Lee alleges bias and prejudice. However, he points to nothing in the record
    upon which any such claim could be based. This appeal is also the first time Lee
    raised the issue of bias or prejudice.
    According to 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(1), a judge of the United States shall
    disqualify himself where he or she has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
    party. Judicial impartiality is presumed. Moix-McNutt v. Coop (In re Moix-McNutt),
    
    215 B.R. 405
    , 409 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ouachita Nat. Bank v. Tosco
    Corp., 
    686 F.2d 1291
    , 1300 (8th Cir.1982). Therefore, a party seeking recusal bears
    a heavy burden. 
    Id. Lee must
    show that the bankruptcy judge displayed a “deep seated
    favoritism or antagonism, making fair judgment impossible.” American Constr. Co.
    v. Hoich, 
    594 F.3d 1015
    , 1022 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Denton, 
    434 F.3d 1104
    , 1111 (8th Cir. 2006). We do not find any evidence of bias or prejudice.
    Certainly, adverse rulings alone are not evidence of bias. Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994).
    The Mailbox Rule
    Additionally, Lee refers to the Mailbox Rule in his brief. We assume this is a
    reference to the Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(c). The Mailbox Rule is reserved for an
    inmate confined in an institution. Rule 8002(c), See e.g. In re 
    Bourgeois 488 B.R. at 626
    , Dudley v. Powers (In re Dudley) 
    273 B.R. 197
    , 198 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002). Lee
    is not an inmate confined in an institution. Therefore the Mailbox Rule is of no avail
    to him. 
    Id. 6 CONCLUSION
    Although, Lee argues in his brief that the dismissal order was erroneous, he
    failed to file a timely notice of appeal from that order and we lack jurisdiction to
    review it. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his third
    motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm.
    ________________________
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