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17-2340 Chen v. Barr BIA Wright, IJ A206 071 811 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 29th day of October, two thousand nineteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DENNIS JACOBS, 8 PETER W. HALL, 9 DENNY CHIN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 YING CHEN, 14 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 17-2340 18 NAC 19 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 22 Respondent. 23 _____________________________________ 24 25 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 28 Attorney General; Carly McIntyre, 1 Assistant Director; Nancy E. 2 Friedman, Senior Litigation 3 Counsel, Office of Immigration 4 Litigation, United States 5 Department of Justice, Washington, 6 DC. 7 8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 11 is DISMISSED in part, and DENIED in part. 12 Petitioner Ying Chen, a native and citizen of China, 13 seeks review of a July 12, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming 14 an October 6, 2016, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 15 denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 16 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ying Chen, No. 17 A206 071 811 (B.I.A. Jul. 12, 2017), aff’g No. A206 071 811 18 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 6, 2016). We assume the parties’ 19 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 20 in this case. 21 Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered 22 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of 23 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
448 F.3d 24524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). 25 26 2 1 Asylum – One-Year Filing Deadline 2 An alien is ineligible for asylum “unless the alien 3 demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the 4 application has been filed within 1 year after the date of 5 the alien’s arrival in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 6 § 1158(a)(2)(B). Our jurisdiction to review the agency’s 7 findings regarding the timeliness of an asylum application is 8 limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 9 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(D). Such claims and 10 questions must be colorable. Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516
11 F.3d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2008); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of 12 Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006). Chen raises no 13 colorable questions of law. 14 Chen contends that the agency erred in relying on her 15 divorce decree as evidence that she may have been in the 16 United States as early as 2012. She argues that the word 17 “America” in the decree could have meant Mexico, and that (in 18 any event) the date was the result of her mother’s error. 19 While a serious mischaracterization of the record may 20 constitute legal error, the alleged error of law is not 21 colorable because the record supports the agency’s 22 interpretation. See Mendez v. Holder,
566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d 3 1 Cir. 2009). Chen never testified that she worked while in 2 Mexico; she generally referred to the United States as 3 America; and she never used America to refer to Mexico. See 4 Siewe v. Gonzales,
480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where 5 there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 6 factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 7 erroneous.” (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 8 574 (1985))). To the extent she challenges the agency’s 9 reliance on her mother’s mistake, she is arguing over the 10 weight the agency gave the evidence, which we lack 11 jurisdiction to review. See Xiao Ji
Chen, 471 F.3d at 329, 12 342. 13 Withholding and CAT – Adverse Credibility 14 There is no time restriction for seeking withholding of 15 removal and CAT relief. The agency denied that relief on 16 credibility grounds, which we review for substantial 17 evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. 18 Sessions,
891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “Considering the 19 totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a 20 trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . 21 the consistency between the applicant’s . . . written and 22 oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such 4 1 statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with 2 other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an 3 inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of 4 the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 5 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 6 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the 7 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 8 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin 9 v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei 10
Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. The adverse credibility determination 11 is supported by substantial evidence. 12 The agency reasonably relied on Chen’s varying 13 descriptions of the incident in which family planning 14 authorities attempted to transport her to the hospital for 15 sterilization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Her 16 asylum application, interview, and testimony gave three 17 different locations for where she was when the authorities 18 came and were inconsistent about who followed her. And her 19 testimony included details of a physical altercation between 20 authorities and her family members that were omitted from her 21 asylum statement. See Ming Zhang v. Holder,
585 F.3d 715, 22 726 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the agency may “draw an 5 1 adverse inference about petitioner’s credibility based, inter 2 alia, on her failure to mention” important details or events 3 in prior statements); Lianping Li v. Lynch,
839 F.3d 144, 150 4 (2d Cir. 2016) (upholding adverse credibility determination 5 where “application did not simply omit incidents of 6 persecution . . . [but rather] described the same incidents 7 of persecution differently”). Chen had no compelling 8 explanations for these discrepancies. See Majidi v. 9 Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must 10 do more than offer a plausible explanation for h[er] 11 inconsistent statements to secure relief; [s]he must 12 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled 13 to credit h[er] testimony.” (internal quotation marks 14 omitted)). Although the agency should not rely too heavily 15 on minor omissions, the information Chen added about her 16 family’s resistance did not merely supplement her account but 17 amounted to a different, more aggressive version of the event. 18 See Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 78-82(holding that “probative 19 value of a witness’s prior silence on particular facts depends 20 on whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably 21 have been expected to disclose” and that “[o]missions need 22 not go to the heart of a claim to be considered in adverse 6 1 credibility determinations, but they must still be weighed in 2 light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context 3 of the record as a whole.”). 4 Having questioned Chen’s credibility, the agency 5 reasonably relied on her failure to rehabilitate her 6 testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. See Biao 7 Yang v. Gonzales,
496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An 8 applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 9 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 10 general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony 11 that has already been called into question.”). The agency 12 declined to afford significant weight to letters from Chen’s 13 mother and friend in China. That was not error because the 14 letters lacked detail, and the authors were unavailable for 15 cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder,
741 F.3d 324, 332, 16 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that “[w]e generally defer to the 17 agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an 18 applicant’s documentary evidence” and deferring to agency’s 19 decision to afford little weight to spouse’s letter). Chen’s 20 mother’s letter also was inconsistent with Chen’s account of 21 her escape from the family planning officials: Chen said she 22 ran away after convincing the officials to stop the van; 7 1 Chen’s mother’s account suggests that Chen escaped during the 2 altercation between authorities and family members at the 3 house. 4 Given the multiple inconsistencies and the lack of 5 reliable corroboration, the adverse credibility determination 6 is supported by substantial evidence. See Xiu Xia Lin,
534 7 F.3d at 165-66. That determination is dispositive of 8 withholding of removal and CAT relief because both claims are 9 based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 10
444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 12 DISMISSED as to the asylum claim, and DENIED in remaining 13 part. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 14 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 15 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 16 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 17 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 18 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 19 34.1(b). 20 FOR THE COURT: 21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 22 Clerk of Court 8
Document Info
Docket Number: 17-2340
Filed Date: 10/29/2019
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 10/29/2019