Zhang, Zheng v. Gonzales, Alberto , 154 F. App'x 520 ( 2005 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted November 10, 2005*
    Decided November 15, 2005
    Before
    Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
    Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
    Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    No. 04-4226                                   Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ZHENG ZHANG,
    Petitioner,                               No. A77-993-888
    v.
    ALBERTO GONZALES,
    Respondent.
    ORDER
    Zheng Zhang, a Chinese citizen, applied for asylum in August 2002, claiming
    that she had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of her membership in a
    particular social group. Specifically, she claimed that her father’s creditors, acting
    with the assistance of the government, detained and assaulted her as a means of
    tracking down her father and that she is at risk due to her family relationship with
    him. An immigration judge denied her relief, and the Board of Immigration
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that
    oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the
    record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 04-4226                                                                   Page 2
    Appeals affirmed. Since we conclude that the record does not compel a finding of
    past persecution or future persecution, we deny the petition for review.
    Zhang, who is 24 years old, is from Fujian province in China. In August
    2000, her father took out a loan to invest in a company and was unable to make
    repayments. Zhang claims that her father’s creditors, accompanied by government
    officials, came to the family home looking for him. He was not there, having
    already fled the town with his wife. In an effort to track down her father, Zhang
    says the creditors and officials bound her hands and arms, punched her in the face,
    kicked her, pulled her hair, and roughly dragged her away by the arm leaving some
    kind of scar. Zhang also says that the officials kept her in prison for three days,
    denied her food, and threatened her with imprisonment if her father was not found.
    She says she was released when she promised to locate her parents, but that the
    officials continued to trail her after her release. Fearing for her safety, she left
    China for the United States the following January.
    The IJ denied Zhang’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    protection under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ found her testimony
    “vague and confusing.” For example, the IJ found that Zhang gave conflicting
    answers regarding whether her father’s debt was owed to the government or private
    creditors. The IJ also found that some of Zhang’s corroborative evidence “added
    more confusion” to her story because it suggested that her father’s debt was not
    even due until months after she was detained. Finally, the IJ found that Zhang’s
    brief detention was not serious enough to rise to the level of persecution, and that,
    in any case, she failed to show she was persecuted on account of her membership in
    a particular social group. Zhang appealed all of those findings and also argued that
    the IJ denied her due process by improperly interfering with the direct exam in her
    hearing. The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, observing only that the IJ
    was not biased and did not deprive Zhang of due process.
    Zhang’s brief is somewhat unclear, but she seems to argue that, contrary to
    what the IJ found, being beaten and detained for three days without food by
    government officials was serious enough to constitute past persecution. Zhang
    further argues that, because she has proven past persecution, she is entitled to a
    presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Dandan v.
    Ashcroft, 
    339 F.3d 567
    , 573 (7th Cir. 2003).
    We have generally defined persecution as harm that rises above the level of
    mere harassment. Asani v. I.N.S., 
    154 F.3d 719
    , 723 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore,
    we have determined that treatment similar to what Zhang experienced does not
    compel a finding of persecution. Prela v. Ashcroft, 
    394 F.3d 515
    , 518 (7th Cir. 2005)
    (interrogations, 24-hour detention, and beating causing injury to petitioner’s
    hands); Liu v. Ashcroft, 
    380 F.3d 307
    , 313 (7th Cir. 2004) (two-day detention,
    No. 04-4226                                                                    Page 3
    pushing, and hair pulling); Dandan, 
    339 F.3d at
    573–74 (three-day detention
    without food and beaten until face became swollen). We have also said that an
    applicant must provide specific information about the severity of her treatment in
    order to show that the evidence compels a finding of persecution. Dandan, 
    339 F.3d. at 574
    . Other than testifying that officials left a scar on her arm when they
    dragged her away, Zhang did not detail the severity of the beating she received, and
    we do not think that a non-specific allegation of a scar is serious enough to compel a
    finding of persecution, 
    Id. at 572
    .
    We also note that it is unclear whether Zhang has shown that the treatment
    she suffered was on account of a protected ground. Zhang argues that the IJ should
    have found that she was persecuted on account of her membership in a particular
    social group—specifically her family relationship to her father. A characteristic
    that defines a social group is one that a person either cannot change or, as a matter
    of conscience, should not be required to change. Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales,
    
    423 F.3d 666
    , 672 (7th Cir. 2004). We have suggested that an immediate family
    qualifies as a social group, Iliev v. I.N.S., 
    127 F.3d 638
    , 642 (7th Cir. 1997), but
    typically such a situation involves the family in question being targeted for a reason
    that is also a protected ground. See 
    id.
     at 639–40 (family with anti-communist
    views); Tzankov v. I.N.S., 
    107 F.3d 516
    , 519 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Najafi v. I.N.S.,
    
    104 F.3d 943
    , 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1997) (family supported the Shah). Zhang’s family
    was targeted because her father owes money, and “individuals who owe money” is
    almost certainly not a protected group since owing money is not a characteristic a
    person cannot change or should not be required to change. See Cruz-Funez v.
    Gonzales, 
    406 F.3d 1187
    , 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2005). In any event, we need not
    reach this issue because we have already determined that Zhang’s evidence does
    not compel a finding that she was persecuted for any reason.
    Finally Zhang argues that the IJ violated her due process rights by
    frequently interrupting her attorney and ultimately allowing her attorney to ask
    only a few questions during the direct exam of Zhang. However, to make out a due
    process claim, Zhang must show that she was “prejudiced” by the IJ’s conduct— in
    other words that the IJ’s conduct potentially affected the outcome of the case.
    Hamid v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 642
    , 645–46 (7th Cir. 2005); Roman v. I.N.S., 
    233 F.3d 1027
    , 1033 (7th Cir. 2000). Zhang has said only that the IJ’s interruptions
    “intimidated” her, and prevented her attorney from presenting the case in the way
    they had planned, but she has not specified what additional evidence she would
    have offered or what she would have done differently if the IJ had not interrupted.
    For the foregoing reasons we DENY the petition for review.