Case: 19-11028 Date Filed: 10/01/2019 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-11028
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cr-00025-MCR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM THOMAS DURHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(October 1, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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William Durham appeals the 110-month’s prison sentence the district court
imposed after accepting his plea of guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. First, he argues that the district court improperly used his prior conviction
for Florida felony battery, Fla. Stat. § 784.041, as a predicate crime of violence in
calculating his base offense level. Second, he argues that his sentence, which was
within the Guidelines sentence range, was substantively unreasonable because the
district court did not vary downward based on mitigating factors, including his
current and past mental health and substance abuse struggles.
I.
We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a
crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Dixon,
874
F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2017). We are bound by a prior panel opinion, even if
wrongly decided, until the opinion’s holding is overruled by the Supreme Court or
this Court sitting en banc. See United States v. Golden,
854 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th
Cir. 2017). We have held that the Florida crime of felony battery, in violation of
Fla. Stat. § 784.041, is categorically a crime of violence under the Sentencing
Guidelines. United States v. Vail-Bailon,
868 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017) (en
banc), cert denied,
138 S. Ct. 2620 (2018).
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Durham’s argument that his prior conviction under § 784.041 was not a
crime of violence is foreclosed by Vail-Bailon. Accordingly, the district court did
not err in using the conviction in calculating Durham’s base offense level.
II.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), including
the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the
public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
The court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.
Id. § 3553(a)(1).
The weight given to any specific 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor is committed to
the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Clay,
483 F.3d 739, 743
(11th Cir. 2007). However, a court can abuse its discretion when it (1) fails to
consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or
irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by
balancing the proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160,
1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Finally, although we do not presume that a
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sentence falling within the guideline range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such
a sentence to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt,
526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.
2008).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Durham’s
sentence, which was within the Guidelines sentence range, because it properly
considered the mitigating factors Durham advanced and was within its discretion to
give greater weight to Durham’s criminal history and the nature and circumstances
of the offense.
AFFIRMED.
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