Atkins v. State , 441 S.W.3d 19 ( 2014 )


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  •                                      Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 393
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CR-12-533
    Opinion Delivered September   25, 2014
    MARCUS TERRELL ATKINS                               PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE HOT
    APPELLANT                       SPRING COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    [NO. 30CR-07-102]
    V.
    HONORABLE CHRIS E WILLIAMS,
    STATE OF ARKANSAS                                   JUDGE
    APPELLEE
    AFFIRMED.
    PER CURIAM
    In 2007, appellant Marcus Terrell Atkins was found guilty by a jury of first-degree battery,
    kidnapping, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and use of a firearm in commission of a
    felony. An aggregate sentence of 480 months’ imprisonment was imposed. The Arkansas Court
    of Appeals affirmed. Atkins v. State, 
    2009 Ark. App. 124
    , 
    302 S.W.3d 635
    .
    Subsequently, appellant timely filed in the trial court a pro se petition for postconviction
    relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2007). The petition was denied.
    No appeal was taken, and this court ultimately granted leave for appellant to proceed with a
    belated appeal from the order. Atkins v. State, 
    2010 Ark. 392
    (per curiam). On appeal, this court
    affirmed the order of the trial court. Atkins v. State, 
    2011 Ark. 398
    (per curiam).
    In 2012, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se petition to correct an illegal sentence
    pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2006), alleging that the trial
    court erred by sentencing him, itself, to fifteen years’ imprisonment for commission of a felony
    with a firearm pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-120 (Repl. 2006) rather than
    allowing the jury to determine if the sentence should be imposed. Appellant further alleged that
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 393
    his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the court’s action. He sought to have the
    fifteen-year sentence vacated on the ground that it was illegal. The trial court dismissed the
    petition, and appellant brings this appeal.
    This court has held that it will reverse the circuit court’s decision granting or denying
    postconviction relief only when that decision is clearly erroneous. Paige v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 432
    (per curiam); Pankau v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 162
    . A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there
    is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the
    definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Sartin v. State, 
    2012 Ark. 155
    ,
    
    400 S.W.3d 494
    . We find no error and affirm the order.
    First, appellant raised the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the trial
    court’s decision not to submit the sentencing issue to the jury in his Rule 37.1 petition. On
    appeal from the Rule 37.1 order, we held that appellant had not demonstrated that his attorney
    was remiss, noting that one of appellant’s codefendants, Kyron Watkins, had raised the same
    issue in his Rule 37.1 petition and we had affirmed the order denying relief in Watkins v. State,
    
    2010 Ark. 156
    , 
    326 S.W.3d 910
    (per curiam). Atkins, 
    2011 Ark. 398
    . Moreover, even if the issue
    had not already been raised under Rule 37.1, section 16-90-111 does not provide a means to
    mount a collateral challenge to a judgment on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Murphy v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 243
    (per curiam).
    With respect to appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in not submitting the
    sentencing issue to the jury, claims of mere trial error are not within the purview of section 16-
    90-111 inasmuch as the statute does not provide a means to address trial error. See Gilliland v.
    2
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 393
    State, 
    2014 Ark. 149
    (per curiam) (Assertions of constitutional error were not cognizable under
    section 16-90-111.). Trial error is a matter to be addressed during trial and on the record on
    direct appeal from the judgment. Id.; Ybarra v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 423
    (per curiam).
    As to the claim that the sentence was illegal, a claim that a sentence is illegal presents an
    issue of subject-matter jurisdiction that can be addressed at any time. Hill v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 291
    (per curiam); Skinner v. Hobbs, 
    2011 Ark. 383
    (per curiam); see Culbertson v. State, 
    2012 Ark. 112
    (per curiam). Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111(a) provides authority to a trial court
    to correct an illegal sentence at any time. See Reeves v. State, 
    339 Ark. 304
    , 
    5 S.W.3d 41
    (1999);
    Renshaw v. Norris, 
    337 Ark. 494
    , 
    989 S.W.2d 515
    (1999). For that reason, the trial court had
    authority to grant relief under the statute if the sentence imposed on appellant was indeed illegal.
    Hodges v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 299
    (per curiam).
    Here, appellant did not claim that the fifteen-year sentence was outside statutory bounds.
    Section 16-90-111(a) provides that any person convicted of any offense that is classified by the
    laws of this state as a felon who employed any firearm of any character as a means of
    committing or escaping from the felony, in the discretion of the sentencing court, may be
    subjected to an additional period of confinement in the state penitentiary for a period not to
    exceed fifteen years. Accordingly, the sentence was not excessive, and appellant did not
    establish that it was illegal. Sentencing in Arkansas is entirely a matter of statute. State v. Colvin,
    
    2013 Ark. 203
    , 
    427 S.W.3d 635
    ; Glaze v. State, 
    2011 Ark. 464
    , 
    385 S.W.3d 203
    . No sentence
    shall be imposed other than as prescribed by statute. Maldonado v. State, 
    2009 Ark. 432
    . A void
    or illegal sentence is one that is illegal on its face. Lovelace v. State, 
    301 Ark. 519
    , 
    785 S.W.2d 212
    3
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 393
    (1990); Fritts v. State, 
    298 Ark. 533
    , 
    768 S.W.2d 541
    (1989). A sentence is illegal on its face when
    it exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense for which the defendant was convicted.
    Lovelace, 
    301 Ark. 519
    , 
    785 S.W.2d 212
    ; Fritts, 
    298 Ark. 533
    , 
    768 S.W.2d 541
    . If a sentence is
    within the limits set by statute, it is legal. Grissom v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 417
    (per curiam).
    Affirmed.
    Marcus Terrell Atkins, pro se appellant.
    Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
    4