Pede, Rudite v. Gonzales, Alberto ( 2006 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-1897
    RUDITE PEDE,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ALBERTO R. GONZALES,
    Respondent.
    ____________
    Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    No. A75-822-118
    ____________
    ARGUED JANUARY 4, 2006—DECIDED MARCH 24, 2006
    ____________
    Before POSNER, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    EVANS, Circuit Judge. Soon after arriving in the United
    States from Latvia in 1997, Rudite Pede married Alexander
    Mishulovich, a United States citizen, and applied for
    adjustment of status. But several things stood in the way of
    her becoming a permanent resident. She obtained her visa
    for entry into this country by fraud and she presented a
    phony passport in the name of Dace Mediniece upon arrival.
    Also, not to skip an unusual detail, her husband
    (Mishulovich) was a sex-slave trafficker (Latvian women
    imported to work as “dancers” in Chicago nightclubs) with
    whom Pede was in cahoots.
    In 1999, Pede was convicted in federal district court
    of conspiracy to commit visa fraud (
    18 U.S.C. §§ 371
    ,
    2                                              No. 05-1897
    1546, and 2) and four counts of visa fraud for causing
    women in Latvia to use false visas for entry into the United
    States (
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    , 1546). Mishulovich was convicted of
    these and additional crimes as part of the same scheme,
    including bringing several Latvian women into the United
    States and holding them in involuntary servitude.
    Upon her conviction, Pede spent 9 months in prison and
    was placed in removal proceedings. Given her conviction
    and the fact that she wasn’t seeking any form of relief from
    deportation, the proceeding would have been over quickly
    except for one thing—Pede and Mishulovich moved to
    reopen her earlier adjustment of status hearing (one she
    missed in 1998) and the government had not gotten around
    to deciding the motion. The general practice under such
    circumstances is to stay the removal proceedings, see Matter
    of Garcia, 
    16 I. & N. Dec. 653
    , 656-57 (BIA 1978); Hassan
    v. INS, 
    110 F.3d 490
    , 492 (7th Cir. 1997), and that’s what
    happened here—at least half a dozen times between
    November 1999 and January 2004. Finally, the immigration
    judge (“IJ”) decided that there was no sense in waiting any
    longer. Even if the motion to reopen was granted, the IJ
    reasoned, there was no way Pede could convince the
    government to overlook her fraud conviction and grant her
    request for adjustment of status. Refusing to allow another
    continuance, the IJ ordered Pede removed.
    Pede now argues that, by refusing to continue her case,
    the IJ denied her the right to have her request for adjust-
    ment properly adjudicated. She points out that we deemed
    such a refusal unacceptable in Subhan v. Ashcroft, 
    383 F.3d 591
    , 594-95 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Benslimane v. Gonza-
    les, 
    430 F.3d 828
    , 832 (7th Cir. 2005) (“An immigration
    judge cannot be permitted, by arbitrarily denying a motion
    for a continuance without which the alien cannot establish
    a ground on which Congress has determined that he is
    eligible to seek to remain in this country, to thwart the
    congressional design.”) (citations omitted). But in Subhan
    the IJ gave no reason for denying the continuance; here, the
    No. 05-1897                                                    3
    reason was clearly spelled out—the ultimate hopelessness
    of Pede’s adjustment application. That’s a perfectly accept-
    able basis for the IJ’s exercise of discretion. See Garcia,
    16 I. & N. Dec. at 656-57 (“It clearly would not be an abuse
    of discretion for the immigration judge to summarily deny
    a request for a continuance . . . upon his determination that
    the visa petition is frivolous or that the adjustment applica-
    tion would be denied on statutory grounds or in the exercise
    of discretion notwithstanding the approval of the petition.”).
    Pede also argues that the IJ improperly failed to notify
    her of her eligibility to apply for voluntary departure,
    withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention
    Against Torture. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1240.11
    (a)(2) (“The immi-
    gration judge shall inform the alien of his or her apparent
    eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in
    this chapter and shall afford the alien an opportunity to
    make application during the hearing.”); Asani v. INS,
    
    154 F.3d 719
    , 727 (7th Cir. 1998). She does not argue,
    however, that she is in fact eligible for any of those forms of
    relief. The IJ made a preliminary finding that she was not,
    and Pede’s attorney made no objection. There is no harm in
    failing to notify an alien of relief for which she is ineligible.
    The petition for review is DENIED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—3-24-06