All Courts |
Federal Courts |
US Court of Appeals Cases |
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit |
2007-01 |
-
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 January 3, 2007 Before Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge No. 03-4352 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. v. No. 1:03CR00087-001 JONATHAN DOTSON, Defendant-Appellant. John Daniel Tinder, Judge. ORDER Jonathan Dotson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, the maximum sentence under the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). On appeal, he challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the gun that arresting officers found in his possession; however, we found no Fourth Amendment violation and affirmed his conviction in an unpublished order. See United States v. Dotson,
2004 WL 1435203(7th Cir. Jun. 25, 2004). In response to Dotson’s petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated our decision and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of its decision in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220(2005). After again affirming Dotson’s conviction, we ordered a limited remand No. 03-4352 Page 2 pursuant to the procedures set forth in United States v. Paladino,
401 F.3d 471, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2005), to allow the district court an opportunity to consider whether it would have imposed the same sentence with the knowledge that the guidelines are not mandatory. The district court responded that it would have imposed the same sentence had the guidelines been advisory at the time of Dotson’s sentencing. We invited both parties to file memoranda regarding the appropriate disposition of this appeal. The government chose not to file anything. Dotson filed a response challenging certain factual findings made by the district judge in calculating the proper guideline range; he did not address the question whether the overall sentence was reasonable. Specifically, Dotson argued that the district court erred by enhancing his base offense level based on the findings that one of his prior convictions was a crime of violence, and that the gun he was convicted of possessing was stolen. The time for challenging the guideline calculations, however, is long past. The scope of the Paladino remand is limited to inquiring whether the district judge would be inclined to stray from the guideline range, given his newfound flexibility to do so. Our subsequent review of that decision for reasonableness does not open the door to factual challenges that should have been raised earlier. Accordingly, we decline to analyze the objections Dotson is now attempting to raise; we consider solely whether the ultimate sentence was reasonable. The district court considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced Dotson at the lowest end of the applicable guidelines range of 120 to 150 months. (That sentence was heavily influenced by the fact that the statutory maximum for Dotson’s offense is 120 months). We have held that a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Mykytiuk,
415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). We are aware that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Rita v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 551(2006) (No. 06-5754), in order to decide whether a presumption of reasonableness is consistent with its Booker decision. In Dotson’s case, however, the district court examined the full record and reasonably decided not to choose a sentence below the guidelines range. We conclude that Dotson’s ultimate sentence was reasonable, even without the benefit of any presumption. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Document Info
Docket Number: 03-4352
Judges: Per Curiam
Filed Date: 1/3/2007
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 9/24/2015