Com. v. Williams, S. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
SHANIQUA MELIT WILLIAMS, :
:
Appellant : No. 1146 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on March 7, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-23-CR-0003321-2013
BEFORE: ALLEN, JENKINS and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2014
Shaniqua Melit Williams (“Williams”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following her conviction of aggravated assault.
Additionally, Williams’s counsel, Steven M. Papi, Esquire (“Attorney Papi”),
has filed an Application to Withdraw Appearance. We affirm Williams’s
judgment of sentence and grant Attorney Papi’s Application to Withdraw
Appearance.
On October 2, 2013, Williams went to the emergency room at Crozer-
Chester Medical Center in Upland, Pennsylvania. After a significant wait,
Williams was told by the triage nurse, Shawna Trapani (“Nurse Trapani”),
that nine people were still in front of her to be treated at the hospital.
Williams became angry and assaulted Nurse Trapani, who suffered scratches
and bruises. Williams was charged with terroristic threats, simple assault
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and aggravated assault. On December 11, 2013, a jury found Williams
guilty of aggravated assault,1 but acquitted her of terroristic threats and
simple assault. On March 7, 2014, Williams was sentenced to four to
twenty-four months in prison, followed by three years of probation. Williams
filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Attorney Papi has filed an Application to
Withdraw Appearance and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (hereinafter the “Anders Brief”).
“When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the
merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to
withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citation omitted). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is
frivolous and wishes to withdraw from representation, he must do the
following:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief
referring to any issues that might arguably support the appeal,
but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a
copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to
retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points
he deems worthy of this Court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.
2009), our Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders,
i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2).
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(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders]
requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the
trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether
the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Edwards, 906 A.2d at 1228
(citation omitted).
Here, Attorney Papi has complied with each of the requirements of
Anders. Attorney Papi indicates that he conscientiously examined the
record and determined that an appeal would be frivolous. Further, Attorney
Papi’s Anders Brief comports with the requirements set forth by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Santiago. Finally, the record contains a
copy of the letter that Attorney Papi sent to Williams, indicating his
determination that the appeal is frivolous, advising of his intention to seek
permission to withdraw, attaching copies of his Anders Brief and Application
to Withdraw Appearance, and advising Williams of her right to proceed pro
se or retain alternate counsel and file additional claims. Accordingly,
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Attorney Papi has complied with the procedural requirements for
withdrawing from representation, and we will review Williams’s appeal.
In his Anders Brief, Attorney Papi identifies one issue of arguable
merit: “Whether [Williams’s] conviction for aggravated assault should be
vacated since the guilty verdict for that offense is irreconcilably inconsistent
with acquittal on the lesser-included offense of simple assault?” Anders
Brief at 3 (some capitalization omitted).
Williams argues that because aggravated assault2 and simple
2
The crime of aggravated assaultis defined, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Offense defined. --A person is guilty of aggravated assault
if he:
***
(2) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes serious bodily injury to any of the
officers, agents, employees or other persons
enumerated in subsection (c) or to an employee of
an agency, company or other entity engaged in
public transportation, while in the performance of
duty;
***
(c) Officers, employees, etc., enumerated. --The officers,
agents, employees and other persons referred to in
subsection (a) shall be as follows:
***
(21) Emergency medical services personnel.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2072(a)(2), (c)(21).
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assault3 both require that the accused cause or attempt to cause bodily
injury to another person, the offense of simple assault is essentially a
predicate offense to the crime of aggravated assault. Id. at 9. Williams
claims that the only difference between the two crimes is that a person is
guilty of aggravated assault if the complainant is an enumerated individual
under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2072(c)(21). Anders Brief at 9. Williams asserts that
a person cannot be guilty of aggravated assault unless that person first
commits a simple assault. Id. Accordingly, Williams contends that her
conviction for aggravated assault should be vacated because it is
irreconcilably inconsistent with her acquittal of simple assault. Id. at 9-10.
Williams’s argument is based on the mistaken assumption that the
verdict of not guilty on the simple assault count is to be interpreted as a
finding by the jury that there was, in fact, no simple assault. As the
3
The crime of simple assault, of which Williams was acquitted, is defined, in
relevant part, as follows:
(a) Offense defined. --Except as provided under section 2702
(relating to aggravated assault), a person is guilty of
assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
***
(2) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear
of imminent serious bodily injury[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2071(1), (2).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently reiterated in Commonwealth v.
Moore, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 2858 (filed October 30, 2014), an acquittal cannot
be interpreted as a specific finding of innocence. See id. at *18. Rather,
“[t]he most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that
either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real
conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the
defendant’s guilt.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carter, 282 A.2d 375,
377 (Pa. 1971) (upholding appellant’s aggravated assault and battery
conviction despite the fact that he was acquitted of a separate count of
simple assault and battery)). When an acquittal on one count in an
indictment is inconsistent with a conviction on a second count, the court
looks upon the acquittal as “no more than the jury’s assumption of a power
which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed
through lenity.” Carter, 282 A.2d at 376 (citation omitted). Thus, although
a defendant’s acquittal may be logically inconsistent with his conviction, an
acquittal on one count is not grounds for reversal of a conviction on another
count. See Moore, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 2858, *28. Accordingly, Williams’s
claim is without merit.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Williams’s appeal is
frivolous, and that Attorney Papi is entitled to withdraw as counsel.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to Withdraw Appearance
granted.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/26/2014
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