Com. v. Baker, C. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
CHRISTOPHER R. BAKER, :
:
Appellant : No. 242 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 23, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Potter County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-53-MD-0000119-1992
BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2014
Christopher R. Baker (“Baker”) appeals from the January 23, 2014
order entered in the Potter County Court of Common Pleas. Baker’s counsel
has filed a brief alleging that Baker’s appeal is frivolous. For the following
reasons, we remand the case with instructions to counsel.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. At the age of
16, Baker was arrested and charged with the May 6, 1992 killing of 72-year-
old Dorothy Wilkinson. Baker was also charged with stealing Ms. Wilkinson’s
car after the murder. On March 11, 1993, following a non-jury trial, Baker
was convicted of first-degree murder and theft.1 The trial court sentenced
Baker on June 15, 1993, to life imprisonment for the charge of murder and
11 to 48 months imprisonment for the theft charge, to run concurrently with
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 3921(a).
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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the life sentence. On July 14, 1993, Baker filed a notice of appeal. This
Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 29, 1994.
Between December 16, 1996 and November 4, 2011, Baker filed three
pro se petitions for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541, et seq. The trial court denied all three of
Baker’s requests for relief, which this Court affirmed.2
On May 21, 2012, Baker filed his fourth pro se PCRA petition. On July
19, 2012, the PCRA court appointed Brent Petrosky (“Attorney Petrosky”) to
represent Baker. On July 23, 2012, Baker filed a pro se amended PCRA
petition, wherein he asserted that the decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012), which holds that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders,” created a new constitutional right that should be
applied retroactively to his case. Id. at 2469. The PCRA court continued
the matter on October 16, 2012, pending resolution by our Supreme Court
of the issue of whether Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review.
In the interim, on February 4, 2013, Baker filed a pro se petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the PCRA court, requesting that his sentence be
2
The PCRA court granted Baker’s November 19, 1998 petition in part to
allow Baker to file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court nunc pro tunc. Our Supreme Court denied Baker’s petition
for allowance of appeal on May 26, 1999. See Commonwealth v. Baker,
739 A.2d 163 (Pa. 1999).
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vacated in light of the Miller decision. Baker thereafter amended his
petition on February 6, 2013. On June 18, 2013, the PCRA court issued an
order stating that Baker’s PCRA petition and petition for writ of habeas
corpus would be held in abeyance until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, filed at docket
number 38 EAP 2012. Baker then filed two pro se amended habeas petitions
on November 18, 2013 and December 27, 2013, respectively.
Following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham,
81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (U.S. 2014), the PCRA
court entered an order on January 3, 2013 pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907,
notifying Baker of its intention to dismiss his petitions without a hearing,
ultimately dismissing them on January 23, 2014.3 Baker filed a pro se notice
of appeal to this Court on February 3, 2014.
On March 12, 2014, Baker filed a motion for appointment of counsel.
This Court entered an order on March 31, 2014, stating:
As the trial court appointed [Attorney Petrosky] to
represent [Baker] on July 19, 2012, and as there is
no indication that [A]ttorney Petrosky was granted
leave to withdraw, the prothonotary is directed to
enter the appearance of [A]ttorney Petrosky in this
Court. Should [A]ttorney Petrosky believe he is not
representing [Baker], [A]ttorney Petrosky shall file a
motion to withdraw in the lower court.
3
The PCRA court properly treated the habeas petition as an amended PCRA
petition, as 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 states that the PCRA is “the sole means for
obtaining collateral relief and encompasses […] habeas corpus[.]”
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Order, 3/31/14, at 1.
On April 7, 2014, Baker attempted to file a pro se brief. Baker then
filed a “Motion to the Court” on April 21, 2014, requesting to proceed pro se
and to receive an extension of time to file his brief. On May 5, 2014, this
Court denied Baker’s “Motion to the Court,” noting that Attorney Petrosky
filed a brief on behalf of Baker on April 28, 2014. Order, 5/5/14.
In the brief, Attorney Petrosky presents one issue for this Court’s
review:
Did a lower court err in following the dictates of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in denying [Baker]
retroactive relief where an appellant has previously
exhausted his direct appeal rights?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Attorney Petrosky provides an explanation of Baker’s requested relief,
a brief background of the case, a brief summary of our Supreme Court’s
ruling in Cunningham, and concludes as follows:
After a careful and thorough review of the orders,
counsel determines that the appealed issue is
frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009) (holding that counsel must now
state reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous and that counsel need not argue in support
of a defendant’s claim, but only refer to potentially
supporting portions of the record.[)]
Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s counsel has
asserted all arguments which could arguably support
an appeal. Counsel has diligently investigated the
possible grounds and finds the appeal frivolous.
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Whether there is evidence contained within this
record that supports Appellant’s contentions that the
lower court abused its discretion by dismissing
Appellant’s pleadings is left to the discretion of this
Court.
Appellant’s Brief at 9-10.
We begin by noting that Attorney Petrosky did not file a petition for
leave to withdraw as counsel and did not request to withdraw as counsel.
However, Attorney Petrosky cites to Santiago in his discussion of the
frivolity of Baker’s appeal, which sets forth the precise requirements a brief
seeking permission to withdraw must contain in order to establish that an
appeal is frivolous pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
As such, Attorney Petrosky appears to be attempting to file an Anders brief
seeking to withdraw as counsel. This Court has established, however, that
“[c]ounsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must proceed
not under Anders but under Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).”
Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007).
“The Turner/Finley decisions provide the manner for post-conviction
counsel to withdraw from representation. The holdings of those cases
mandate an independent review of the record by competent counsel before
a PCRA court or appellate court can authorize an attorney’s withdrawal.”
Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2012). The
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procedure for petitioning to withdraw as counsel under Turner/Finley is as
follows:
[PCRA] counsel must [] submit a ‘no-merit’ letter to
the trial court, or brief on appeal to this Court, [1]
detailing the nature and extent of counsel's diligent
review of the case, [2] listing the issues which the
petitioner wants to have reviewed, [3] explaining
why and how those issues lack merit, and [4]
requesting permission to withdraw.
Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy
of the ‘no-merit’ letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s
petition to withdraw; and (3) a statement advising
petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new
counsel.
If counsel fails to satisfy the foregoing technical
prerequisites of Turner/Finley, the court will not
reach the merits of the underlying claims but, rather,
will merely deny counsel's request to withdraw.
Upon doing so, the court will then take appropriate
steps, such as directing counsel to file a proper
Turner/Finley request or an advocate's brief.
Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 721 (internal citations omitted).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Attorney Petrosky failed
to satisfy the technical prerequisites of Turner/Finley. First, counsel has
failed to state the nature and extent of his review. In the brief he filed,
Attorney Petrosky simply states “[a]fter a careful and thorough review of the
orders, counsel determines that the appealed issue is frivolous.” Appellant’s
Brief at 9. He then states that “[c]ounsel has diligently investigated the
possible grounds and finds the appeal frivolous.” Id. at 10. At no time,
however, does Attorney Petrosky state the nature and extent of his review
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or what he considered in arriving at his conclusion that Baker’s appeal is
frivolous.
In Commonwealth v. Liebensperger, 904 A.2d 40 (Pa. Super.
2006), this Court determined that counsel’s statement that he reviewed “the
pleadings, discovery information, record papers, and transcripts, as well as
the applicable case law” satisfied the requirement that counsel detail the
nature and extent of counsel's diligent review. Id. at 45. In view of our
decision in Liebensperger, we conclude that Attorney Petrosky failed to
sufficiently detail the nature and extent of counsel's diligent review of the
case.
Attorney Petrosky also failed to list the issues that Baker desired this
Court to review. In his brief, Attorney Petrosky presented one issue for our
review. However, the record reflects that Baker filed a pro se statement of
errors complained on of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on February
14, 2013, wherein he listed four issues, with several sub-issues, he wished
to have reviewed on appeal. Attorney Petrosky failed to list these issues and
failed to explain how these issues lack merit, which contravenes the
requirements of Turner/Finley.
Furthermore, Attorney Petrosky never requested permission to
withdraw, nor is there evidence of record establishing that Attorney Petrosky
advised Baker that he believed his appeal was frivolous or of his right to
proceed pro se or by new counsel. See Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 721. To the
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contrary, the record establishes that Attorney Petrosky filed a brief following
Baker’s attempt to file a pro se appellant’s brief, resulting in the denial of
Baker’s request to proceed pro se.
Based upon the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that Attorney
Petrosky’s attempt to withdraw as counsel is deficient. Accordingly, we
must remand this case. Should Baker renew his request to proceed pro se
before the PCRA court, the court shall hold a Grazier4 hearing.5 If Baker
does not wish to proceed pro se or the PCRA court determines that his
waiver of his right to counsel is not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent,
Attorney Petrosky (or newly appointed counsel, if the PCRA court deems
necessary) must file either a proper advocate’s brief or a “no-merit” letter
that complies with the requirements of Turner/Finley.
Case remanded with instructions. Panel jurisdiction retained.
4
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
5
As this is Baker’s fourth PCRA petition, he is not entitled to counsel. See
Commonwealth v. Kubis, 808 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the PCRA court shall
appoint an attorney to represent a petitioner during his first PCRA petition
when he demonstrates that he is ‘unable to afford or otherwise procure
counsel.’ […] [N]o such right exists for subsequent PCRA petitions[.]”)
(emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the trial court appointed Attorney
Petrosky to represent Baker in this appeal. See Order, 3/31/14, at 1.
However, once counsel is appointed and undertakes representation, the
Rules of Professional Conduct require that, contrary to the manner in which
Attorney Petrosky proceeded in this case, counsel must provide “competent,
thorough, and prepared representation.” See Rules of Professional Conduct
1.1. Furthermore, Rule 1.3 requires that the representation be diligent and
zealous. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3. Consequently, in consideration
of the trial court’s decision to appoint counsel to represent Baker in this
matter, we invoke the Grazier requirement.
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