United States v. Bryan Gregory ( 2019 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 19-1583
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Bryan Lee Gregory
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
    ____________
    Submitted: December 13, 2019
    Filed: December 26, 2019
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before BENTON, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Bryan Gregory appeals after he pled guilty to a firearm offense; and the district
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    court sentenced him to the statutory-maximum prison term. Gregory has been
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    The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri.
    granted leave to proceed pro se, and has filed briefs arguing his counsel was
    ineffective; his plea was involuntary; and the district court erred in denying his
    motions to withdraw his plea and to suppress evidence, and in imposing two United
    States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”) enhancements and special
    conditions of supervised release. He also moves to supplement the record with
    evidence related to the suppression issue.
    Initially, we note Gregory’s plea agreement contained an appeal waiver.
    Assuming the appeal waiver does not bar this appeal, this court addresses Gregory’s
    arguments, except that we decline to consider Gregory’s ineffective-assistance claim
    on direct appeal. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 
    449 F.3d 824
    , 826-27 (8th
    Cir. 2006) (holding ineffective-assistance claims are best litigated in collateral
    proceedings).
    We conclude the plea colloquy shows Gregory knowingly and voluntarily
    entered his guilty plea, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    his motions to withdraw his guilty plea. See United States v. Green, 
    521 F.3d 929
    ,
    931 (8th Cir. 2008) (considering whether defendant established “fair and just” reason
    to withdraw plea after Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy; reviewing for abuse of discretion
    decision to deny motion to withdraw plea; and reviewing de novo whether plea was
    knowing and voluntary). Furthermore, Gregory’s challenge to the denial of his
    suppression motion is foreclosed by his valid guilty plea, see United States v.
    Muratella, 
    843 F.3d 780
    , 783 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding a valid guilty plea generally
    “forecloses independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that
    occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea”); and his motion to supplement the
    record is therefore moot.
    We also conclude the district court did not plainly err in applying an
    enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, given that Gregory agreed to that enhancement
    in the plea agreement. See United States v. Barrett, 
    173 F.3d 682
    , 684 (8th Cir. 1999)
    -2-
    (“A defendant may not challenge an application of the Guidelines to which he agreed
    in a plea agreement (unless he proves the agreement invalid or succeeds in
    withdrawing from it).”); see also United States v. Kirlin, 
    859 F.3d 539
    , 543 (8th Cir.
    2017) (stating this court reviews district court’s application of Guidelines de novo,
    and its findings of fact for clear error; if defendant fails to timely object, review is for
    plain error). We further conclude the district court did not err in applying an
    enhancement based on Gregory’s conduct during an incident that was part of the
    offense charged in the indictment, and during which, he stipulated, he had possessed
    the firearm. See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1) (permitting 6-level enhancement if
    defendant, during course of offense or immediate flight therefrom and in manner
    creating substantial risk of serious bodily injury, assaulted law enforcement officer).
    Finally, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
    the challenged special conditions of supervised release. See United States v. Godfrey,
    
    863 F.3d 1088
    , 1101 (8th Cir. 2017) (reviewing special conditions of supervised
    release for abuse of discretion); United States v. Wiedower, 
    634 F.3d 490
    , 493 (8th
    Cir. 2011) (noting sentencing court has broad discretion when imposing release
    conditions; when crafting special condition, court must make individualized inquiry
    into facts and circumstances underlying case and make sufficient findings on record
    so as to ensure condition satisfies statutory requirements; purposes in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) include protection of public).
    Accordingly, we deny Gregory’s motion to supplement the record, and we
    affirm.
    ______________________________
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