John J. Conforti etc v. United States ( 1996 )


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  •                              No. 95-1735
    John J. Conforti, doing                 *
    business as C & C Produce,              *
    *
    Petitioner,                       *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                              *   Department of Agriculture.
    *
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Respondent.                       *
    Submitted:   September 11, 1995
    Filed:    January 18, 1996
    Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
    MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
    John Conforti appeals the Secretary of Agriculture's decision
    sanctioning him for violating the employment restrictions in the
    Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b)
    (1980) ("PACA").   We uphold the Secretary's determination that
    Conforti violated PACA, but modify the penalty that the Secretary
    imposed.
    I.
    PACA was enacted to protect produce growers "from the 'sharp
    practices of financially irresponsible and unscrupulous brokers in
    perishable commodities.'"   In re Lombardo Fruit & Produce Co.,
    
    12 F.3d 110
    , 112 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hull Co. v. Hauser's
    Foods, Inc., 
    924 F.2d 777
    , 780 (8th Cir. 1991).     PACA requires
    wholesale produce dealers to obtain a license from the United
    States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), 7 U.S.C. § 499c(a), and
    prohibits licensees from employing individuals "responsibly
    connected" to a company that has failed to satisfy USDA reparation
    orders.   
    Id. § 499h(b)(3).
        Under the statute, a person is
    responsibly connected to a company if he serves as a partner,
    officer, or director of it, or if he holds more than 10 percent of
    its outstanding stock. 
    Id. §§ 499a(9).
    Conforti operates C&C Produce, a licensed produce dealership.
    In June, 1993, Conforti hired Joseph Cali, his life-long friend, to
    work for C&C Produce. On June 24, 1993, Conforti received a letter
    from the USDA informing him that Cali was responsibly connected to
    Royal Fruit, a company with several outstanding reparation orders.
    The letter indicated that Conforti could not employ Cali after
    July 24, 1993, unless he posted a bond that was later set at
    $100,000.
    Conforti then tried to obtain a bond.      He first asked his
    insurance company for one, but it required full collateralization.
    He next applied for a line of credit at United Missouri Bank
    ("UMB") to collateralize the bond, but learned that approval would
    take three months. Conforti then decided to post $100,000 of his
    own funds to guarantee the line of credit. UMB initially approved
    the transaction, but changed its mind after the USDA advised the
    loan officer that Conforti's license was going to be revoked.
    In November, Conforti secured a line of credit at a different bank,
    but when he learned that the insurance company charged an
    additional $15,000 fee to issue the bond, he "threw up his hands"
    and abandoned his efforts.
    Conforti did not fire Cali on July 24 as instructed; he did
    not finally fire him until November 19, 1993, after he gave up his
    search for a bond. In the interim, the USDA warned Conforti at
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    least five times that Cali's continued employment could result in
    the suspension or revocation of his PACA license.
    Three months after he fired Cali, the USDA filed a complaint
    seeking to revoke Conforti's PACA license. The Administrative Law
    Judge ("ALJ") found that Conforti had violated PACA and suspended
    his license for thirty days. The USDA appealed to the Judicial
    Officer ("JO"), who affirmed the ALJ's decision that Conforti
    violated PACA but increased the suspension to 90 days. The JO's
    decision is the final decision of the Secretary of Agriculture.
    7 C.F.R. § 2.35 (1993). Conforti petitioned this court to review
    the Secretary's order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2342.
    II.
    Conforti first argues that the JO improperly found that Cali
    was responsibly connected to Royal Fruit.        He contends first
    that the finding cannot stand in the absence of a predicate finding
    in a special hearing on the question of Cali's connection to Royal
    Fruit. We disagree. It is true that USDA regulations establish a
    procedure to challenge the USDA's "responsibly connected"
    designation. 7 C.F.R. §§ 47.48-47.63 (1993). This proceeding,
    however, commences after the USDA finds that a person is
    responsibly connected, 
    id. § 47.49(a),
    and nothing in the statute
    indicates that PACA's employment restrictions take effect only
    after this proceeding is completed. The statute straightforwardly
    prohibits employing anyone who is a responsibly connected person as
    defined by PACA. 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b). Thus, if the record contains
    evidence that Cali was a partner, director, or officer in Royal
    Fruit, or held more than 10 percent of Royal Fruit's stock, his
    employment is restricted and Conforti violated PACA by employing
    him. 
    Id. § 499a(9).
    Conforti also maintains that even if a previous hearing under
    7 C.F.R. §§ 47.48-47.63 was not required, the record lacks evidence
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    indicating that Cali met PACA's definition of a responsibly
    connected individual. This argument is without merit. Prior to
    issuing his final order, the JO took official notice of an ALJ's
    opinion in In re Midland Banana and Tomato Co., PACA Docket No.
    D-93-548, and In re Royal Fruit, PACA Docket No. D-93-549 (USDA
    1994) ("Royal Fruit"). In Royal Fruit, the ALJ found that Cali was
    the President and a director of Royal Fruit and that he held 50
    percent of the company's stock. Given these previous findings, we
    believe that the JO was justified in concluding that Cali was
    responsibly connected.
    Conforti contends that the JO was not entitled to consider
    these previous findings because he improperly used the device of
    official notice. We find no error in the JO's procedure. USDA
    regulations allow the JO to take official notice of "such matters
    as are judicially noticed by the courts of the United States,"
    7 C.F.R.§ 1.141(g)(6) (1993), and the USDA Rules of Practice permit
    the JO to consider "any matter of which official notice is taken."
    7 C.F.R. 1.145(i) (1993). We have held that "federal courts may
    sua sponte take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if
    they relate directly to the matters at issue." Hart v. Comm'r, 
    730 F.2d 1206
    , 1207 n.4 (8th Cir. 1984); see also United States v.
    Jackson, 
    640 F.2d 614
    , 617 (1981). The JO also gave Conforti the
    required opportunity to object to the order taking official notice.
    5 U.S.C. § 556(e).
    Alternatively, Conforti contends that Cali is not responsibly
    connected because he played only a minor role in Royal Fruit.
    Conforti points to the ALJ's findings in Royal Fruit that Cali was
    by-and-large a "front man" and that Royal Fruit was actually the
    "alter ego" of Robert Heimann. Conforti argues that, under the
    doctrine adopted in Quinn v. Butz, 
    510 F.2d 743
    , 756 (D.C. Cir.
    1975), Cali's nominal status in Royal Fruit merely raises a
    rebuttable presumption that he is responsibly connected.
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    The central difficulty that Conforti's argument encounters is
    that we specifically rejected it ten years ago. See Pupillo v.
    United States, 
    755 F.2d 638
    , 643 (8th Cir. 1985).       We apply a
    per se rule: "Section 499a(9) [is] an irrebuttable statement that
    an officer, director, or holder of more than ten percent of the
    outstanding stock of a corporation is responsibly connected
    with that corporation or association."        
    Id. Cali's actual
    responsibilities or interests in Royal Fruit are, therefore,
    irrelevant to the question of whether he was responsibly connected;
    because he was both an officer in the company and held 33 percent
    of its stock, he was responsibly connected as a matter of law.
    Because we find that the JO's decision that Cali was a
    responsibly connected person is supported by substantial evidence,
    we affirm it. 
    Pupillo, 755 F.2d at 643
    .
    III.
    Conforti also asserts that he did not violate PACA because he
    made a good faith effort to obtain a bond and because the USDA led
    him to believe that he could continue to employ Cali while he was
    searching for a bond. We see how Conforti could have gotten this
    impression from his communications with the USDA. Although the
    USDA initially told Conforti to obtain a bond or fire Cali by
    July 24, the USDA did not set the bond amount until July 16,
    leaving very little time before the deadline. Conforti then asked
    the USDA to reduce the bond; the USDA denied his request on
    August 9.   The August 9 letter reiterated that Conforti needed
    either to obtain a bond or fire Cali, but it did not mention the
    July 24 deadline.    On July 30, the USDA sent a letter asking
    Conforti whether he intended to fire Cali or to obtain a bond.
    Finally in November, after Conforti stopped looking for a bond,
    M.A. Clancy, the PACA Licensing Program Review Head, advised him
    that if he could not post a bond, he should fire Cali.
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    Conforti does not cite any authority to support his official
    estoppel argument, and we know of none.     In point of fact, the
    Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that an estoppel will rarely
    work against the government.      See, e.g., Office of Personnel
    Management v. Richmond, 
    496 U.S. 414
    , 423 (1990). As the Court has
    noted, "When the government is unable to enforce the law because
    the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the
    interests of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of
    law is undermined." Heckler v. Community Health Services, 
    467 U.S. 51
    , 61 (1984).      Therefore, in the absence of "affirmative
    misconduct" by the government, INS v. Hibi, 
    414 U.S. 5
    , 8 (1973),
    "not even the temptations of a hard case" like Conforti's justify
    applying an estoppel against the USDA. Federal Crop Ins. Co. v.
    Merrill, 
    332 U.S. 380
    , 386 (1947).
    We strictly construe PACA's employment restriction, see Hull
    Co. v. Hauser's Foods, 
    924 F.2d 777
    , 782 (8th Cir. 1991); 
    Pupillo, 755 F.2d at 643
    , and, as the D.C. Circuit has noted, the
    "employment bar is phrased as an absolute." Siegel v. Lyng, 
    851 F.2d 412
    , 415 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b) ("The Secretary
    may . . . suspend or revoke the license of any licensee who, after
    the date given in such notice, continues to employ any person in
    violation of this section.").    Therefore, Conforti's good faith
    efforts, however sincere, cannot excuse his failure to fire Cali.
    IV.
    After the Secretary determines that a licensee violated PACA's
    employment restrictions, he may suspend or revoke the license.
    7 U.S.C. § 499h. Conforti argues that suspending his license for
    90 days was unduly harsh. We review the Secretary's sanction for
    an abuse of discretion, affirming it unless it is "without
    justification in fact." ABL Produce v. U.S.D.A., 
    25 F.3d 641
    , 645
    (8th Cir. 1994). Even under this deferential standard, we agree
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    that a 90-day suspension was not justified by the facts.        We
    therefore reverse the JO's sanction and reinstate the ALJ's 30-day
    license suspension.
    In ABL 
    Produce, 25 F.3d at 645
    , a license-holder challenged an
    order revoking his license for violating PACA's employment
    restrictions. We reversed the sanction and reinstated the 30-day
    suspension awarded by the ALJ because the JO failed to consider
    several "relevant factors," namely, whether the company's conduct
    threatens to undermine PACA's purposes, the circumstances of the
    violation, and the effect the sanction will have on the company.
    
    Id. at 646.
    We apply these considerations to the case at hand.
    A.
    The JO found that by employing Cali, Conforti threatened to
    undermine PACA's purposes.    As we have already noted, PACA was
    designed to protect produce growers from "sharp" and "unscrupulous"
    practices of financially irresponsible brokers.     In re Lombardo
    Fruit & Produce 
    Co., 12 F.3d at 112
    . Congress was particularly
    concerned about the risk of non-payment. ABL 
    Produce, 25 F.3d at 646
    .
    The record in this case is devoid of evidence that Conforti is
    in any way a threat to produce growers. C&C Produce is financially
    healthy, and Conforti's suppliers themselves characterized his
    payment practices and ethics as "exemplary." The JO disregarded
    this information, however, concluding that "Mr. Conforti's ethics,
    payment practices, complaints against C&C produce and the financial
    health of Mr. Conforti's company are irrelevant." Given the fact
    that PACA was intended to protect suppliers, we do not see how this
    kind of information can be characterized as irrelevant. The JO
    therefore erred when he refused to consider it.
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    The JO further found that employing Cali threatened the
    industry because he was responsibly connected to Royal Fruit. As
    we have already said, however, Cali was simply a "front-man" who
    lacked both authority and an actual interest in Royal Fruit. The
    ALJ considered Cali's "front man" status and concluded that "to say
    that Mr. Cali was a great risk to the industry is hyperbole." The
    JO, on the other hand, disregarded Cali's limited involvement
    because it "did not lessen the responsibility of Mr. Cali for
    Royal's PACA violations."
    We agree entirely, as we said above, that the extent of Cali's
    participation has no bearing on whether he is responsibly connected
    to Royal Fruit. 
    Pupillo, 755 F.2d at 643
    . We believe, however,
    that his actual position at Royal Fruit is relevant to whether
    Cali's employment at C&C Produce threatened the produce industry.
    By disregarding the fact that Cali's role in Royal Fruit was
    de minimis, therefore, the JO overstated the threat that Cali's
    employment posed to the produce industry.
    B.
    The JO also increased the ALJ's sanction because Conforti
    "deliberately chose not to heed [the government's] warning" to fire
    Cali or obtain a bond. We agree that Conforti should be punished
    for employing Cali for four months after the USDA's deadline. We
    find, however, that the JO abused his discretion by not considering
    the mitigating circumstances in the case.
    As the ALJ noted, Conforti "made a diligent and good faith
    effort to comply with the complainant's demands that he obtain a
    bond." During the period that Conforti employed Cali, he tried to
    obtain a bond from several different sources, and he consistently
    updated the USDA about his progress. While, as we have said, we do
    not agree with Conforti that his diligence absolves him of guilt in
    the matter, we do think that, particularly in light of the mixed
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    signals sent by the USDA, all of which we rehearsed above, the JO
    erred by completely discounting his efforts.
    C.
    Finally, we think that the JO abused his discretion when he
    failed to consider how the 90-day suspension would affect C&C
    Produce.    Conforti operates a wholesale produce dealership.
    Because his customers, primarily restaurants, require daily
    service, even a 30-day suspension is likely to have devastating
    financial consequences. ABL 
    Produce, 25 F.3d at 647
    ; see also
    Capital Produce Co. v. U.S., 
    930 F.2d 1077
    , 1081 (5th Cir. 1991)
    ("The 45-day suspension may destroy or seriously hamper [the
    produce company's] relationships with its customers, who depend
    upon daily services"). We think that there is every chance that
    suspending his license for 90 days will drive Conforti, a man with
    a previously spotless record, out of the produce business
    altogether.
    V.
    For the reasons adduced, we affirm the decision of the
    Secretary of Agriculture finding that Conforti violated PACA's
    employment restrictions. We find, however, that the facts in the
    case do not justify the sanction imposed. In light of Conforti's
    exemplary record, his diligent efforts to obtain a bond, and Cali's
    limited participation in Royal Fruit, we reverse the JO's sanction
    and reinstate the ALJ's decision suspending Conforti's PACA license
    for 30 days.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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