In Re: Kansas City v. State of MO ( 1996 )

No. 94-4035
In re: Kansas City Star *
Company, * Petition for Writ of Mandamus
*
Petitioner. *
Submitted: February 1, 1995
Filed: January 4, 1996
Before MCMILLIAN, HEANEY, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri held that the Missouri Sunshine Law does not prevent the
Kansas City, Missouri School District Board of Directors from
appearing before the district court's Desegregation Monitoring
Committee in closed session. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus
instructing the district court to hold its order in abeyance. We
deny the writ of mandamus, but remand the case for further
tailoring of the district court's order in consideration of ideals
of comity and the underlying concerns of state law.
BACKGROUND
In 1986, the United States District Court created a
Desegregation Monitoring Committee (DMC), consisting of citizens
and experts, to "oversee implementation of the court's orders by
conducting evaluations, collecting information, and recommending
modifications in the orders" regarding the implementation of the
desegregation remedy. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 41-43
(1986). This court confirmed the propriety of the DMC. Jenkins v.
Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816
(1987). In effect, the DMC serves as a buffer among the various
parties in the Jenkins litigation: parties are required to submit
their disputes to the DMC, which then attempts to find a resolution
without formal litigation. Any DMC action is subject to de novo
review by the district court. At the DMC's request, the Kansas
City, Missouri School District Board of Directors (the Board)
attended occasional closed-door meetings with the DMC Executive
Committee.
Following one such meeting on June 20, 1994, a representative
of the Kansas City Star Company (the Star) contacted the Board to
complain that the closed meetings violated the Missouri Sunshine
Act, Mo. Ann. Stat. ch. 610 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (the Act).
Specifically, the Star asserted that the meetings in question were
"public meetings" as defined by § 610.010(5) of the Act, and
therefore, the meetings violated the Act's prohibition on closed
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sessions unless the meetings were limited to the Act's designated
exclusions. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 610.021.
On July 18, 1994, the Board's general counsel advised the DMC
of the dispute and the Board's conclusion that the Act prevented it
from attending closed meetings. On September 7, 1994, the DMC
Executive Committee notified the Board that matters relating to the
desegregation litigation compelled the DMC to exercise its power to
meet in closed session with litigant parties; moreover, it
considered the closed meetings to be "consistent with areas of
exception under the [Act] and reasonable in view of the DMC's
responsibility to the Federal District Court." (Letter from
Eubanks, DMC Chair, to Dittmeier, the Board's general counsel, of
9/7/94, at 2). It then informed the Board that its presence was
required at a September 19th closed-door meeting. The meeting's
agenda was to include 1) the Board's intended direction in
complying with the district court's August 15, 1994 order regarding
status reports and the Long-Range Magnet Renewal Process ("LRMRP"),
2) the parameters of future discussions regarding the LRMRP, 3) the
type of information that the DMC would be requesting during the
renewal process and the intended dissemination of such material,
and 4) the qualifications and selection process for the Director of
Traditional Schools and principals for King and Nowlin middle
schools.
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A separate letter to the President of the Board, Dr. Julia H.
Hill, officially advised Board members that their presence was
required. After learning of the DMC's position, the Star advised
the Board that it would file suit if Board members met behind
closed doors. In a letter dated September 9, 1994, Hill informed
the DMC that the Board did not feel at liberty to attend the closed
session scheduled for September 19th without a judicial resolution
of the dispute. Board members did not attend the meeting.
On September 20, 1994, the DMC's Executive Committee voted to
take exception to the Board's failure to appear. It further
directed the Board to attend a meeting scheduled for October 17,
1994. On September 29, 1994, the Board appealed the DMC's
September 20th resolution to the district court. The Star was
permitted to file an amicus curie brief. On November 2, 1994, the
district court entered an order denying the Board's appeal. In the
order, the district court expressly authorized the DMC to require
members of the Board, either individually or jointly, to attend
closed session with the DMC for the purpose of discussing any issue
relevant to the implementation of the remedial plan.
The district court found that the closed meetings between the
DMC and the litigants had resulted in "candid discussion about the
issues involved with implementing the remedial plan which, in turn,
[decreased] the amount of time, energy, and expense required by the
great number of appeals." As the basis for its decision, the
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district court found that 1) the DMC was not a "public governmental
body" as defined by the Act, but rather an arm of the court; and 2)
the proposed meetings were not "public meetings" of the Board,
which neither convenes nor takes official action at such meetings,
but were DMC meetings at which the Board's attendance was required.
On November 19, 1994 the Board met in a closed session with
the DMC to discuss the agenda items of the September 19th meeting.
No public notice was posted, nor a reason for the closed meeting
provided. The Star petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus
directing the district court to hold its order in abeyance. On
January 13, 1995, this court ordered the DMC Executive Committee to
refrain from holding closed meetings until further instruction was
given from this court.
The only issue before this court is the application of the Act
to the DMC Executive Committee closed-door meetings at which the
Board appears; a First Amendment challenge to the district court's
order has not been raised and is not considered.
DISCUSSION
I. Writ of Mandamus
Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy that is appropriate
only under exceptional circumstances where a judicial usurpation of
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power is established. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449
U.S. 33, 35 (1980). To avoid placing the district court in the
place of a litigant and creating piecemeal appellate litigation,
the Supreme Court has required that a party seeking issuance of a
writ of mandamus must have no other adequate means to attain relief
and must demonstrate that its right to issuance of the writ is
"clear and indisputable". Id.; accord In re Burlington Northern,
Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 1982).
In determining whether to grant mandamus relief, the following
factors are relevant considerations: 1) the party seeking the writ
has no other adequate means to attain relief; 2) the petitioner
will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal;
3) the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of
law; 4) the district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or
manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and 5) the
district court's order raises new and important problems or issues
of law of first impression. In re Bieter, 16 F.3d 929, 993 (8th
Cir. 1994) (adopting Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d
650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977)).
As a threshold issue, we focus on the third factor: Was the
district court's decision that the closed-door meetings are not
subject to the Act clearly erroneous as a matter of law?
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First, the district court determined that the DMC was not
covered by the Act. On appeal, the Star argues that the DMC is a
public governmental body, citing language of the Act regarding
"judicial entities when operating in an administrative capacity,"
§ 610.010(4). Yet reading the statute as a whole, including the
definition of a public governmental body, leads us to the
conclusion that the statute is aimed at state-created bodies.
Specifically, the Act defines public governmental bodies as
entities "created by the constitution or statutes of this state, by
order or ordinance of any political subdivision or district,
judicial entities when operating in an administrative capacity, or
by executive order." § 610.010(4). The Star's argument fails to
recognize the important distinction between federal and state
governmental bodies by ignoring the fact that the DMC was created
by a federal court to monitor the implementation of a remedy for
constitutional violations. The Star would read the phrase
"judicial entities" without any limitation to those created by the
state constitution or statutes. Thus, according to its
interpretation, any governmental body created by any federal court,
such as the case here, or even one created by the President of the
United States through executive order would be subject to the
limitations imposed by this state statute. This cannot be
accurate. The Star's interpretation would permit the Missouri
State Legislature to subject the federal government to all state
regulations, including those found in the Act. Reference to the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution is sufficient to
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refute this claim. Therefore, the district court's holding that
the DMC, as an arm of the federal court, falls outside the scope of
the Act is correct.1
Second, the district court found that the Board was a public
governmental body as defined by the Act, and therefore its meetings
were subject to the requirements imposed by the Act. There is no
disagreement on this point.
Finally, the district court held that the closed-door meetings
in question were DMC meetings, called and controlled by the DMC, in
which the Board neither formally convenes nor takes official
action. It therefore concluded that the meetings did not trigger
the Act's provisions. The Star disagrees: it argues that the Act
prevents the Board, as a public governmental body, from meeting
behind closed doors in any context except for those instances
expressly provided by the Act. Consistent with this position, the
Star claimed at oral argument that if a state governmental body
appeared as a party at a settlement conference ordered by a federal
district court, such a conference could not be closed without
violating the Act. We reject this argument. The Supreme Court has
unequivocally stated that a "state-law prohibition against
compliance with [a federal] district court's decree cannot survive
1
The Attorney General of the State of Missouri supports this
construction of the Act. (Br. of Attorney Gen. at 9). While the
representations of the Attorney General are not binding on the
state courts or legislature, we assume that they are authoritative
within the executive branch.
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the command of the Supremacy Clause." Washington v. Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958)).
In this case, the district court has determined that DMC
meetings with the litigants are necessary to the implementation of
the desegregation remedy. Thus, rather than accepting the Star's
interpretation of the Act, which would conflict with the
functioning of federal governmental bodies, we believe it is
abundantly clear and hold that the Act does not cover official
meetings of federal governmental bodies, even where state
governmental bodies appear at such meetings for the purpose of
federal concerns. Therefore, the district court's decision is not
clearly erroneous as a matter of law. As such, a writ of mandamus
cannot be justified.
II. Supervisory Power
While our interpretation of the Act suggests no error in the
district court's decision, there is another overarching federalism
concern that must be addressed--comity. Although the district
court's order does not violate the Act by ordering the Board to
appear before it or the DMC in closed session, the extent to which
such action imposes on the policies that underlie the Act must be
considered.
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In ascertaining the scope of the Act, we interpret Missouri
law as would a Missouri state court. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). State courts have held that the Act's affirmative
provisions should be interpreted broadly and its exceptions
narrowly. Kansas City Star v. Fulson, 859 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993). With this in mind, as well as the Act's triggering
provision, which includes "all matters which relate in any way to
the performance of the public governmental body's functions or the
conduct of its business," Mo. Ann. Stat. § 610.010(3), we must
delineate where the Act's underlying concerns are present.
Even though the Act is binding on the Board, the statute is
not without limitations. If only a few members of the Board attend
a closed-door meeting, the Act would not be triggered. If the
Board meets in closed session, but does not discuss public
business, then concerns of infringing upon the Act's objectives
disappear. Thus, if Board members merely were to provide the DMC
with information, receive the DMC's views, or even discuss subjects
other than its public business, such as improving communication,
see Fulson, 859 S.W.2d at 940 ("Matters of public business are not
synonymous with matters of public interest."), no conflict with the
policies of the Act would occur.2
2
We take note that the Attorney General of Missouri supports
this interpretation of the Act. (Br. of Attorney Gen. at 9.)
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As the Board is bound by the Act, subject to these
limitations, we think it is desirable as a matter of comity that
the district court give careful attention to the restrictions under
which the Board acts. While under the Supremacy Clause, the
district court can, under appropriate circumstances, order the
Board to attend closed meetings, it is a power that the court
should use sparingly and with full consideration of the principles
of comity.
While we acknowledge the district court's finding that closed-
door meetings increase the efficiency and efficacy of
implementation, these benefits must be weighed against the concerns
of comity for state law. The authority of the DMC, as an arm of
the court, must be strictly monitored and carefully tailored to
match the requirements of its mission: implementation of the
remedy. The district court's order, however, provides no
limitation or guidelines for exercising the authority it granted
the DMC to close its sessions. Therefore, on the basis of our
supervisory powers, see In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1337 (8th
Cir. 1986), we advise the district court to tailor its order.
Specifically, the district court should provide that 1) in
instances in which the prohibitions of the Act might be
contravened, the DMC seek a court order stating that such a closed
meeting is necessary for remedy implementation; 2) in other
instances, the meeting's agenda be controlled so as not to infringe
on the policies regarding discussion of public business; and 3) in
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all cases, the agenda of DMC meetings be limited to only those
areas clearly within the mission of remedy implementation.
Clearly, the DMC remains unhampered to call closed meeting with the
Board or its members in cases which do not fall within the
parameters of the Act, as set forth above.
The case is remanded to the district court for action
consistent with this decision.
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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