American Academy of v. United States ( 1996 )


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  •                                 _____________
    No. 95-2791WM
    _____________
    American Academy of Family            *
    Physicians, a not-for-profit          *
    corporation,                          *
    *
    Appellee,            *   Appeal from the United States
    *   District Court for the Western
    v.                               *   District of Missouri.
    *
    United States of America,             *
    *
    Appellant.           *
    _____________
    Submitted:    April 8, 1996
    Filed: August 6, 1996
    _____________
    Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    _____________
    FAGG, Circuit Judge.
    The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) appeals the district court's grant
    of a tax refund to the American Academy of Family Physicians (Academy).
    The IRS contends the Academy, a tax-exempt organization, is required to pay
    federal income tax on certain payments it received through its sponsorship
    of group insurance plans.     We conclude the payments are not taxable, and
    affirm.
    The Academy is a national association of family physicians that was
    organized to represent the interests of family physicians and to promote
    quality health care.   The Academy is exempt from federal income tax as a
    business league under 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), (c)(6).     The Academy created the
    American Academy of Family Physicians Foundation (Foundation) to serve as
    the Academy's charitable arm.   The Foundation is exempt from federal income
    tax as a scientific and educational foundation.       See 
    id. § 501(a),
    (c)(3).
    The Academy owns and sponsors group disability, medical, and life
    insurance plans that are available to Academy members and their employees.
    The Principal Mutual Life Insurance Company (Principal) underwrites the
    policies.    The policies were initially administered by an individual, and
    when he died, he bequeathed the business of administering the policies to
    the Foundation.   The Foundation then created AAFP Insurance Services, Inc.
    (ISI), a separate corporation, and turned over the administration of the
    insurance plans to ISI.   ISI is a for-profit corporation that pays federal
    income tax on its profits from administering the insurance plans and
    distributes dividends to the Foundation, which owns all ISI's stock.    The
    Academy provides its membership lists to ISI for fair market value.     ISI
    reports     twice a year to an Academy committee, and must obtain the
    committee's approval before making any changes to the policies.
    The Academy members who elect coverage under the group policies pay
    premiums to Principal.    Principal sets aside part of the premium payments
    as reserves to pay future claims, and Principal controls the investment of
    the reserves.     The group policies require Principal to turn over to the
    Academy any reserve funds remaining after the policies have been terminated
    and all the claims have been paid, whenever that might occur.        In the
    meantime, whether the insurance plans are profitable for Principal or not,
    the policies require Principal to make annual payments to the Academy for
    Principal's use of the reserves, based on a fixed percentage of the
    insurance reserves.   Principal paid the Academy over $600,000 a year during
    the Academy's 1984 to 1987 fiscal years.    The issue on appeal is whether
    these annual payments are taxable.
    The IRS contends the payments are taxable under 26 U.S.C. § 511,
    which provides that an organization entitled to a tax
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    exemption under § 501(a), like the Academy, still must pay income tax on
    its "unrelated business taxable income."       See 
    id. § 511(a)(1)-(2)(A).
    Unrelated business taxable income is income the organization earns by
    regularly carrying on a trade or business that is not substantially related
    to the purposes or functions entitling the organization to its § 501(a) tax
    exemption.   
    Id. §§ 512(a)(1),
    513(a).   Here, the IRS concluded Principal's
    payments to the Academy were compensation for the Academy's sponsorship of
    the group insurance plans, and the payments qualified as unrelated business
    taxable income.   The IRS determined the Academy had improperly failed to
    pay tax on the payments received from 1984 to 1987.    The Academy paid the
    back taxes and interest assessed by the IRS and then brought this refund
    action, contending the Academy's participation in the insurance plans did
    not constitute a trade or business under § 513 and the payments from
    Principal were interest, a type of income specifically excluded from
    unrelated business taxable income, 
    id. § 512
    (b)(1).         Relying on the
    parties' extensive factual stipulations, the district court decided the
    Academy's insurance activities were not a trade or business, granted the
    Academy summary judgment, and ordered a tax refund.   The district court did
    not reach the interest issue.
    In reviewing the district court's decision, we first must determine
    the meaning of the phrase "trade or business" in § 513.      Section 513(c)
    defines a trade or business as "any activity which is carried on for the
    production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of
    services."    Treasury Regulation § 1.513-1(b) clarifies this statutory
    definition by providing that "trade or business" has the same meaning in
    § 513 as it does in 26 U.S.C. § 162, the Internal Revenue Code section
    permitting business expense deductions.      United States v. American Bar
    Endowment, 
    477 U.S. 105
    , 110 (1986).      The standard test for whether an
    activity is a trade or business under § 162 is whether the activity "`was
    entered into with the dominant hope and intent of realizing a profit.'"
    
    Id. at 110
    n.1 (quoting Brannen v. Commissioner, 
    722 F.2d 695
    , 704 (11th
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    Cir. 1984)).    In other words, "the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging
    in   the   activity   must   be    for    income   or    profit."      Commissioner     v.
    Groetzinger, 
    480 U.S. 23
    , 35 (1987).          In keeping with these interpretations
    of § 162, several courts of appeals have adopted a profit motive test to
    determine whether an activity is a trade or business for purposes of the
    unrelated business income tax.           American Bar 
    Endowment, 477 U.S. at 110
    n.1
    (citing    Professional Ins. Agents v. Commissioner, 
    726 F.2d 1097
    (6th Cir.
    1984);     Carolinas Farm & Power Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 
    699 F.2d 167
    (4th Cir. 1983);         Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States,
    
    693 F.2d 525
    (5th Cir. 1982)).              "`[T]he existence of a genuine profit
    motive is the most important criterion for . . . a trade or business.'"
    Professional Ins. 
    Agents, 726 F.2d at 1102
    (quoted case omitted);                     see
    Louisiana Credit Union 
    League, 693 F.2d at 532
    .
    In addition to the profit motive requirement, the income-producing
    activity of a tax-exempt organization must have the general characteristics
    of a trade or business.            American Bar 
    Endowment, 477 U.S. at 110
    -11.
    Specifically, some courts of appeals have recognized that an exempt
    organization     must   carry      out    extensive     business    activities   over   a
    substantial period of time to be engaged in a trade or business, and we
    agree with the reasoning of these cases.                See Zell v. Commissioner, 
    763 F.2d 1139
    , 1142 n.2 (10th Cir. 1985) (interpreting "trade or business" in
    § 162);     Professional Ins. 
    Agents, 726 F.2d at 1102
    (interpreting §§ 162
    and 513);    McDowell v. Ribicoff, 
    292 F.2d 174
    , 178 (3rd Cir.) (interpreting
    § 162), cert. denied, 
    368 U.S. 919
    (1961).              Contrary to the IRS's position,
    requiring extensive commercial activities is consistent with American Bar
    Endowment, in which the Supreme Court held the American Bar Endowment's
    (ABE's) group insurance program was a trade or business for purposes of §
    513(c) and triggered the unrelated business income tax, 
    see 477 U.S. at 119
    .     The ABE's insurance activities were clearly extensive.                  The ABE
    assembled a group of better-than-average insurance risks and negotiated on
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    their behalf with insurance companies, 
    id. at 111,
    compiled lists of ABE
    members and solicited them, collected premiums for the insurer, maintained
    files on each policyholder, answered members' questions about the policies,
    and screened claims for benefits, 
    id. at 107.
    Moreover, the ABE's significant business activity was important to
    the    Supreme Court's analysis.    The Supreme Court decided the ABE's
    insurance activities met the definition of a trade or business because they
    involved both the sale of goods and the performance of services, and
    "possesse[d] the general characteristics of a trade or business."     
    Id. at 110
    -11.    Indeed, the ABE was engaging in the same kind of commercial
    activities that taxable organizations perform to earn a profit.       
    Id. at 111.
      Recognizing that "[t]he undisputed purpose of the unrelated business
    income tax was to prevent tax-exempt organizations from competing unfairly
    with businesses whose earnings were taxed," the Supreme Court described the
    ABE's insurance program as a classic example of "the sort of unfair
    competition that Congress intended to prevent."       
    Id. at 114.
        Having
    examined Supreme Court and court of appeals precedents, we conclude we must
    consider both the Academy's motive for participating in the insurance plans
    and the nature and extent of the Academy's participation during the
    relevant tax years.
    In our view, the Academy did not have the profit motive required for
    a trade or business.    
    Id. at 110
    n.1.   The IRS contends the Academy was
    earning a profit because the payments from Principal to the Academy were
    essentially "a brokerage fee for [the Academy's] delivering its members to
    the insurance company as premium-paying customers."   Appellant's Br. at 24.
    This contention is unsupported by the record and goes against the grain of
    the parties' stipulations.
    The stipulations show the payments were not compensation for
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    services rendered and were not profit in a commercial sense.      As we have
    already explained, the parties stipulated the group policies entitled the
    Academy to receive the excess reserves after the policies' termination.
    Thus, the Academy had a recognizable interest in the reserves Principal was
    holding.    The parties also stipulated Principal was required to make the
    annual payments to the Academy as "interest on [the] insurance reserves for
    Principal's use of the reserves."    Appellant's App. at 148.   These annual
    payments were based on a specified, annual, fixed percentage of the
    insurance reserves, and were generated by Principal's investment of the
    reserves.    Further, the parties stipulated the interest on the insurance
    reserves was payable without regard to the profitability of the group
    insurance plans.     Based on these stipulations, the annual payments were
    neither brokerage fees nor other compensation for commercial services, but
    were the way the parties decided to acknowledge the Academy's eventual
    claim to the excess reserves while Principal was still holding and using
    the reserves.   We need not decide whether the payments were interest within
    the meaning of § 512(b)(1) as the Academy asserts, because the stipulated
    record persuades us the payments were not compensation for commercial
    services performed by the Academy and were not profit for purposes of the
    unrelated business income tax.
    Besides finding no profit motive, we also conclude the Academy's
    involvement in the insurance plans was not extensive and did not "possess[]
    the   general characteristics of a trade or business."          American Bar
    
    Endowment, 477 U.S. at 110
    -11.      At most, the Academy purchased the group
    policies offering coverage to its members, sold its membership lists to ISI
    for fair market value, allowed Principal and ISI to use the Academy's
    endorsement, and kept track of the policy provisions to make certain the
    insurance products the Academy sponsored would meet the needs of its
    members.    The IRS stipulated that ISI handled the promotion, marketing, and
    administration, and Principal processed the insurance applications and made
    decisions about coverage.     The Academy had no
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    administrative or underwriting responsibilities, unlike the ABE and the
    taxpayers in all the other cases the IRS cites on appeal.    See 
    id. at 107,
    111;     Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 
    53 F.3d 120
    , 124-25 (5th Cir.
    1995); Illinois Ass'n of Professional Ins. Agents v. Commissioner, 
    801 F.2d 987
    , 989-90 (7th Cir. 1986);    Professional Ins. 
    Agents, 726 F.2d at 1099
    ,
    1100, 1102;    Carolinas Farm & Power Equip. Dealers 
    Ass'n, 699 F.2d at 168
    ;
    Louisiana Credit Union 
    League, 693 F.2d at 533
    .    The parties' stipulations
    make clear the Academy was not engaged in the kind of activities that
    concerned the Supreme Court in American Bar Endowment.        While the ABE
    negotiated with an insurance company and performed numerous administrative
    
    tasks, 477 U.S. at 107
    , 111, the Academy neither carried on a tax-free
    business nor sought a competitive edge for the group insurance program
    based on the Academy's tax-exempt status.         Instead, it was ISI that
    operated the group insurance program for a profit and passed its after-tax
    profits on to the Foundation (in the form of dividends) to support the
    Foundation's charitable work.   ISI paid income tax like all other competing
    commercial entities.    Although the Academy made group coverage available
    by assembling its members into a group and purchasing the policies, the
    Academy consistently acted like an insurance customer, not an insurance
    company, and ISI took the active, profit-making role.        We conclude the
    Academy's involvement in the group policies was not significant enough to
    constitute a trade or business and expose the Academy to income tax.
    Contrary to the IRS's view, "not every income-producing and profit-
    making endeavor constitutes a trade or business."      
    Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35
    .    The Academy's sponsorship of a group insurance program administered
    in its entirety by an unrelated, non-exempt corporation with no competitive
    advantage over other taxable organizations does not translate into taxable
    business activity for the Academy.    Even if Principal made the payments to
    the Academy for the Academy's sponsorship -- and the parties' stipulations
    show otherwise -- the payments would not be taxable.
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    For purposes of this case, it does not matter whether the payments were
    brokerage fees, gratuities to promote goodwill, or interest, because the
    Academy was not engaged in business activity for a profit and the unrelated
    business income tax does not apply.    We affirm the judgment of the district
    court.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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