PlaNet Productions v. Elizabeth Shank ( 1997 )


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  •                           United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 96-2365
    _____________
    PlaNet Productions, Inc.,                *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellant,       *
    * On appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the Western
    * District of Missouri.
    Elizabeth Shank,                         *
    *
    Defendant - Appellee.        *
    _____________
    Submitted: January 15, 1997
    Filed: July 15, 1997
    _____________
    Before WOLLMAN and FLOYD R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges, and MONTGOMERY,1
    District Judge.
    _____________
    FLOYD R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
    In this case, appellant PlaNet Productions, Inc. ("PlaNet") brought claims against
    appellee Elizabeth Shank for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The district
    court granted Shank's motion for summary judgment on both claims, and PlaNet now
    1
    The HONORABLE ANN D. MONTGOMERY, United States District Judge
    for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
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    appeals. Because we conclude that the district court2 correctly determined that PlaNet
    failed to present a genuine issue of material fact on either of its claims, we affirm the
    district court's grant of summary judgment.
    II.   BACKGROUND
    Prior to December 31, 1993, Shank served as the vice president and secretary
    for PlaNet. She was also a shareholder and member of PlaNet's board of directors.
    PlaNet licensed thirty-second television commercials known as "E Patrol" videos,
    which were intended to inform children of ways to help the environment. Beginning
    in 1993, PlaNet focused its E Patrol marketing efforts toward gas and utility companies.
    Shank was primarily responsible for marketing to utilities in the western United States,
    including a division of Utilicorp called Missouri Public Service ("Mo. Pub.").
    On December 31, 1993, Shank entered into an Agreement (the "Agreement") to
    sell her shares in PlaNet to Laura Lombardi, the only other shareholder of the company.
    Pursuant to the Agreement, Shank was able to continue marketing for PlaNet as an
    independent contractor. Paragraph 5 of the Agreement provided:
    5.     In exchange for and in reliance upon Ms. Shank's future
    work in marketing E Patrol, PlaNet agrees to:
    (a) Pay Ms. Shank an amount equal to seventy-five
    percent (75%) of the gross receipts of any contract for licensing of
    E-Patrol Vignettes with [Mo. Pub.], KCP&L and/or Gas Service
    Company that is entered into within six (6) months of the date of
    this Agreement. Ms. Shank will serve as a primary liaison in
    servicing any of these accounts. PlaNet will also pay Ms. Shank
    75% of the gross receipts from any renewals of such contracts with
    [Mo. Pub.], KCP&L, and/or Gas Service Company. Payment will
    2
    The HONORABLE SCOTT O. WRIGHT, Senior United States District Judge
    for the Western District of Missouri.
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    be made to Ms. Shank on or before thirty (30) days following
    receipt by PlaNet of the payment.
    (b) Should such a contract be entered into with [Mo.
    Pub.], KCP&L, or Gas Service on or before June 30, 1994, PlaNet
    will pay to Ms. Shank an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of
    the gross receipts of any E Patrol licensing to the list of utilities set
    forth on Exhibit D attached hereto and incorporated herein by this
    reference within two years of the date of Closing.
    (c) PlaNet will pay Ms. Shank an amount equal to thirty-three
    percent (33%) of the gross receipts of any Earth Minute license
    agreements to broadcast, cable, utilities or other sponsors,
    purchasers or licensees for a period of two years from the date of
    Closing. The forgoing [sic] payments shall not include a
    percentage of any amounts received by PlaNet for merchandising
    utilizing the Earth Minute name or logos.
    PlaNet's App. at 20-21.
    After the parties entered into the Agreement, Shank engaged in some marketing
    work on behalf of PlaNet, which was directly targeted at Mo. Pub. Specifically, Shank
    made phone calls to Nancy Cummings, Mo. Pub.'s Director of Communications. On
    March 23, 1994, Mo. Pub. entered into an E Patrol License Agreement with PlaNet.
    In an affidavit submitted to the district court, Cummings stated that Mo. Pub. entered
    into the license agreement as a direct result of Shank's marketing efforts. However,
    Lombardi claims that she made a phone call to Cummings on PlaNet's behalf, and at
    the conclusion of the phone call, Cummings told her that Mo. Pub. would enter into a
    license agreement with PlaNet. In exchange for the E Patrol license, Mo. Pub. paid
    PlaNet $22,000. Pursuant to Shank's Agreement with PlaNet, she received seventy-five
    percent of the Mo. Pub. licensing fee, which amounted to $16,500. Shank has also
    received additional compensation in accordance with the Agreement. In total, PlaNet
    has paid Shank approximately $60,000 since she sold her ownership in the company.
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    PlaNet filed a complaint alleging that Shank breached her Agreement with
    PlaNet by failing to provide the required marketing efforts and that Shank should
    therefore refund the money PlaNet paid her. Alternatively, PlaNet claimed that the
    payments provided to Shank amounted to unjust enrichment. The district court granted
    summary judgment in favor of Shank. PlaNet appeals.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    "We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo." Davidson
    & Schaaff, Inc. v. Liberty Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 
    69 F.3d 868
    , 870 (8th Cir. 1995). We
    will affirm the district court if "the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
    non-moving party, shows that no dispute of material fact exists and that the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
    Id. Because this
    is a diversity case,
    we review the district court's interpretation of Missouri law de novo. See 
    id. PlaNet's breach
    of contract claim largely hinges upon its contention that the
    Agreement contains ambiguous language. PlaNet contends that the term "future work
    in marketing" is ambiguous, and therefore the court should have looked to parol
    evidence, including the past practices of the parties, to determine what the term means.
    PlaNet then argues that a reasonable person could conclude that the term means
    "reasonable future marketing, consistent with past practice." PlaNet's Br. at 15.
    Therefore, because Shank's post-Agreement marketing efforts were substantially less
    extensive than her past marketing efforts, she breached the Agreement by providing
    inadequate marketing efforts.
    We do not agree with PlaNet's contention that the term "future work in
    marketing" is ambiguous. Under Missouri law, "[a] contract is ambiguous only if its
    terms are susceptible to more than one meaning so that reasonable persons may fairly
    and honestly differ in their construction of the terms." Angoff v. Mersman, 
    917 S.W.2d 207
    , 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). However, "[a] contract is not ambiguous merely
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    because the parties disagree over its meaning." Jake C. Byers, Inc. v. J.B.C. Invs., 
    834 S.W.2d 806
    , 816 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). "To determine whether a contract is
    ambiguous, we consider the whole instrument and give the words in the contract their
    natural and ordinary meaning." 
    Id. While parol
    evidence may be used to clarify an
    ambiguous contract, see 
    id. at 817,
    "[a] party cannot use parol evidence to create an
    ambiguity or to show that an obligation is other than that expressed in the written
    instrument," 
    Angoff, 917 S.W.2d at 211
    .
    We agree with the district court's conclusion that the Agreement was
    unambiguous. The Agreement provided that in exchange for Shank's "future work in
    marketing E Patrol," Shank would receive a portion of the proceeds of any contract
    entered into between Mo. Pub. and PlaNet. Shank undoubtedly performed some
    marketing work for PlaNet after the effective date of the Agreement and before Mo.
    Pub. signed a licensing agreement with PlaNet. The Agreement did not specify that
    Shank's future marketing had to be consistent with her past practices, and parol
    evidence "cannot cause the court to read into the contract something which it does not
    say." Craig v. Jo B. Gardner, Inc., 
    586 S.W.2d 316
    , 324 (Mo. 1979). Furthermore,
    the goal of Shank's marketing effort was to help PlaNet enter into a license agreement
    with one of the utilities. Mo. Pub.'s Director of Communications stated in her affidavit
    that Mo. Pub. entered into the license agreement as a direct result of Shank's marketing
    efforts.3 As the district court correctly reasoned, if only a moderate marketing effort
    3
    PlaNet asserts that a genuine issue of material facts exists as to whether Mo.
    Pub. entered into a license agreement with PlaNet as a result of Shank's marketing
    efforts. In her affidavit, Laura Lombardi stated that she made a phone call to
    Cummings on February 3, 1994, at the end of which Cummings informed her that Mo.
    Pub. would enter into a license agreement with PlaNet. However, assuming, as we
    must, Davidson & 
    Schaaff, 69 F.3d at 870
    , that Lombardi's claim is true, her affidavit
    does not prove that Mo. Pub.'s decision to enter into the license agreement was based
    on Lombardi's phone call rather than Shank's marketing work. Lombardi's affidavit left
    open the possibility that Mo. Pub. had already determined to enter into an agreement
    with PlaNet based on Shank's marketing efforts. Cummings's affidavit established that
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    was required to persuade Mo. Pub. to enter into a license agreement, Shank was not
    required to do any more than that under the terms of the Agreement.
    Additionally, parol evidence cannot be used to "modify or contradict the
    unambiguous terms of a written contract purporting to incorporate the whole agreement
    between the parties." South Side Plumbing Co. v. Tigges, 
    525 S.W.2d 583
    , 588 (Mo.
    Ct. App. 1975). The Agreement between Shank and PlaNet contained an integration
    clause,4 which is a strong indication that the parties intended for the Agreement to be
    complete and final. See 
    Byers, 834 S.W.2d at 813
    . We conclude that the Agreement
    was complete and unambiguous and that under the terms of the Agreement, Shank's
    marketing efforts were acceptable.
    PlaNet also argues that the only consideration provided in exchange for Shank's
    payment was her past service to PlaNet, and because past services cannot constitute
    consideration, the contract was not valid. However, because PlaNet raised this
    this was, in fact, the case. Furthermore, between the time Lombardi spoke with
    Cummings and Mo. Pub. entered into the license agreement, Shank had additional
    contacts with Cummings in furtherance of obtaining the agreement with Mo. Pub. In
    light of the overwhelming evidence that Shank's efforts resulted in the Mo. Pub. license
    agreement, Lombardi's self-serving affidavit is not sufficient to create a genuine issue
    of material fact.
    4
    The integration clause provided:
    15. This Agreement, including all Exhibits hereto, constitute[s]
    the entire agreement between Ms. Shank and PlaNet. The undersigned
    shall not be bound by any prior communication between or among them
    concerning the subject matter of this Agreement. The undersigned hereby
    expressly deny any reliance upon said communications. Any prior
    agreement between Ms. Shank and PlaNet is voided by the execution of
    this Agreement.
    PlaNet's App. at 26-27.
    -6-
    argument for the first time in its Reply Brief, we will not consider it. See Myre v.
    Iowa, 
    53 F.3d 199
    , 201 (8th Cir. 1995).
    Finally, PlaNet claims that the payments to Shank resulted in unjust enrichment.
    Under Missouri law, a plaintiff is entitled to restitution for unjust enrichment when (1)
    the defendant was enriched by the receipt of a benefit; (2) the enrichment was at the
    expense of the plaintiff; and (3) it would be unjust to allow the defendant to retain the
    benefit. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Mundelius, 
    887 S.W.2d 726
    , 727 (Mo. Ct. App.
    1994). In this case, it is not unjust to allow Shank to keep the compensation because
    she has received only that to which she was entitled under the Agreement.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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