Donald Bryant, Sr. v. John J. Callahan ( 1998 )


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  •                           United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 97-3530
    ___________
    Donald Bryant, Sr., on behalf of          *
    Donald Bryant, Jr.,                       *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    Appellant,                   *   District Court for the
    *   Eastern District of Arkansas.
    v.                                   *
    *
    Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of         *
    Social Security Administration,1          *
    *
    Appellee.
    ___________
    Submitted: February 9, 1998
    Filed: April 16, 1998
    ___________
    Before McMILLIAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    HANSEN, Circuit Judge.
    1
    Kenneth S. Apfel has been appointed to serve as Commissioner of the Social
    Security Administration and is automatically substituted as appellee. See Fed. R. App.
    P. 43(c) (1).
    Donald Bryant, Sr. (Mr. Bryant), appeals the district court's2 grant
    of summary judgment to the Social Security Administration, affirming the
    Commissioner's decision to deny his application for children's Supplemental
    Security Insurance (SSI) disability benefits on behalf of his son, Donald
    Bryant, Jr. (Donald Jr.). We affirm.
    I.
    Mr. Bryant applied for children's SSI disability benefits on behalf
    of his son, Donald Jr., alleging that Donald Jr. was disabled due to a
    learning disability and migraine headaches.         The Social Security
    Administration denied the claim both initially and upon reconsideration.
    Mr. Bryant requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law
    Judge (ALJ) on January 12, 1995. Donald Jr. and his father both testified
    at the hearing.
    At the time of the hearing, Donald Jr. was 14 years old and in the
    sixth grade. He was attending special education classes and said he had
    trouble concentrating.    He testified that he gets along well with his
    teachers and friends, with the exception of two or three fights. Donald
    Jr. complained that he suffers migraine headaches two or three times a
    week, lasting two to three hours at a time. He said he has had these
    headaches since he was born. The headaches usually start around 2:00 in
    the afternoon. He said they make him dizzy, sick to his stomach, and
    bring on photophobia (a painful sensitivity to light). Relief comes only
    from the combination of prescription medication and sleep; aspirin and
    Tylenol had no effect. Donald Jr. is also anemic, which makes him tired
    and less active than other children.
    2
    The Honorable Henry L. Jones, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas, trying the case by consent of the parties pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c) (1994).
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    Although he testified that he had these headaches his whole life,
    Donald Jr. sought medical attention for the first time in September 1994,
    just months prior to the hearing. At that time, the results of a CT scan
    performed on his head were normal, and       Dr. Joe Elser diagnosed the
    headaches as migraine headaches. He prescribed Amitriptyline for Donald
    Jr. and instructed Donald Jr. to keep a diary of his headaches, to continue
    the medication for two to three months, to report back on its
    effectiveness, and to consider further therapy if the medication proved to
    be unsuccessful. There is no indication that Donald Jr. sought further
    treatment.
    In a 1991 intellectual evaluation recommended by the school system
    due to his poor academic progress, Donald Jr. scored a verbal IQ of 79, a
    performance IQ of 93, and a full scale IQ of 85 on the Weschler
    Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised. The results of this evaluation
    placed Donald Jr. in the slow learner level of intellectual functioning.
    Subsequently in 1995, Donald Jr. was reevaluated at the request of his
    attorney.    On this occasion, Donald Jr. scored a verbal IQ of 70, a
    performance IQ of 71, and a full scale IQ of 69 on the Weschler
    Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised. These scores placed Donald Jr.
    within the classification of mild retardation.
    Donald Jr.'s fifth grade teacher indicated that he was doing well in
    school. She said Donald Jr. behaves in an age appropriate manner, that he
    is polite and interacts well with his classmates, and that he always
    completes his work assignments.      She said he is sleepy at times but
    concentrates well. Records indicate that Donald Jr. misses school only 3
    or 4 times a year due to his headaches.
    The ALJ found that Donald Jr. has severe impairments, but that they
    do not meet or equal a listed impairment.       The ALJ then performed an
    individual functional assessment and determined that Donald Jr.'s
    impairments are not of comparable severity to those which would disable an
    adult.   Accordingly, the ALJ denied benefits, and the appeals council
    denied further review.
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    On behalf of his son, Mr. Bryant sought judicial review of the agency
    decision.    The district court concluded that the ALJ's decision was
    supported by substantial evidence on the record. Thus, the court granted
    summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Mr. Bryant appeals, arguing
    that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because
    Donald Jr. has a listed impairment of mental retardation, evidenced by his
    full scale IQ score of 69 and his history of migraine headaches.
    II.
    We review the Commissioner's denial of a child’s SSI disability
    benefits by considering whether substantial evidence supports the
    Commissioner's decision. Briggs v. Callahan, No. 97-1488, 
    1998 WL 119768
    ,
    at * 1 (8th Cir. Mar. 19, 1998); Young ex rel. Trice v. Shalala, 
    52 F.3d 200
    , 201-02 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable
    mind would conclude the evidence is adequate to support the decision, and
    we consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as well
    as evidence that supports it. Briggs, 
    1998 WL 119768
    , at *1.
    Consistent with the standards applicable at the time of the ALJ's
    decision, the ALJ followed a four-step sequential evaluation process for
    determining whether Donald Jr. was entitled to children's SSI benefits.
    See 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.924
    (b)-(f) (1995). Using this process, the ALJ determined
    that (1) Donald Jr. is a student and not engaged in work activity, (2) he
    suffers from severe impairments including a learning disability and
    migraine headaches, but (3) his impairments do not meet or equal a listed
    impairment, and additionally, (4) he does not have an impairment or
    combination of impairments that are comparable to those which would disable
    an adult.
    On August 22, 1996, prior to the district court's review of the ALJ's
    decision, the President signed into law the Personal Responsibility and
    Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 
    110 Stat. 2105
    , 2188 (1996).
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    This new legislation requires a child to prove that he or she has a
    "medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in
    marked and severe functional limitations." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i)
    (West Supp. 1998). This is a more stringent standard than the old one.
    Briggs, 
    1998 WL 119768
    , at *2. This new standard eliminates the fourth step
    in the old evaluation process, which previously allowed a finding of
    disability if the child suffered a "medically determinable physical or
    mental impairment of comparable severity" to one that would disable an
    adult. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994). The new standard applies to
    Donald Jr.'s case, because this case was pending at the time the new
    legislation was enacted. See Briggs, 
    1998 WL 119768
    , at *2. Nevertheless,
    we will apply the old standard as did the ALJ, because where a claim was
    properly denied under the old standard, "it must also be denied under the
    new, more stringent, standard." 
    Id.
     We conclude that the ALJ properly
    denied the claim under the old standard.
    Mr. Bryant's only argument is that the ALJ's finding that Donald Jr.'s
    impairments do not meet the listing for mental retardation is not supported
    by substantial evidence. A child meets the mental retardation listing and
    is disabled when the child has "[1] [a] verbal, performance, or full scale
    IQ of 60 through 70 and [2] a physical or other mental impairment imposing
    additional and significant limitation of function." 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
    subpt. P, app. 1, § 112.05(D) (1995).
    Donald Jr.'s 1995 full scale IQ score of 69 meets the first prong of
    the listing. See Briggs, 
    1998 WL 119768
    , at *2. The ALJ discounted this
    score by considering that the result is inconsistent with Donald Jr.'s 1991
    full scale IQ score of 85. The ALJ found that the earlier, significantly
    higher score combined with his appearance and demeanor at the hearing
    indicate that Donald Jr. is closer to the low normal range than the retarded
    range of intelligence. Mr. Bryant asserts that the ALJ should not have
    considered the 1991 score, arguing that it is not sufficiently current for
    an accurate assessment under the listing. Social Security regulations state
    that the results of IQ tests obtained between ages 7 and 16 should be
    considered current for only two years
    -5-
    when the IQ is 40 or above. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §
    112.00(D). The Commissioner argues that even absent the earlier higher IQ
    scores, other factors demonstrate that the lone 69 score is unreliable. The
    Commissioner argues that the 69 score is simply not in line with Donald
    Jr.'s actual intellectual functioning because Donald Jr.'s grades show
    marked improvement in almost all courses from 1991 through 1995.        The
    Commissioner asserts that such consistent scholastic improvement is
    inconsistent with the alleged decline in Donald Jr.'s intellectual
    functioning claimed to be evidenced by the lone 69 IQ score of the 1995
    evaluation.
    We need not resolve this factual dispute, because we agree with the
    district court that even assuming Donald Jr. meets the first prong of the
    mental retardation listing with his full scale IQ score of 69, he does not
    meet the second prong. The second prong of the mental retardation listing,
    requiring an "additional and significant limitation of function," §
    112.05(D), is met when a claimant "has a physical or additional mental
    impairment that has a 'more than slight or minimal' effect on his ability
    to perform work." Sird v. Chater, 
    105 F.3d 401
    , 403 (8th Cir.1997) (quoting Cook v. Bowen, 
    797 F.2d 687
    , 690 (8th Cir.1986), and discussing the listing at § 12.05(C) which is the adult mental retardation standard).
    The additional impairment need not be disabling in and of itself but need only result in a significant work-related
    limitation of function to satisfy the adult standard. See id.
    Mr. Bryant asserts that Donald Jr.'s headaches have a significant
    effect on his ability to function sufficient to satisfy the second prong of
    the listing. He asserts that the ALJ found as much by stating at step two
    of the evaluation process that Donald Jr.'s learning disability and
    headaches "are severe impairments."       (Appellant's Adden. at 5.)     We
    disagree.
    At step two, where the ALJ concludes that the learning disability and
    headaches are severe impairments, the ALJ's imprecise language causes
    confusion for the reader. We note that later in the decision, however, the
    ALJ specifically finds at step three that
    -6-
    while Donald Jr. has a marked limitation in the cognitive domain, his
    headaches "impose no more than a slight limitation of function." (Id. at
    6.) In this manner, the ALJ explains his reasoning more fully. When the
    ALJ separately analyzes the functional limitations caused by each impairment
    at step three, we see that the ALJ actually considers Donald Jr.'s learning
    disability as a significant limitation but views the headaches as no more
    than a slight limitation of function. The earlier imprecise wording is
    clarified through the later findings.      We have often "held that '[a]n
    arguable deficiency in opinion-writing technique is not a sufficient reason
    for setting aside an administrative finding where . . . the deficiency
    probably ha[s] no practical effect on the outcome of the case.'" McGinnis
    v. Chater, 
    74 F.3d 873
    , 875 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Benskin v. Bowen, 
    830 F.2d 878
    , 883 (8th Cir. 1987)) (alterations in original). Our review of the
    record convinces us that substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's
    conclusion that Donald Jr.'s headaches impose no more than a slight
    limitation of function at this time, which is not sufficient to satisfy the
    second prong of the mental retardation listing. He has missed little school
    on account of his headaches.        His headaches are responding to his
    medication, which he only recently sought and obtained. Additionally, his
    school work has been improving, and he gets along well with others at
    school.
    We conclude that Donald Jr. does not satisfy the requirements for a
    listed impairment, and the ALJ's decision to deny benefits is supported by
    substantial evidence.
    III.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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