United States v. Ronald Lindsey ( 1998 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 98-2130MN
    ___________
    United States of America,                      *
    *
    Appellee,                         *
    *   On Appeal from the United States
    v.                                             *   District Court for the
    *   District of Minnesota.
    Ronald Lindsey also known as RL,               *
    *   [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                        *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 20, 1998
    Filed: November 16, 1998
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, and RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit
    Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    I.
    The appellant, Ronald Lindsey, was convicted in a jury trial of one count of
    conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, one count of
    possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841,
    and two counts of use of a telephone in the commission of a felony, in violation of 21
    U.S.C. § 843. He was sentenced to 292 months in prison.
    II.
    The first issue Lindsey raises on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence. When
    reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the government, giving the government the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences to be drawn from the evidence. United States v. Manzer, 
    69 F.3d 222
    , 226
    (8th Cir. 1995). We have reviewed the record in this case and find that, viewed in the
    light most favorable to the government, the evidence is sufficient to support each of
    Lindsey's convictions. In this case, two co-conspirators testified regarding Lindsey's
    conduct, and both testified that he was a member of a conspiracy to distribute crack
    cocaine. In addition, several police officers testified regarding their investigation and
    the evidence discovered in Lindsey's home. This evidence is sufficient to support
    Lindsey's convictions.
    The second issue Lindsey raises on appeal is the admission of a partially
    inaudible tape recording of a drug-related phone call and the admission of a police
    officer's testimony regarding the contents of the inaudible portions. We agree that
    portions of the tape were inaudible and should not have been played for the jury. In
    addition, the district court erred by allowing a police officer to testify about the
    contents of the inaudible portions of the tape. Because Federal Rule of Evidence 1002
    states that the original recording is required to prove the contents of a recording, it was
    error to admit the officer's testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 1002. However, under the
    circumstances of this case, it was harmless error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). Under
    Rule 52(a), a conviction will be reversed "only if the jury may have been swayed by
    improperly admitted evidence." United States v. Horsman, 
    114 F.3d 822
    , 828 (8th Cir.
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    1997). In this case, two co-conspirators testified that Lindsey was involved in a
    conspiracy to possess and distribute crack cocaine, and that Lindsey used a telephone
    as part of the conspiracy. It is not likely that the jury was substantially swayed by the
    admission of the partially inaudible tape or the officer's testimony regarding the tape's
    contents. Thus, his conviction need not be reversed.
    The final issue Lindsey raises on appeal is that the government did not establish
    the quantity of crack cocaine he possessed by a preponderance of the evidence.
    Sentencing factors such as whether a given amount of cocaine constitutes crack are
    matters for the court to determine by a preponderance of the evidence. United States
    v. Monroe, 
    978 F.2d 433
    , 434 (8th Cir. 1992).
    Lindsey claims that the government did not present any evidence that the 1.5
    kilograms of cocaine seized from 1419 Bayard Street was crack, and not another form
    of cocaine base. Because Lindsey did not object to the quantity at his sentencing
    hearing, we review the district court's determination of drug quantity under the plain
    error standard. United States v. El Hani, 
    37 F.3d 1280
    , 1284-85 (8th Cir. 1994). In
    this case, a co-conspirator testified that Dennis Carter always sent crack cocaine to the
    co-conspirators, and Lindsey stipulated that the seized material was cocaine base, or
    crack cocaine. In light of this evidence, it was not plain error to hold Lindsey
    accountable for the 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine that were seized from Bayard Street.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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