James E. Darst v. Kenneth S. Apfel ( 1999 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 98-3110EM
    _____________
    James E. Darst,                     *
    *
    Appellant.        *    Appeal from the United States
    *    District Court for the Eastern
    v.                      *    District of Missouri.
    *
    Social Security Administration,     *
    *
    Appellee.         *
    _____________
    Submitted: March 8, 1999
    Filed: April 12, 1999
    _____________
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and STROM,* District
    Judge.
    _____________
    STROM, District Judge.
    James Darst appeals from the district court’s1 grant of summary judgment in
    favor of the Social Security Administration on his Privacy Act claim. After careful
    *
    The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, Senior Judge, District of Nebraska, sitting
    by designation.
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    The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Missouri.
    review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the decision of the district
    court.
    I.
    Appellant James Darst is a former Administrative Law Judge in the Social
    Security Administration (SSA) Office of Hearing and Appeals in Creve Coeur,
    Missouri. He filed suit alleging that the SSA violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
    552a(e)(2), when, during an internal investigation into certain alleged ethics
    violations by Darst, it reviewed documents in his application for Medicare coverage
    file, without first obtaining information directly from him.
    The events which gave rise to this suit began on April 4, 1995, when Darst
    applied for Medicare insurance coverage. Darst stated that he was born on June 17,
    1930, but failed to provide a certified copy of his birth certificate. On two occasions,
    the SSA advised him that it needed a certified copy of his birth certificate rather than
    the photocopy he provided. On May 18, 1995, the SSA advised Darst that his
    application was denied because he did not submit proof that he was at least sixty-two
    years of age. On June 21, 1995, Darst filed a Request for Reconsideration, stating
    that the decision was incorrect and that he had no other proof to offer. This Request
    was denied on December 13, 1995. He requested further review, and on March 19,
    1996, Darst was advised that upon an independent review, the SSA found their first
    decision was correct. Six days later, on March 25, 1996, Darst filed, in the Creve
    Coeur hearing office, a “Request for Hearing by Administrative Law Judge” and
    executed a “Waiver of Written Notice of Hearing.” On that same day, ALJ Myron
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    Mills, one of Darst’s colleagues, held a hearing and issued a decision awarding Darst
    Medicare benefits. In his decision, ALJ Mills stated that Darst had entered as an
    exhibit the original of his birth certificate with raised seal.
    This sequence of events resulted in an investigation into possible ethics
    violations by Darst and ALJ Mills because of the appearance of impropriety and of
    preferential treatment. This investigation was conducted by Mr. Robert L. Welch, a
    Social Security Program Specialist in the SSA Regional Office of Region VII, and
    consisted of a review of the SSA files dealing with Darst’s application for Medicare
    coverage, including the tape recording of the hearing held March 25th by ALJ Mills.
    Welch did not interview any witnesses. Eventually the information he developed was
    forwarded to Chief Administrative Law Judge Boyer. After consultation with the
    Office of Special Counsel, Boyer issued letters counseling Darst and Mills about the
    appearance of impropriety of holding Darst’s hearing the same day it was requested
    and of giving Darst’s claim priority over other claimants. The SSA asserts that these
    letters were not placed in the official personnel files of Darst or Mills, and that no
    action was taken on the basis of these letters. Darst does not dispute these assertions,
    but claims that the review of his application for coverage file violated the Privacy Act
    and the subsequent counseling letter caused damage to his personal and professional
    reputation as well as mental and emotion distress.
    II.
    Our review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo.
    Lindstedt v. Missouri Libertarian Party, 
    160 F.3d 1197
    , 1198 (8th Cir. 1998). On
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    appeal, Darst contends that in granting summary judgment to the Social Security
    Administration, the district court erred in concluding (1) that the defendant’s failure
    to interview Darst or otherwise afford him an opportunity to give a statement
    constituted failure to comply with § 552a(e)(2); and (2) that the Privacy Act does not
    require the agency to collect information directly from an individual in all
    circumstances.
    The Privacy Act supports “the principle that an individual should to the
    greatest extent possible be in control of information about him which is given to the
    government.” Waters v. Thornburgh, 
    888 F.2d 870
    , 875 (D.C.Cir. 1989). The
    language of the Act relied upon by Darst provides that
    Each agency that maintains a system of records shall -
    collect information to the greatest extent practicable
    directly from the subject individual when the information
    may result in adverse determinations about an individual’s
    rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs.
    5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2). In order to obtain relief under section § 552a(e)(2) of the
    Privacy Act, the plaintiff must show that (1) the Social Security Administration failed
    to collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the plaintiff, (2)
    the violation had an adverse effect on the plaintiff, and (3) the defendant acted in an
    intentional or willful manner. 
    Waters, 888 F.2d at 872
    ; Hudson v. Reno, 
    130 F.3d 1193
    , 1204-5 (6th Cir. 1997).
    The SSA acknowledged at oral argument that it was an agency subject to
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    § 552a(e)(2). However, the SSA disputes that it “collected” any information which
    violated § 552a(e)(2) because in conducting its ethics investigation, it merely
    reviewed Darst’s application for coverage and other such documents in Darst’s
    application file. The Court was not cited to, nor did we find any case addressing
    whether a “collection” occurs when the agency reviews its own files. The cases
    generally involve situations where the agency seeks information about a particular
    employee from third parties. For example, in 
    Waters, supra
    , the agency contacted the
    Pennsylvania Board of Bar Examiners to determine if its employee was lying about
    needing time off work to take the bar exam. In Brune v. IRS, 
    861 F.2d 1284
    (D.C.Cir. 1988), the agency interviewed taxpayers to gather information concerning
    whether one of its agents made false statements. In Olivares v. National Aeronautics
    and Space Admin., 
    882 F. Supp. 1545
    (D.Mary. 1995), aff’d by 
    103 F.3d 119
    (4th Cir.
    1996), the agency contacted the universities which an employee formerly attended to
    confirm he studied there. In Hudson v. Reno, 
    130 F.3d 1193
    (6th Cir. 1997), while
    conducting an investigation into allegations of an employee’s misconduct, the agency
    interviewed approximately thirty people about the employee’s misconduct before
    interviewing the employee. In contrast to these cases, Darst’s situation merely
    involved a review of the agency’s file relating to his application for coverage. The
    SSA did not contact third party sources to gather information. The indications of
    impropriety were apparent from the face of the documents and from the sequence of
    events in the application file which revealed that the hearing was held on the same
    day and in the hearing office where Darst worked. For these reasons, there was no
    need to interview Darst about the sequence of events. As the district court noted, the
    Privacy Act does not require that the information be collected directly from the
    individual in all circumstances. The Act merely requires that the agency do so “to the
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    greatest extent practicable.” The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals’
    ruling in Brune noted that the statements under investigation which were made by an
    IRS agent had already provided the government with the agent’s version of the facts.
    
    Brune, 861 F.2d at 1287
    . Under these circumstances, the court found that it was not
    necessary to contact the agent first before interviewing third parties. Here the
    information in the application for coverage file obviated the need to interview Darst
    or third persons. The data on the documents themselves was sufficient to create the
    appearance of impropriety and the appearance of preferential treatment.
    We find the conduct of the agency does not constitute a violation of the Privacy
    Act § 552a(e)(2). Because we find that SSA did not violate § 552a(e)(2) in collecting
    the information it did, the Court need not address other issues which Darst raised in
    this appeal.
    III.
    In summary, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting
    summary judgment to the Social Security Administration. The judgment of the
    district court is therefore affirmed.
    RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, concurs in the judgment.
    A true copy.
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    ATTEST:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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