United States v. Larry A. Edmisten ( 2000 )


Menu:
  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 99-3900
    ___________
    United States of America,                  *
    *
    Appellee,             * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the Western
    v.                                   * District of Missouri.
    *
    Larry A. Edmisten,                         *
    *
    Appellant.            *
    ___________
    Submitted: March 3, 2000
    Filed: March 31, 2000
    ___________
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, FAGG, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    FAGG, Circuit Judge.
    Larry A. Edmisten appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
    A police officer on patrol received a dispatch indicating an assault had occurred,
    describing the two fleeing suspects, and informing officers the suspects could be
    headed toward a particular apartment complex. The officer saw Edmisten's pickup
    truck enter the specified apartment complex parking lot and then exit the lot with a
    male and a female passenger the officer believed might fit the description of the assault
    suspects. The officer followed Edmisten's truck and pulled Edmisten over after
    observing Edmisten weave within his lane and noting Edmisten's license plate
    illuminator was burned out. Edmisten gave the officer his identification and, in
    response to the officer's inquiry, provided only the first names of his passengers, saying
    he could not remember their last names even though he had known them for several
    years. After the license check revealed no outstanding warrants for Edmisten and that
    Edmisten's license was valid, the officer gave him a verbal warning for the traffic
    violations.
    The officer then informed Edmisten that he wanted to talk to his passengers.
    While Edmisten waited quietly at the rear of the truck, the officer questioned the
    passengers, who gave the officer first names, which differed from the names Edmisten
    had provided, as well as last names. The officer could not confirm the information the
    passengers provided because the passengers had not given him their real names.
    Believing the passengers were trying to conceal their identities and uncertain why they
    were doing so, the officer called for backup and asked Edmisten to consent to a search
    of his truck. Edmisten refused. The female passenger then told the officer her real
    name, she admitted she initially concealed her identity because there were outstanding
    warrants for her, and she was arrested by the officers.
    Meanwhile, a second officer arrived on the scene and, taking Edmisten around
    the corner and out of earshot of the passengers, explained they were trying to identify
    Edmisten's passengers, asked for permission to search the truck for the passengers'
    identification, and assured Edmisten he would be allowed to leave if nothing
    incriminating was found in his pickup. Edmisten agreed to a search, opened the
    passenger door for the officer, and stood silently beside the officer while the officer
    looked through the glove compartment where he found the male passenger's
    identification, unzipped a duffle bag on the front seat in which he found marijuana and
    a scanner, and opened a container holding methamphetamine. Edmisten was arrested
    on drug-related charges and moved to suppress the evidence found during the search
    of his truck. After the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and
    -2-
    recommendation denying Edmisten's motion, Edmisten entered a conditional guilty plea
    to possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
    § 841(a) (1994).
    On appeal, Edmisten first contends the district court should have granted his
    motion to suppress because the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion sufficient
    to detain Edmisten after issuing the verbal warning. We disagree. Edmisten concedes
    the officer properly stopped him for the observed traffic violations. See United States
    v. Perez, 
    200 F.3d 576
    , 579 (8th Cir. 2000) (any traffic violation creates probable cause
    justifying stop of vehicle's driver). Having done so, the officer was entitled to conduct
    a reasonable investigation related to the traffic stop, which included asking Edmisten
    about the identity of his passengers, see 
    id., and questioning
    the passengers to verify
    the information Edmisten provided, see United States v. Johnson, 
    58 F.3d 356
    , 357 (8th
    Cir. 1995). Edmisten's contradictory statements that he had known the passengers for
    several years but could not recall their last names, coupled with the officer's belief that
    the passengers fit the description of the assault suspects and the officer's observation
    of all three individuals in the complex parking lot, established reasonable suspicion to
    detain Edmisten while the officer broadened his inquiry and attempted to identify the
    passengers. See 
    Perez, 200 F.3d at 579
    ; 
    Johnson, 58 F.3d at 357-58
    . The passengers,
    when questioned, gave the officer information that conflicted with Edmisten's
    suspicious statements, justifying Edmisten's further detention while the officer
    continued to investigate. See United States v. Ramos, 
    42 F.3d 1160
    , 1163 (8th Cir.
    1994) ("If reasonably related questions raise inconsistent answers, . . . a trooper's
    suspicions may be raised so as to enable him to expand the scope of the stop and ask
    additional, more intrusive, questions.").
    Edmisten also contends the district court erroneously concluded Edmisten's
    consent to the search was voluntary and knowing. We need not reach the issue of
    consent, however, to conclude the officers had the authority to search Edmisten's
    pickup. Because the officers had already lawfully arrested the female passenger, they
    -3-
    could properly search the passenger compartment of the pickup incident to that arrest.
    See United States v. Hensley, 
    469 U.S. 221
    , 235-36 (1985); New York v. Belton, 
    453 U.S. 454
    , 460 (1981); United States v. Czeck, 
    105 F.3d 1235
    , 1238 (8th Cir. 1997).
    We thus affirm the district court's denial of Edmisten's motion to suppress.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -4-