St. Luke's Hospital v. NLRB ( 2001 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 00-3169
    No. 00-3410
    ___________
    St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian     *
    Hospitals, Inc.,                      *
    *
    Petitioner - Cross-Respondent, * Petitions for Review or Enforcement
    * of an Order of the National
    v.                              * Labor Relations Board.
    *
    National Labor Relations Board,       *
    *
    Respondent - Cross-Petitioner. *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 10, 2001
    Filed: October 10, 2001
    ___________
    Before LOKEN, Circuit Judge, BOGUE,* District Judge, and GOLDBERG,** Judge
    of the United States Court of International Trade.
    ___________
    LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
    In 1991, Carol Hollowood became a registered nurse first assistant (“RNFA”)
    in the labor and delivery department of St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hospital
    *
    The HONORABLE ANDREW W. BOGUE, United States District Judge for
    the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
    **
    The HONORABLE RICHARD W. GOLDBERG, sitting by designation.
    in Chesterfield, Missouri. On June 1, 1998, Hollowood appeared on a local television
    news broadcast and accused St. Luke’s of “jeopardizing the health of mothers and
    babies” by altering the shift assignments and responsibilities of the labor and delivery
    RNFAs. Hollowood was discharged four days later. The Textile Processors, Service
    Trades, Health Care, Professional and Technical Employees Union (the “Union”)
    filed an unfair labor practice charge on her behalf. After a hearing, the National
    Labor Relations Board ruled that St. Luke’s violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
    National Labor Relations Act, 
    29 U.S.C. §§ 158
    (a)(1) and (3), by terminating
    Hollowood on account of protected concerted activity. St. Luke’s petitions for review
    of the Board order, and the Board cross-petitions for enforcement. We grant the
    petition for review and deny enforcement.
    The primary duties of a labor and delivery RNFA are to assist surgeons in
    Cesarean-sections, tubal ligations, and hysterectomies performed in St. Luke’s
    obstetrical operating rooms. In August 1997, St. Luke’s advised the eight labor and
    delivery RNFAs that the hospital would alter their work assignments from two
    twenty-four-hour shifts to four twelve-hour shifts each week, increase their non-
    surgical patient care duties, and replace three RNFAs with lesser-trained operating
    room staff. The RNFAs opposed these changes. All but one declined to stay in the
    labor and delivery department working twelve-hour shifts, instead accepting St.
    Luke’s offer of twenty-four-hour RNFA positions in other surgery departments.
    Hollowood objected because twenty-four-hour shifts gave her more time to work at
    a second job and because she did not want to take on more non-surgical patient
    duties. However, she agreed to continue working twenty-four-hour shifts in the labor
    and delivery department during a transition period, where she helped train new nurses
    for the open RNFA positions.
    In the ensuing months, the labor and delivery RNFAs complained to physicians
    and hospital administrators that patient care would be compromised by these changes.
    In addition, Hollowood and Mike O’Neil, an operating room RNFA, used this dispute
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    to renew their efforts to organize St. Luke’s nurses on behalf of the Union. By March
    1998, O’Neil, Hollowood, and a “core group of coworkers” were openly campaigning
    to organize St. Luke’s nurses. Hollowood testified that she persuaded forty-two
    nurses to sign petitions to be represented by the Union. St. Luke’s concedes it was
    aware of Hollowood’s participation in these organizing activities.
    On June 1, O’Neil, Hollowood, and a contract physician in the labor and
    delivery department arranged to be interviewed by a reporter for a local TV station.
    Part of the interview appeared on that evening’s news, with Hollowood’s remarks
    playing a lead role:
    ANCHOR: Our top story at ten, some doctors and nurses at St. Luke’s
    Hospital are angry about changes they say threaten the health of
    expectant mothers in the delivery room.
    ANCHOR 2: The changes affect the medical teams that perform C-
    sections at St. Luke’s. . . .
    REPORTER: Well Rick and Karen there are eight specially trained
    nurses that assist staff obstetricians with C-sections at St. Luke’s. They
    each have anywhere between 15 to 23 years of seniority with the
    hospital and a whole lot of experience. Until recently, the nurses
    worked on a system of 24 hour shifts they say was essential to the care
    of mothers ready to deliver. Well, now the RNs accuse the hospital of
    cutting their shift in order to replace them with less qualified employees.
    Registered nurse first assistant Carol Hollowood says when a
    patient comes into the delivery room at St. Luke’s, she’s treated like a
    member of the family. But Hollowood accuses the powers that be of
    jeopardizing the health of mothers and babies by offering her and her
    counterparts short shifts and more responsibilities.
    CAROL HOLLOWOOD R.N.: Initially two years ago we had three
    people on a 24 hour shift, because, as we said before, Dr. Gearhart said,
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    that labor and delivery you have emergencies that can happen not one
    at a time but possibly two at a time where we needed a crew of people
    that were qualified to assume the responsibility of these emergencies for
    mother and baby. And then two years ago, they reduced to two and
    didn’t allow us to do two sections at one time or two cases at one time
    in labor and delivery. And now what they’re trying to do is have one
    person cover what three people did two years ago.
    REPORTER: Hollowood opted to transfer to another section of the
    hospital. She’s certain that her replacement won’t have her
    qualifications.
    Following Hollowood’s statement, the contract physician complained that nurses
    were being replaced by “patient care technicians.” O’Neil then stated that nurses
    would use collective bargaining “to refocus the issues back on the patient and fight
    for their rights for adequate staffing.”
    At the Board hearing, hospital administrators testified that, in the three days
    following June 1, they received strong negative reactions to Hollowood’s public
    statement from many St. Luke’s physicians and nurses. On June 2, Dr. George
    Tucker, the hospital’s president, received a hand-written note from Dr. Ron
    Leidenfrost, the chief cardiovascular surgeon, stating that if the two disloyal nurses
    were still employed at the hospital, “please keep them out of my work areas -- they
    are poison to this organization.” Dr. David Krajcovic, Chief of Surgery, complained
    to Tucker personally and then wrote on June 4: “I do not care to have [Hollowood]
    work in my room during OR procedures.” Dr. Carlton Pearse, an OBGYN surgeon
    responsible for training RNFAs, wrote on June 4: “Since Carol’s public statements,
    the staff on the L&D floors have indicated that they do not wish to work with her and
    feel she will be constantly watching them to see if they do anything wrong and then
    run and tell the media. . . . I will not work with her or have her deal with my patients.”
    Gail Wagner, Vice President of Patient Services, testified that physicians and staff
    were very upset that Hollowood had publicly said “they weren’t competent and that
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    things were unsafe for the patients, which was not the case.” Patricia Geldbach,
    Director of Surgical Services, testified that Hollowood’s remarks were “the talk of the
    operating room” the day after the news broadcast. Dr. Druck, President of St. Luke’s
    medical staff, an elected position, told Geldbach “that 90 percent of the physicians
    in the doctor’s lounge were very angry [and] were very concerned about what this
    was going to do to the hospital.” Janette Gunn, Patient Care Manager for the labor
    and delivery department, testified she had never seen an adverse staff reaction so
    widespread and extreme. Consistent with her testimony at the hearing, labor and
    delivery RNFA Susan Browning wrote St. Luke’s on June 5, explaining that
    Hollowood’s accusations were false and concluding:
    Hollowood has been undermining the RNFA program for six months.
    She has made derogatory comments about me and administration in
    front of physicians. I will no longer work with her. It has been a
    difficult situation for six months, now it is untenable.
    On June 5, acting at the direction of Dr. Tucker, Hollowood’s supervisor
    delivered a letter explaining that she was terminated immediately because “[b]y your
    actions and behavior, you have created an atmosphere of distrust and enmity, and
    physicians and nurses have now refused to work with you as a result of your
    wrongfully disparaging their professionalism and performance.” The Union promptly
    filed this unfair labor practice charge.
    Under sections 8(a)(1) and (3),“it is undisputed that if the employer fires an
    employee for having engaged in union activities and has no other basis for the
    discharge, or if the reasons that he proffers are pretextual, the employer commits an
    unfair labor practice.” N.L.R.B. v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 
    462 U.S. 393
    , 398
    (1983). Following the hearing, the Board’s administrative law judge ruled that
    Hollowood’s termination was an unfair labor practice, concluding that her television
    statement was protected concerted activity because it was not maliciously false, that
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    the Board’s General Counsel “made a prima facie showing” that the statement and
    Hollowood’s earlier activities on behalf of the Union were the motivating factors
    behind her discharge, and that St. Luke’s stated reason for the discharge -- that
    adverse staff reaction had rendered Hollowood unemployable -- was not credible and
    therefore pretextual. The Board affirmed, ordering Hollowood’s reinstatement with
    back pay and rejecting St. Luke’s stated reason for the discharge because “the
    subjective feelings of Hollowood’s coworkers are not a relevant consideration in
    determining whether [the] discharge of Hollowood was unlawful.” Four legal and
    factual errors require us to reject the ALJ’s and the Board’s analysis.
    First, we reject the ALJ’s legal conclusion that Hollowood’s public statement
    was protected activity unless maliciously false. Section 10(c) of the National Labor
    Relations Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (c), prohibits the Board from ordering the
    reinstatement of any employee “if such individual was suspended or discharged for
    cause.” In N.L.R.B. v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW, 
    346 U.S. 464
    , 477-78 (1953),
    the Supreme Court upheld the discharge of striking technicians who had distributed
    handbills on the picket line disparaging their employer’s television programming:
    Even if the attack were to be treated . . . as a concerted activity wholly
    or partly within the scope of those mentioned in § 7, the means used by
    the technicians in conducting the attack have deprived the attackers of
    the protection of that section, when read in the light and context of the
    purpose of the Act.
    Applying Local 1229, we held in N.L.R.B. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
    660 F.2d 354
    ,
    356 (8th Cir. 1981), that employee public statements are protected concerted activity
    “if they are directly related to an ongoing labor dispute, are not a disparagement of
    the Company’s reputation or the quality of the Company’s product, and are not
    maliciously motivated.” (Emphasis added); accord Community Hosp. of Roanoke
    Valley, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 
    538 F.2d 607
    , 610 (4th Cir. 1976) (nurse’s public statements
    protected because true and directly related to terms and conditions of employ). These
    -6-
    cases establish that an employee exceeds the boundaries of protected activity when
    she falsely and publicly disparages her employer or its products and services. An
    employee may not appeal to the public by conveying information with “reckless
    disregard of its truth or falsity.” Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. N.L.R.B., 
    621 F.2d 510
    , 517 (2d Cir. 1980).
    In this case, we agree with the ALJ that Hollowood’s public statement related
    to an ongoing labor dispute concerning the terms and conditions of her employ. And
    we accept the ALJ’s finding that the statement was not malicious in the sense of being
    the product of an evil motive. But Hollowood clearly disparaged the quality of
    patient care being provided by St. Luke’s in a way guaranteed to adversely affect the
    hospital’s reputation with prospective patients and the public at large. And St. Luke’s
    proved that the disparagement was materially false:
    • Hollowood falsely stated that the changes left St. Luke’s labor and delivery
    operating rooms understaffed because emergencies “can happen not one at a time but
    possibly two at a time.” She knew or should have known that St. Luke’s averages one
    emergency C-section a month and has never had to deal with two at one time.
    • Hollowood falsely stated that St. Luke’s had reduced the labor and delivery
    staffing from three RNFAs to two “and didn’t allow us to do two sections at one
    time.” There was no such prohibition, and her suggestion that two RNFAs on duty
    jeopardized patient care was false because there are only two labor and delivery
    operating rooms, one of which was always available for emergencies.
    • Hollowood falsely stated that St. Luke’s is “trying to . . . have one person
    cover what three people did two years ago.” Under the new staffing procedure, three
    trained professionals are assigned to each C-section team, but only one is an RNFA.
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    • Hollowood’s statement that “her replacement won’t have her qualifications”
    was materially misleading. In June 1998, the new RNFAs did not have the same level
    of labor and delivery experience as the departing RNFAs, but they had the same or
    better training to prepare for the position, and all had extensive operating room
    experience. For example, Hollowood’s replacement, Susan Browning, had
    substantial operating room experience and the same training as Hollowood.
    Hollowood’s June 1 statement accused St. Luke’s of “jeopardizing the health
    of mothers and babies” by depleting its staff of labor and delivery RNFAs, reducing
    the effectiveness of the remaining RNFAs by increasing their duties, and providing
    less qualified replacements. The statement was materially false and misleading. It
    is contrary to the public interest, and serves no legitimate purpose of the National
    Labor Relations Act, to falsely declare in a televised news interview that a hospital
    is risking the health of its patients. We reject the Board’s finding that Hollowood’s
    televised statement to the reporter (as opposed to her other activities on behalf of the
    Union) was protected concerted activity. As we said in N.L.R.B. v. Red Top, Inc.,
    
    455 F.2d 721
    , 726 (8th Cir. 1972), “assuming arguendo that the employees were
    engaged in protected activity, there is a point where their methods of engaging in that
    activity would take them outside the protection of the Act.” Accord Earle Indus., Inc.
    v. N.L.R.B., 
    75 F.3d 400
    , 405-07 (8th Cir. 1996).
    Second, the ALJ erred in ruling that, when the Board’s General Counsel
    presented a prima facie case that Hollowood was discharged for protected concerted
    activity, St. Luke’s had the burden to prove that it would have discharged her anyway.
    The Board’s General Counsel “has the burden of proving” that the employee’s
    protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the discharge.
    Transportation Mgmt., 
    462 U.S. at 401
    . Only if the General Counsel proves that anti-
    union animus was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to discharge does
    the burden shift to the employer to prove it would have made the same decision
    -8-
    absent the employee’s protected activity. See Wilson Trophy Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 
    989 F.2d 1502
    , 1510 (8th Cir. 1993).
    In this case, the difference between presenting a prima facie case and satisfying
    the ultimate burden of persuasion is material. Hollowood openly campaigned for the
    Union for months prior to the June 1 television broadcast, without adverse action by
    St. Luke’s. O’Neil had for years been the primary union supporter among St. Luke’s
    nurses. He appeared on the same June 1 broadcast but was not fired or otherwise
    disciplined.1 These circumstances strongly support the uncontradicted testimony by
    numerous St. Luke’s witnesses that Hollowood was terminated only because of
    widespread physician and staff reaction to her materially false public statement.
    Thus, the ALJ’s misstatement of the law precludes enforcement of the Board’s order.
    Third, we reject the Board’s legal conclusion that the reactions of Hollowood’s
    coworkers to her false public statement “are not a relevant consideration.” An
    employer establishes an affirmative defense by proving that a legitimate reason for
    the discharge would have brought about the discharge notwithstanding the General
    Counsel’s proof of an unlawful motive. GSX Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 
    918 F.2d 1351
    , 1357
    (8th Cir. 1990). Even within the bounds of otherwise protected concerted activity,
    an employer need not tolerate employee misconduct that is “flagrant or [that]
    render[s] the employee unfit for employment.” Carleton College v. N.L.R.B., 
    230 F.3d 1075
    , 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). Adverse coworker reaction to
    1
    Dr. Tucker testified that O’Neil was not disciplined because he promoted
    unionization without disparaging the abilities or the training of St. Luke’s medical
    staff or the care provided its patients. Inexplicably, the ALJ cited the disparity
    between St. Luke’s treatment of O’Neil and Hollowood as evidence of anti-union
    animus. In fact, it was evidence that Hollowood was not discharged because of her
    union activity. See N.L.R.B. v. Arkansas Grain Corp., 
    392 F.2d 161
    , 167 n.5 (8th
    Cir. 1968).
    -9-
    an employee’s materially false public disparagement is relevant in applying this
    standard.
    Fourth, substantial evidence on the record as a whole does not support the
    ALJ’s decision to discredit St. Luke’s stated reason for Hollowood’s discharge. In
    his written decision, the ALJ rejected the above-quoted physician letters reacting to
    Hollowood’s public statement because the physicians did not testify. Yet the letters
    were admitted into evidence without objection from the General Counsel’s trial
    attorney, from the Union’s attorney, or from Hollowood’s attorney, and without
    comment by the ALJ during the hearing that physician testimony was needed.
    Moreover, the critical question was whether the hospital administrators credited the
    oral and written comments by physicians that they would not work with Hollowood
    after she had publicly denigrated the quality of their patient care.
    Patient lives are at stake in hospital surgeries, and medical professionals are
    devoted to providing the highest quality patient care. Common sense teaches that
    patient care is directly affected by the ability of a team of physicians and nurses to
    work together in the confines of an operating room; that a hospital must not risk
    staffing the operating room with doctors and nurses who cannot work effectively
    together; and that surgeons cannot be expected to tolerate operating room staff who
    seem to be more interested in publicizing flaws in the process than in helping protect
    the patient. Here, Dr. Tucker testified that he made the decision to terminate
    Hollowood after hearing adverse physician and staff reaction to her public statement
    that was more widespread and extreme than any he had ever witnessed. This
    testimony was corroborated by numerous other hospital administrators. It is
    inherently credible that physicians and nurses falsely accused of “jeopardizing the
    health of mothers and babies” would react in this fashion. Thus, there is
    overwhelming evidence that St. Luke’s terminated Hollowood, not because of her
    union activities, but because her false and disparaging public statement alienated her
    from her most important coworkers and made her continued employment untenable.
    -10-
    The Board’s decision to the contrary will not be enforced because the ALJ’s
    credibility determinations are not supported by substantial evidence and the
    inferences drawn by the ALJ and the Board are inherently incredible. See Carleton
    College, 
    230 F.3d at 1078
     (explaining how the substantial evidence test is applied);
    N.L.R.B. v. Prescott Int’l Prods. Co., 
    500 F.2d 6
    , 11 (8th Cir. 1974).
    For each of the foregoing reasons, we grant St. Luke’s petition for review and
    deny enforcement of the Board’s order.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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