United States v. Francisco Jimenez-Arzate ( 2015 )


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  •                        FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                           No. 12-50373
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                         3:12-cr-01421-LAB-1
    FRANCISCO JIMENEZ-ARZATE,
    Defendant-Appellant.                      ORDER AND
    AMENDED
    OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    November 19, 2014—Pasadena, California
    Filed January 12, 2015
    Amended March 30, 2015
    Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Kim McLane Wardlaw,
    Circuit Judges, and Matthew F. Kennelly, District Judge.*
    Order;
    Per Curiam Opinion
    *
    The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    2             UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE
    SUMMARY**
    Criminal Law
    The panel amended an opinion, filed January 12, 2015,
    affirming a sentence for illegal reentry after deportation;
    denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied on behalf of
    the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which
    the district court found that the defendant’s prior conviction
    for violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is
    categorically a crime of violence for federal sentencing
    purposes.
    The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that United
    States v. Grajeda, 
    581 F.3d 1186
    (9th Cir. 2009), which held
    that a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of
    violence, is no longer good law in light of People v.
    Aznavoleh, 
    148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901
    (Ct. App. 2012), and People
    v. Wyatt, 
    229 P.3d 156
    (Cal. 2010).
    The panel held that Ceron v. Holder, 
    747 F.3d 773
    (9th
    Cir. 2014) (en banc), does not abrogate Grajeda. The panel
    observed that Ceron, which addresses whether a § 245(a)(1)
    conviction is categorically a crime of moral turpitude, does
    not address the question of whether a § 245(a)(1) conviction
    is categorically a crime of violence; and that Ceron, which
    relied exclusively on the identical language from People v.
    Williams, 
    29 P.3d 197
    (Cal. 2001), that is quoted in Grajeda,
    does not clearly indicate a different interpretation of the mens
    rea requirement for § 245(a)(1) than that set forth in Grajeda.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE                  3
    The panel held that there was justification for the district
    court’s exercise of discretion in imposing supervised release.
    COUNSEL
    Vincent J. Brunkow (argued), Kara Lee Hartzler, Federal
    Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, California, for
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section,
    Criminal Division, Andrew R. Haden (briefed), Assistant
    United States Attorney, and Mark R. Rehe (argued), Andrew
    R. Haden, United States Attorney’s Office, San Diego,
    California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    ORDER
    The opinion filed on January 12, 2015, and appearing at
    
    776 F.3d 662
    , is amended as follows:
    On Opinion page 664, replace the paragraph beginning
    “Ceron v. Holder, 
    747 F.3d 773
    (9th Cir.2014) (en banc),
    addresses the question” with the following:
    Ceron v. Holder, 
    747 F.3d 773
    (9th Cir.
    2014) (en banc), does not abrogate Grajeda’s
    holding that a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is
    categorically a crime of violence. 
    Grajeda, 581 F.3d at 1197
    . Ceron addresses the
    question of whether a conviction under
    California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is
    4          UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE
    categorically a crime of moral turpitude. It
    does not address the question of whether a
    conviction under § 245(a)(1) is categorically
    a crime of violence. Furthermore, in Ceron,
    we discussed the mens rea requirement for
    § 245(a)(1), relying exclusively on the
    California Supreme Court’s opinion in
    
    Williams, 29 P.3d at 202
    –03. 
    Ceron, 747 F.3d at 779
    , 784. However, the identical language
    from Williams is also quoted in Grajeda. See
    
    Grajeda, 581 F.3d at 1194
    . Accordingly,
    Ceron does not clearly indicate a different
    interpretation of the mens rea requirement for
    § 245(a)(1) than that set forth in Grajeda.
    With the opinion thus amended, the panel has voted
    unanimously to deny the petition for rehearing. Judge
    Wardlaw has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc,
    and Judges Kleinfeld and Kennelly recommended denial.
    The full court has been advised of the petition for
    rehearing and no active judge of the court has requested a
    vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P.
    35.
    The petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en
    banc is DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing or
    petitions for rehearing en banc will be entertained.
    UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE                  5
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Francisco Jimenez-Arzate pleaded guilty to having
    illegally re-entered the United States after having previously
    been deported. The district court sentenced him to 34 months
    in prison and three years of supervised release. He timely
    appeals his sentence.
    Jimenez-Arzate argues that the district court erred in
    finding that his prior conviction for violation of California
    Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence
    for federal sentencing purposes. He contends that United
    States v. Grajeda, 
    581 F.3d 1186
    (9th Cir. 2009), is no longer
    good law in light of People v. Aznavoleh, 
    148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901
    (Ct. App. 2012), and People v. Wyatt, 
    229 P.3d 156
    (Cal.
    2010). Jimenez-Arzate also argues that Ceron v. Holder,
    
    747 F.3d 773
    (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), abrogates Grajeda.
    We disagree. Aznavoleh involved a defendant who
    intentionally ran a red light while racing another car down the
    street even though he saw a car entering the intersection on
    the green. People v. Aznavoleh, 
    148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901
    , 905,
    908 (Ct. App. 2012). The defendant made no effort to stop
    despite a passenger warning him that he needed to stop. 
    Id. at 904.
    The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial
    court’s finding that the defendant met the willfulness element
    of assault under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which the
    California Court of Appeal defined as intentionality. 
    Id. at 906.
    Wyatt involved a father who, while play wrestling with
    his infant son, struck the boy with such force that he killed
    6           UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE
    him. People v. Wyatt, 
    229 P.3d 156
    , 157 (Cal. 2010). The
    Wyatt court upheld the father’s conviction for involuntary
    manslaughter and assault on a child causing death because
    “substantial evidence established that defendant knew he was
    striking his young son with his fist, forearm, knee, and elbow,
    and that he used an amount of force a reasonable person
    would realize was likely to result in great bodily injury.” 
    Id. As did
    the California Court of Appeal in Aznavoleh, the
    California Supreme Court in Wyatt explained that “a
    defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that
    would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would
    directly, naturally and probably result from his conduct. He
    may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but
    should have known.” 
    Id. at 159
    (quoting People v. Williams,
    
    29 P.3d 197
    , 203 (Cal. 2001)).
    Contrary to Jimenez-Arzate’s argument, Aznavoleh did
    not hold that an automobile accident stemming from merely
    reckless driving may result in a conviction under § 245(a)(1).
    The defendant in Aznavoleh engaged in street racing,
    heedlessly disregarding a perceived likelihood of death or
    grave injury to others. Likewise, in Wyatt, a reasonable
    person would have recognized the dangers of striking a child
    with the deadly force used, even if the defendant was not
    subjectively aware of the risks of his “play wrestling” with
    the child in that manner.
    Ceron v. Holder, 
    747 F.3d 773
    (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc),
    does not abrogate Grajeda’s holding that a conviction under
    § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence. 
    Grajeda, 581 F.3d at 1197
    . Ceron addresses the question of whether
    a conviction under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is
    categorically a crime of moral turpitude. It does not address
    the question of whether a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is
    UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE                   7
    categorically a crime of violence. Furthermore, in Ceron, we
    discussed the mens rea requirement for § 245(a)(1), relying
    exclusively on the California Supreme Court’s opinion in
    
    Williams, 29 P.3d at 202
    –03. 
    Ceron, 747 F.3d at 779
    , 784.
    However, the identical language from Williams is also quoted
    in Grajeda. See 
    Grajeda, 581 F.3d at 1194
    . Accordingly,
    Ceron does not clearly indicate a different interpretation of
    the mens rea requirement for § 245(a)(1) than that set forth in
    Grajeda.
    Jimenez-Arzate also argues that the district court abused
    its discretion in imposing a term of supervised release
    because he would be deported as an illegal alien upon his
    release. Here, the district court made an individualized
    finding that supervised release was warranted because of
    Jimenez-Arzate’s consistent history of sneaking back into the
    United States after deportation. The district court specifically
    noted that Jimenez-Arzate had previously been deported three
    times and that “[t]he three wags of fingers in his face saying
    ‘stay out, stay out or you’re going to be subject to
    prosecution’ didn’t do any good.” The district judge also
    noted that he “can’t trust [Jimenez-Arzate’s] assurance he’s
    not going to come back” because “[h]e probably gave that
    assurance on three prior occasions, and yet he’s back again
    committing crimes.” The district judge concluded that
    supervised release was necessary to protect the public and
    deter Jimenez-Arzate from returning to the United States.
    There was justification for the district court’s exercise of
    discretion in imposing supervised release.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-50373

Filed Date: 3/30/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/30/2015