Olaniyi v. Alexa Cab Co ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    4-3-2007
    Olaniyi v. Alexa Cab Co
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-3104
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    Recommended Citation
    "Olaniyi v. Alexa Cab Co" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1362.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1362
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NO. 06-3104
    ADEGOKE OLANIYI; LAMINE SANOU;
    SOLANGE CHADDA; OLAH BESSID;
    FENELON NORELIEN
    v.
    ALEXA CAB CO; TOMORROW FINANCING;
    FIRST KEYSTONE; MIKE ETEMAD; CHRIS STEWART;
    BANCO POPULAR; RANA CAB CO
    Solange Chadda,
    Appellant
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-05250)
    District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
    __________________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    April 2, 2007
    Before: RENDELL, COWEN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: April 3, 2007)
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Solange Chadda, along with four others, filed a complaint and amended
    complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    styled as a class action suit seeking damages against numerous defendants for their
    alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
    § 1964 (“RICO”). Chadda’s main allegations focused on fraud with respect to certain
    mortgage transactions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaints pursuant to,
    inter alia, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). After allowing for the filing of amended
    complaints, the District Court conducted two hearings at the conclusion of which it
    granted defendants’ motions and dismissed Chadda’s complaint. This timely appeal
    followed.1
    We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
    exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant defendants’ motions to
    dismiss. See Petruska v. Gannon University, 
    462 F.3d 294
    , 299 and n.1 (3d Cir. 2006).
    We accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences
    that can be drawn therefrom. 
    Id. We will
    affirm a dismissal for failure to state a claim if
    we can “say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we
    hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears
    ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which
    would entitle [her] to relief.’” McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 
    88 F.3d 188
    , 189 (3d
    Cir. 1996) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972)). For the reasons that
    1
    We note that only the appeal of appellant Chadda is before the Court. The
    appeals filed by her co-plaintiffs and docketed at C.A. Nos. 06-3105 and 06-3106 were
    procedurally terminated by the Clerk without judicial action pursuant to L.A.R. 3.3 and
    L.A.R. Misc. 107.1(a).
    2
    follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal.
    Initially, we note our agreement with appellee Banco Popular’s position that the
    District Court’s alleged violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 does not warrant relief from this
    Court. Put quite simply, the District Court did not improperly permit Mr. Heartmann St.
    Croix to intervene in the proceedings below as asserted by Chadda in her informal
    appellate brief. The record clearly shows that, while the District Court allowed Mr. St.
    Croix to offer testimony at one of the hearings, Mr. St. Croix did not seek to intervene in
    the underlying proceedings and the court understood that he was not a plaintiff in this
    particular lawsuit. See N.T. from Hearing of 5/16/06 at p. 43.
    We further agree with the District Court’s determination that Chadda’s complaint
    suffered from numerous fatal deficiencies. As the District Court noted, to the extent
    Chadda and her co-plaintiffs were simply seeking to challenge the decision issued by
    Judge Sanchez in Sanou, et al. v. Etemad, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 05-cv-03871, they were
    required to do so by filing a motion for reconsideration in that case or seeking appellate
    review of the order of dismissal in this Court.
    Additionally, the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v.
    Guardian Life Ins. Co., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377 (1994). The District Courts have jurisdiction
    over federal questions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and actions involving parties of diverse
    citizenship when there is a certain minimum amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. §
    1332(a). While the RICO authorizes civil suits by any persons injured in their business or
    property by reason of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, see Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
    3
    Fidelcor, Inc., 
    926 F.2d 1406
    , 1411 (3d Cir. 1991), the allegations of mortgage fraud and
    identity theft set forth in Chadda’s amended complaint do not state such a claim. See
    Lum v. Bank of America, 
    361 F.3d 217
    , 223-24 (3d Cir.2004) (In order to plead a
    violation of RICO, a plaintiff must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a
    pattern (4) of racketeering activity,” and must satisfy the heightened pleading requirement
    of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) where the claim is based on a predicate act of fraud.). See also
    Kehr 
    Packages, 926 F.2d at 1412
    (noting that the Supreme Court stressed in H.J. Inc. v.
    Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 
    492 U.S. 229
    , 239 (1989), that a plaintiff must show
    “that the racketeering acts are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of
    continued criminal activity.”).
    The District Court was thus correct to conclude that Chadda’s complaint fails to
    state a claim under its federal question jurisdiction, and that her fraud allegations – which
    are between parties who are not diverse – must be pursued in state court. See 28 U.S.C.
    § 1332(a)(1); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 
    48 F.3d 693
    , 696 (3d Cir. 1995)
    (recognizing that to satisfy § 1332(a)(1) jurisdiction no plaintiff can be a citizen of the
    same state as any defendant). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s final order
    of dismissal.
    4