ROBERT J. TRIFFIN VS. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY (DC-010038-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0628-17T2
    ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND
    GAS COMPANY, (d/b/a) PSE&G,
    Defendant-Respondent,
    and
    TIENNA MOORE, STEPHANIE JUSTE and
    NADIYAH KNOLTON,
    Defendants.
    _____________________________________
    Argued October 2, 2018 – Decided October 15, 2018
    Before Judges Fisher and Firko.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-010038-14.
    Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
    Respondent has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff appeals from the trial court order denying costs and post-
    judgment interest. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the oral
    opinion rendered by Judge Deborah M. Gross-Quatrone.
    The parties are familiar with the procedural history and facts of this
    case, and, therefore, they will not be repeated in detail here. 1
    Plaintiff sought "appellate costs" in the sum of $1,024.33.             In her
    decision, the judge found that:
    Plaintiff did not - - contrary to [p]laintiff's assertion - -
    derive any benefit from the appeal. Plaintiff's benefit,
    if any, came by way of the trial court's decision. He's
    woefully defeated in the Appellate Division. To
    follow [p]laintiff's arguments to a logical conclusion,
    every plaintiff who had recovered something at the
    trial level - - and here inclusive of the defendants in
    this case . . . would be a prevailing party and would be
    permitted then to bring an appeal virtually free of cost,
    even if they ultimately lose the appeal.
    The judge concluded that plaintiff was not the "prevailing party on
    appeal."
    In his brief on appeal, plaintiff argues:
    1
    The chronology is set forth in this court's unpublished opinion entered on
    October 5, 2016 in which we remanded and directed the trial court to make a
    determination of court costs. We incorporate, by reference, the facts stated in
    our prior opinion to the extent they are consistent with those developed on
    remand.
    A-0628-17T2
    2
    POINT ONE
    MOTION      JUDGE     GROSS-QUATRONE
    COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN SHE
    MISAPPREHENDED    THE   NEW    JERSEY
    STANDARDS FOR A PARTY TO RECOVER
    HIS/HER COURT COSTS UNDER COURT RULE
    4:42-8.
    POINT TWO
    MOTION       JUDGE      GROSS-QUATRONE
    PREJUDICIALLY ABUSED HER DISCRETION
    AND COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
    SHE DENIED TRIFFIN'S REQUEST UNDER RULE
    4:42-11 TO RECOVER STATUTORY POST-
    JUDGMENT    INTEREST    AND   APPELLATE
    EXPENSES.
    We review costs and interest determinations for an abuse of discretion
    and same will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions. See, e.g., Rendine
    v. Pantzer, 
    141 N.J. 292
    , 317 (1995). "Unless otherwise provided by law . . .
    costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party."      TWC Realty
    P'ship v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Edison, 
    321 N.J. Super. 216
    ,
    217 (App. Div. 1999) (citing R. 4:42:8(a)); see also Gallo v. Salesian Soc'y
    Inc., 
    290 N.J. Super. 616
    , 659-60 (App. Div. 1996); Regino v. Aetna Cas. &
    Sur. Co., 
    200 N.J. Super. 94
    , 100 (App. Div. 1985). A "high threshold" is
    imposed "for exercise of the court's limited discretion respecting cost . . . ."
    TWC Realty P'ship., 
    321 N.J. Super. at 217
    .
    A-0628-17T2
    3
    Rule 4:42-8(a) provides as follows: "Unless otherwise provided by law,
    these rules or court order, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
    party." Plaintiff argues that the judge's interpretation of Rule 4:42-8(a) is not
    entitled to any deference when reviewed by this court. We reject plaintiff's
    argument because a trial court's ruling on discretionary matters will not be
    reversed on appeal absent a "clear error in judgment." In re Estate of Hope,
    
    390 N.J. Super. 533
    , 541 (App. Div. 2007).
    Our New Jersey Supreme Court has also adopted a definition of
    "prevailing party" status, holding:
    Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly
    benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement
    . . . [A] plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the
    merits of his [or her] claim materially alters the legal
    relationship between the parties by modifying the
    defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the
    plaintiff.
    Tarr v. Ciasulli, 
    181 N.J. 70
    , 86 (2004) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 
    506 U.S. 103
    ,
    111-12 (1992)); see also Warrington v. Village Supermarket, Inc., 
    328 N.J. Super. 410
    , 421 (App. Div. 2000) (applying the Third Circuit's "prevailing
    party" standard, which focuses on whether a "plaintiff succeeds in 'moving the
    defendant to do more than it was already committed to do . . . .'" (citing Ashley
    v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
    794 F.2d 128
    , 136 (3d Cir. 1986))).
    A-0628-17T2
    4
    There is ample support in the record for the judge's determination that
    plaintiff is not a prevailing party as defined by Rule 4:42-8(a).
    Plaintiff's remaining argument, including his claim for post-judgment
    interest, is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
    R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A) and (E).
    Affirmed.
    A-0628-17T2
    5