United States v. Keith Fields ( 2003 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 02-3266
    ___________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Plaintiff-Appellee,       *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the Northern
    * District of Iowa.
    Keith Fields,                          *
    *
    Defendant-Appellant.      *
    ___________
    Submitted: March 11, 2003
    Filed: April 8, 2003
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
    Keith Fields pled guilty to one count of selling child pornography in violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2252
    (a)(3)(B). The district court1 sentenced Fields to 57 months in
    prison, followed by a three year term of supervised release under special conditions
    that restrict his use of computers and the internet. Fields appeals the conditions, and
    we affirm.
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    The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, Chief Judge, United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa.
    In the summer of 2001 Fields created lolitagurls.com, an internet site that
    provided subscribers access to "hard to find" and "shocking" nude pictures of "girls
    age 12–17." The site generated over $22,000 in revenue for Fields in the
    approximately eight months it was in operation.
    Fields was indicted for possession of child pornography and was later charged
    by information with selling child pornography. He pled guilty to the latter charge and
    was sentenced to 57 months and three years supervised release. Special conditions
    were placed on his release, two of which are the subject of this appeal. Condition
    seven prohibits Fields from "owning or operating any photographic equipment
    including … computers, scanners, and printers," and condition eight states that he
    may not have internet service in his residence and may only possess a computer if he
    is granted permission by his probation officer and agrees to periodic inspections and
    other restrictions.
    On appeal Fields argues that special conditions seven and eight are not
    reasonably related to the statutory purposes underlying conditions of release and that
    they involve a "greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary," in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    . He also raises two constitutional claims, arguing that
    the conditions are unconstitutionally vague and that they amount to cruel and unusual
    punishment by burdening his ability to find employment. Because Fields did not
    object to the special conditions at the sentencing hearing, he would be entitled to no
    more than plain error review. See United States v. Crose, 
    284 F.3d 911
    , 912 (8th Cir.
    2002).
    A sentencing court is afforded "wide discretion when imposing terms of
    supervised release" within the statutory framework provided by Congress. 
    Id.
     Under
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3583
    (d)(1) and 3553(a), special conditions on a term of supervised
    release must be "reasonably related" to the following factors—the nature and
    circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant,
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    deterrence of criminal conduct, protection of the public from further crimes of the
    defendant, and needed educational or vocational training, medical care or other
    correctional treatment. Section 3583(d)(2) also requires that the special conditions
    involve "no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary" to advance
    the statutory purposes.
    The widespread use of computers and the internet have provided new
    opportunities to deal in and view child pornography, and courts have fashioned some
    special conditions of release for defendants convicted of such crimes to place
    restrictions on their use of computers and the internet. Appellate courts have
    overturned conditions seen as overly restrictive, especially in cases involving simple
    possession of child pornography. See United States v. Sofsky, 
    287 F.3d 122
    ,
    124–126 (2d Cir. 2002) (conditions forbidding use of computers and internet without
    permission from probation officer limited access to important source of information
    and communication); see also United States v. Freeman, 
    316 F.3d 386
    , 391–92 (3d
    Cir. 2003); United States v. White, 
    244 F.3d 1199
    , 1205–07 (10th Cir. 2001); but see
    United States v. Zinn, 
    321 F.3d 1084
    , 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2003) (conditions upheld).
    In cases where defendants used computers or the internet to commit crimes involving
    greater exploitation, such restrictions have been upheld. See, e.g., United States v.
    Paul, 
    274 F.3d 155
    , 158 (5th Cir. 2001) (defendant possessed child pornography on
    his computer and used the internet to discuss ways to find "young friends"); United
    States v. Crandon, 
    173 F.3d 122
    , 125 (3d Cir. 1999) (defendant used the internet to
    meet a fourteen year old girl with whom he engaged in sexual activity and took
    pornographic pictures).
    There is no doubt in this case that special conditions seven and eight are
    reasonably related to the statutory factors for supervised release. Limits on Fields'
    use of computers and the internet are obviously related to the circumstances of his
    offense—running a child pornography website for profit. The conditions are
    calculated to deter Fields from repeating his illegal activity and to protect the public
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    from similar conduct. See Zinn, 
    321 F.3d at
    1092–93; Paul, 
    274 F.3d at 169
    .
    Although the restrictions could conceivably impact Fields' access to educational or
    vocational training, he points to no specific programs in which he is interested. He
    may also raise any concrete concerns with his probation officer and the district court
    if and when they arise.
    The key question here is whether the conditions involve a "greater deprivation
    of liberty than is reasonably necessary" to advance the statutory interests. Selling
    subscriptions to child pornography is more serious than a possessory offense. Fields'
    website exploited young girls for profit, and though he may not himself be a child
    predator, he made materials available for others who fit that description. Moreover,
    the conditions do not constitute a total ban on his use of computers or the internet.
    Although he is barred from using computers as photographic equipment and from
    having internet access in his home, he may use and even possess a computer with the
    permission of his probation officer. We find no abuse of discretion in the imposition
    of conditions seven and eight and certainly no plain error.
    Fields' constitutional claims are without merit. First, we find nothing vague
    about the conditions imposed by the district court and do not believe that providing
    a probation officer with discretion regarding Fields' computer use subjects him to
    arbitrary or selective enforcement of the law. Second, he cites no case in which a
    condition of supervised release was found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
    and instead supports his Eighth Amendment claim with citations to the United States
    Code and the United States Sentencing Guidelines requiring that occupational
    conditions be no more restrictive than necessary. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3563
    (b)(5) (2000);
    United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5F1.5 (Nov. 2002). We note that special
    conditions seven and eight do not by their terms impose any occupational restrictions
    and permit application to the probation officer to obtain greater access.
    We conclude that the district court did not deviate from any established legal
    4
    rule in setting the conditions of Fields' supervised release. See Crose, 
    284 F.3d at 912
    . We find no basis for plain error and no abuse of discretion, and the judgment
    of the district court is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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